Timothy R. Danker
SelectQuoteAbout Timothy R. Danker
Timothy R. Danker, 52, is the Chief Executive Officer and a director of SelectQuote, serving as CEO since 2017 and on the board since 2017 (board tenure ~8.5 years as of Sept 30, 2025) . He holds a B.S. in business administration from the University of Missouri and an MBA from the University of Kansas . Under his tenure, the company emphasizes Adjusted EBITDA, revenue, and operating cash flow in pay design; 2025 “compensation actually paid” for the PEO correlated with improved net income and adjusted EBITDA, while cumulative TSR remained challenged ($100 invested in FY2025 equated to $12.36) . The board separates the Chair and CEO roles, with an independent Chair, and classifies Danker as non-independent .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| SelectQuote | Chief Executive Officer; Director | 2017–present | Leads strategy; non-independent director |
| SelectQuote | President, Life Division | 2016–2019 | Led Life segment operations |
| SelectQuote | EVP, Life Division | 2015–2016 | Senior leadership in Life |
| SelectQuote | President, Auto & Home Division | 2012–2015 | Led A&H distribution |
| Spring Venture Group | Co‑founder & CEO | 2007–2012 | Built a senior healthcare insurance distribution platform |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| — | — | — | No current external public company directorships disclosed for Danker . |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | FY 2023 | FY 2024 | FY 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 525,000 | 540,750 | 556,973 |
| Target Annual Bonus (% of Salary) | — | — | 100% |
| Actual AIP (Non-Equity Incentive) ($) | 542,490 | 898,051 | 701,786 |
| Misc. Cash Bonus ($) | 256 | 495 | 629 |
Notes:
- FY25 base salaries for NEOs were reviewed; CEO base up 3% YoY to $556,973 .
Performance Compensation
Annual incentive plan (FY2025):
- Structure: 75% company performance; 25% individual goals .
- Metrics and weights: Revenue (33%), Adjusted EBITDA (33%), Operating Cash Flow (33%) .
- Payout curves: Revenue/EBITDA thresholds at 70% (40% payout) to 126% (200% payout); OCF threshold to max range with specified $ levels .
| Component | Weight | Target | Actual | Payout Basis |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (consolidated, $000s) | 33% | 1,447,950 | 1,522,391 | 105% of target |
| Adjusted EBITDA ($000s) | 33% | 106,388 | 126,220 | 119% of target |
| Operating Cash Flow ($000s) | 33% | (19,700) | (11,666) | At/above target scale |
FY2025 AIP outcomes for Danker:
- Company component payout: 138% of target .
- Individual component payout: 90% of target .
- Aggregate AIP payout: $701,786 (126% of total target) .
Long-term equity (FY2025 grants):
- Instruments: 50% RSUs (time-based, 3 equal annual tranches), 50% PVUs (price-vested units) with stock-price hurdles, 3 annual time-based tranches post-1-year and 5-year performance window; no options granted FY2025 .
- Price hurdles (FY2025 PVUs): $3.13, $6.00, $9.00 (60-day average required) .
| Grant (FY2025) | Target Grant Value ($) | RSUs (#) | PVUs (#) | Grant-Date Fair Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Timothy R. Danker | 2,400,000 | 383,387 | 383,387 | 2,212,143 |
Additional PVU hurdle schedules outstanding by grant cohort: 8/1/2022 ($4.00, $7.50, $10.00, $12.50); 9/13/2023 ($2.50, $5.00, $7.50, $10.00); 10/28/2024 ($3.13, $6.00, $9.00) .
Shares vested in FY2025:
- Danker: 562,193 shares; value realized $2,331,727 .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Beneficial ownership (as of Sept 20, 2025): 2,903,107 shares (includes 2,624,594 direct, 9,398 IRA, 269,115 options exercisable within 60 days); ~1.6% of shares outstanding .
- Options exercisable within 60 days: 269,115 . Selected option grants outstanding include 88,731 (8/1/2020, $17.89), 135,288/45,096 tranche (8/1/2021, $17.80) .
- Unvested RSUs at 6/30/25 by grant: 11,274 (2021), 176,860 (2022), 600,000 (2023), 511,183 (2024); PVUs at target: 600,000 (2022), 300,000 (2023), 255,591 (2024) .
- Stock ownership guideline: CEO 5x base salary; NEOs 3x; must retain 100% of net vested shares until in compliance; all NEOs in compliance as of record date .
- Hedging/pledging: Prohibited for directors and executive officers (hedging, margin, short sales, pledging), with narrow pre-cleared exceptions .
Employment Terms
Employment agreement highlights:
- Term: 3-year initial term; automatic 1-year renewals unless 90-day notice .
- Severance (no-cause or good reason): prorated annual bonus; lump sum = 1x (base + target bonus); COBRA reimbursement .
- Change-in-control severance (double-trigger; termination within 90 days prior or two years post-CoC): 2x (base + target bonus) for Danker; equity acceleration as specified (RSUs and options accelerate; PVUs accelerate time-vesting with performance based on deal price vs hurdles) .
- No excise tax gross-ups; best-net cutback applies .
Potential payments (as of 6/30/25):
| Scenario | Pro‑Rated Bonus ($) | Cash Severance ($) | Health ($) | Equity Acceleration ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Involuntary w/o cause or good reason | 556,973 | 1,113,946 | 19,817 | — | 1,690,736 |
| CoC + involuntary/good reason (double-trigger) | 556,973 | 2,227,892 | — | 3,092,375 | 5,877,240 |
Restrictive covenants:
- Non-compete and non-solicit generally 2 years post-termination (18 months for certain NEOs post-CoC unless severance multiple increased) .
Board Governance
- Board leadership: Independent Chair (Donald L. Hawks III); CEO and Chair roles separated .
- Board independence: All directors independent except Danker .
- Committees: Audit (Weldon Chair), Compensation and Talent Development (Devine Chair), Nominating & Corporate Governance (Hawks Chair), Healthcare Oversight (co‑chaired by Patel and Devanny); Danker serves on External Affairs Subcommittee (a subcommittee of Healthcare Oversight) .
- Attendance: Board held 4 meetings in FY2025; each director attended ≥75% of applicable meetings; all directors attended 2024 annual meeting .
- Director compensation: Employee directors receive no additional pay for board service (Danker receives none) .
Performance & Track Record
Company performance context (financials):
| Metric | FY 2023 | FY 2024 | FY 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenues ($) | 1,002,848,000 [GetFinancials]* | 1,321,776,000* [GetFinancials]* | 1,526,594,000 [GetFinancials] |
| Net Income ($) | (58,544,000) [GetFinancials] | (34,125,000) [GetFinancials] | 47,580,000 [GetFinancials] |
| EBITDA ($) | 48,896,000* [GetFinancials]* | 80,648,000* [GetFinancials]* | 85,168,000* [GetFinancials]* |
Values retrieved from S&P Global. Asterisk indicates the specific value lacked a direct document citation via the tool.
Pay-versus-performance and TSR indicators:
- PEO “compensation actually paid” (CAP): 2025 $2.99m; 2024 $5.30m; relates most closely to Adjusted EBITDA, revenue, and operating cash flow .
- TSR: Value of initial fixed $100 investment: 2022 $12.88; 2023 $10.12; 2024 $14.33; 2025 $12.36 .
Operational and capital actions highlighted in FY2025:
- Securitized $100m of commissions receivable; raised $350m preferred equity from Morgan Stanley and Bain; reduced total debt by nearly $300m; expanded pharmacy fulfillment capacity; Senior division Adjusted EBITDA margin ~27% .
Compensation Peer Group (for FY2025 program design)
Accolade; Alignment Healthcare; BRP Group; CarGurus; eHealth; EverQuote; GoHealth; GoodRx; HealthEquity; MediaAlpha; MultiPlan; Shutterstock; Tripadvisor; Trupanion; Veradigm; ZipRecruiter .
Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback
- 2024 say-on-pay support ~92% approval; committee maintained pay-for-performance structure for FY2025 and considered investor feedback .
Compensation Committee & Policies
- Independent consultant: Semler Brossy; assessed as independent; scope included peer group, plan design, risk, clawback policy implementation .
- Risk assessment: Programs not reasonably likely to have a material adverse effect; no timing of grants around MNPI .
- Clawback: Implemented pursuant to NYSE rules (committee oversaw development) .
Director Compensation (Danker as Director)
- As CEO and director, Danker receives no incremental director fees; director retainers and RSUs apply to non‑employee directors only .
Equity Ownership & Trading Signals
- Ownership alignment: Danker beneficially owns ~1.6% of shares; subject to 5x salary ownership guideline and strict anti-hedging/pledging policy .
- Vesting pipeline and potential selling pressure: Material RSU/PVU awards outstanding (e.g., 511,183 FY2024 RSUs; multiple PVU tranches) and 562,193 shares vested in FY2025 could contribute to periodic liquidity events around vesting dates, subject to 10b5‑1 plans and holding requirements .
Employment Contracts, Severance, and CoC Economics
- Double-trigger CoC; 2x multiple for CEO; equity treatment: RSUs/options accelerate upon qualifying termination; PVU performance satisfied only if deal price meets hurdles .
- No excise tax gross‑ups; best-net cutback .
- Non-compete/non-solicit provisions generally two years .
Board Governance (Danker-specific)
- Role: CEO and Class I director; non‑independent .
- Committee roles: Serves on External Affairs Subcommittee (Healthcare Oversight Committee subcommittee) .
- Dual-role implications: Separation of Chair/CEO and regular executive sessions of independent directors mitigate concentration of power; independent Chair presides in executive sessions .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment is explicit: AIP weighted to revenue, Adjusted EBITDA, and operating cash flow with above-target FY2025 payouts; LTI is 50% PVUs with stock-price hurdles, directly linking realizable pay to share price recovery .
- Governance mitigants: Independent Chair, robust anti-hedging/pledging, stock ownership guidelines (5x salary), double-trigger CoC, and no 280G gross-ups support investor alignment .
- Retention and liquidity dynamics: Significant unvested RSU/PVU overhang and ongoing vesting (562k shares vested FY2025) can create periodic supply; however, retention objectives and holding requirements may temper near-term selling .
- Performance trajectory: Financials improved in FY2025 (return to GAAP profitability; higher EBITDA), but multi-year TSR remains depressed (FY2025 $100 to $12.36); PVU design requires multi-year price hurdles to crystallize value, aligning CEO incentives with sustained stock recovery .