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Nicholas Pinchuk

Nicholas Pinchuk

Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer at Snap-onSnap-on
CEO
Executive
Board

About Nicholas Pinchuk

Nicholas T. Pinchuk, age 78, is Chairman, President, and CEO of Snap-on Incorporated (SNA), roles he has held since 2009 (Chairman) and 2007 (CEO); he joined Snap-on in 2002 after executive operational and financial roles at United Technologies and earlier engineering/finance roles at Ford. He holds BS and MS in engineering from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute and an MBA from Harvard Business School, and served as a U.S. Army officer in Vietnam . Under his leadership in 2024, net sales were $4.71B (-0.5% YoY), operating margin before financial services improved to 22.7% (+70 bps), and diluted EPS rose 4% to $19.51; five-year cumulative TSR reached 228.34 vs 176.44 for the S&P 500 Industrials and 197.02 for the S&P 500 .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic impact
Snap-on IncorporatedPresident and COO; previously SVP & President – Worldwide Commercial & Industrial Group2002–2007 (COO/President); SVP role prior to 2007 Led global operations and C&I group, precursor to CEO role
United Technologies CorporationExecutive operational and financial management positionsPre-2002 Large-cap operations/finance experience leveraged to Snap-on’s margin and process discipline
Ford Motor CompanyFinancial and engineering positionsPre-2002 Automotive engineering/finance grounding, relevant to Snap-on’s core end market

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic impact
Columbus McKinnon CorporationDirector (prior service)Pre-2025 (not currently disclosed) Industrial motion control exposure; network and governance experience
U.S. ArmyOfficer (Vietnam)Historical service Leadership under stress; discipline relevant to execution

Fixed Compensation

Multi-year CEO compensation (Summary Compensation Table):

Metric202220232024
Salary ($)$1,142,473 $1,142,473 $1,142,473
Stock Awards ($)$4,673,039 $5,532,076 $5,502,126
Option Awards ($)$1,179,998 $1,323,023 $1,443,040
Non-Equity Incentive ($)$1,738,702 $1,800,681 $1,014,859
Change in Pension Value/Deferred Earnings ($)$486,011 $455,232 $499,568
All Other Compensation ($)$264,437 $321,272 $874,796
Total ($)$9,484,660 $10,574,757 $10,476,862

Notes:

  • 2024 All Other Compensation includes 401(k) and deferred match plus dividend equivalents on vested awards; dividend equivalents totaled $786,501 .
  • Annual incentive targets for CEO are 135% of base salary .

Performance Compensation

Annual incentive design and 2024 outcomes:

  • Weighting: 50% consolidated financial results (Operating Income and RONAEBIT) + 50% personal strategic business goals .
  • CEO personal goals payout: 70% of target .
  • Consolidated financial results payout: 61.6% of target .
ComponentThresholdTargetMaximumActual
Operating Income ($mm)$1,044.7 $1,138.7 $1,305.9 $1,074.0
RONAEBIT (%)33.0% 38.0% 43.0% 37.2%
Consolidated payout (% of target)25% if threshold criteria met 100% 200% 61.6%
CEO personal goals payout (% of target)70%

Long-term incentives (design since 2021):

  • CEO equity mix: PSUs 60%, Stock Options 20%, RSUs 20% .
  • Vesting: PSUs over 3 years based on revenue CAGR and RONAEBIT; Options vest 1/3 annually over 3 years; RSUs 3-year cliff .

2024 CEO grants:

Grant typeGrant dateUnitsExercise priceFair value
PSUs (target)2/15/202415,340 $4,126,460
RSUs2/15/20245,114 $1,375,666
Options2/15/202423,710 $269.00 $1,443,040

PSU payout for 2022–2024 performance cycle:

MetricThresholdTargetMaximumActualPayout (% of target)
Net Sales ($mm, FY2024)$4,659 $4,866 $5,078 $4,707 107.8%
RONAEBIT (3-year avg, %)19.0% 24.0% 38.0% 36.9% 107.8%

Equity Ownership & Alignment

  • Beneficial ownership: 1,434,762 shares (2.7% of outstanding) as of record date Feb 24, 2025; options exercisable within 60 days: 625,480 .
  • Stock ownership guidelines: CEO must hold ≥6x base salary; all executives met guidelines as of Aug 2024 .
  • Anti-hedging and anti-pledging: Prohibited for directors and executive officers under Insider Trading Policy .
  • Clawbacks: SEC-compliant restatement recovery policy effective Oct 2, 2023, plus broader Company policy covering cash and equity incentives for top executives .

Ownership trend:

Metric202120232025
Shares beneficially owned (#)1,538,032 1,518,605 1,434,762
% of outstanding2.8% 2.8% 2.7%
Options exercisable within 60 days (#)960,348 826,293 625,480

Vesting and potential selling windows:

  • 2024 options vest approx. 2/15/2025, 2/15/2026, 2/15/2027 (three equal tranches) .
  • 2024 RSUs cliff vest approx. 2/15/2027 .
  • 2022 PSUs paid out in Feb 2025 at 107.8% of target based on three-year performance .
  • Company prohibits hedging/pledging, which mitigates forced-selling risk from collateral needs .

Employment Terms

  • No general U.S. employment agreement; change-of-control agreements in place for NEOs including CEO, with double trigger; severance multiples at 2x salary and benefits; continuation of health, disability, life insurance, pension credit and 401(k) matching for two years; no excise tax gross-up; payments may be reduced to avoid 280G excise tax; bonus used in calculations is three-year average .
  • Severance outside change-of-control determined case-by-case; no U.S. perquisites beyond standard employee benefits .
ProvisionTerm
Change-of-control triggerDouble trigger (event + qualifying termination)
Cash severance multiple2x salary and applicable benefits
Benefits continuationHealth/disability/life, pension credit, 401(k) match for 2 years
Excise taxNo gross-up; cutback provision to avoid 280G/4999
ClawbacksSEC-required and Company policy covering cash/equity incentives
Hedging/pledgingProhibited

Board Governance

  • Board service: Director since 2007; Chairman since 2009; CEO since 2007 .
  • Independence: Not independent (executive director) .
  • Committee roles: None; Audit (Jones, Gillis, Stebbins), Governance (Adams, Holden, Knueppel), Compensation (Daniel, Lehman, Sherrill) .
  • Lead Independent Director: James P. Holden (since 2009) .
  • Board meetings/attendance: Board met 7 times in fiscal 2024; all directors ≥75% attendance (Holden missed one set due to illness) .
  • Employee directors receive no additional board compensation .

Director compensation and equity for non-employee directors (context for governance norms):

  • Annual cash retainer $110,000; committee chair and member fees disclosed; 2024 grant of 599 restricted shares per non-employee director vesting after ~1 year .

Say-on-Pay & Shareholder Feedback

YearApproval (%)
201796%
201889%
202079%
202192%
202493%

Management response: Committee maintains pay-for-performance structure, increased PSU weighting, prohibits repricing, and retains independent consultant Semler Brossy; no conflicts of interest identified .

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Mix shift to performance-based equity: Since 2021, CEO LTI is 60% PSUs, 20% options, 20% RSUs, emphasizing operating performance and RONAEBIT-linked value creation .
  • 2024 annual incentive paid below prior year, reflecting tougher consolidated metrics; consolidated payout 61.6% and CEO personal goals 70% .
  • Governance features: Minimum vesting periods (≥1 year for performance awards; ≥3 years for time-based RSUs), no option repricing, dividends only upon vesting, robust clawbacks, anti-hedging/pledging .

Performance & Track Record

Five-year TSR (cumulative $100 investment):

Fiscal year endedSnap-on TSRS&P 500 Industrials TSRS&P 500 TSR
Dec 31, 2019$100.00 $100.00 $100.00
Dec 31, 2020$104.01 $111.06 $118.40
Dec 31, 2021$134.00 $134.52 $152.39
Dec 31, 2022$145.95 $127.15 $124.79
Dec 31, 2023$189.28 $150.20 $157.59
Dec 31, 2024$228.34 $176.44 $197.02

Recent financial highlights:

Metric20232024Change
Net Sales ($B)$4.73 $4.71 -0.5%
Operating Earnings before Financial Services ($mm)$1,039.9 $1,068.8 +2.8%
Op. margin before Financial Services (%)22.0% 22.7% +70 bps
Consolidated Operating Earnings ($mm)$1,310.4 $1,345.7 +2.7%
Diluted EPS ($)$18.76 $19.51 +4.0%

Compensation Peer Group

Peer group used for 2024/2025 planning (15 companies):

  • AMETEK; Crane; Donaldson; Dover; Flowserve; Fortive; IDEX; Kennametal; Lincoln Electric; Pentair; Rockwell Automation; Roper; Stanley Black & Decker; Timken; Xylem .

Pay positioning:

  • Target total direct compensation generally between 50th–75th percentile of market; annual incentive targets at ~50th percentile; pay mix increases at-risk with responsibility .

Equity Ownership Guidelines & Pledging

  • Executive stock ownership guidelines based on multiples of salary; CEO at ≥6x; all executives met guidelines in Aug 2024 .
  • Anti-hedging/anti-pledging: Strict prohibition for directors and executive officers .

Employment & Contracts Details

  • No standard U.S. employment agreements; change-of-control agreements feature double trigger, 2x multiples, benefit continuations, no tax gross-up, and potential cutback to avoid excise taxes; bonus averaged over three years for severance calculation .
  • Severance (non-CoC): case-by-case basis; standard global benefits and select overseas allowances only where applicable; no U.S. perquisites beyond normal employee benefits .

Board Governance Implications

  • Dual-role CEO + Chairman: Company cites unified leadership benefits; mitigated by a long-tenured independent Lead Director and fully independent committees .
  • Director independence: CEO not independent; all other directors except CEO determined independent; executive sessions led by Lead Director .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: High PSU weighting tied to multi-year revenue CAGR and RONAEBIT plus rigorous clawbacks, prohibitions on hedging/pledging, and strong ownership guidelines reduce misalignment risk and pledging-related overhang .
  • Near-term supply dynamics: 2022 PSUs vested at 107.8% in Feb 2025; 2024 options vest annually beginning Feb 2025; 2024 RSUs cliff vest Feb 2027; while vesting can create windows for Form 4 activity, hedging/pledging bans and governance design mitigate forced selling; monitor filings for discretionary sales around these dates .
  • Pay-for-performance calibration: 2024 annual incentive paid below prior year given tougher consolidated targets (61.6% of target), while multi-year PSU payout remained above target (107.8%), signaling resilient long-term operating returns despite mixed near-term sales trends .
  • Governance quality: Double-trigger CoC without tax gross-ups, no repricing, minimum vesting, independent consultant, and strong say-on-pay history (majority support across years) point to shareholder-friendly practices, lowering governance risk premium .