Christopher Lapointe
About Christopher Lapointe
Christopher Lapointe is Chief Financial Officer (CFO) of SoFi Technologies and has served in this role since May 2021. He previously served as SoFi’s interim CFO from April 2020 and CFO of Social Finance from September 2020 until May 2021; he was Head of Business Operations beginning in June 2018. He holds a BA from Dartmouth College and an MBA from the Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth; age 41 per the 2025 proxy. Annual cash incentives for 2024 were tied to adjusted net revenue, adjusted EBITDA, new members, and return on tangible equity (ROTE), with specific target and payout mechanics described below .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| SoFi / Social Finance | CFO (SoFi Technologies) | May 2021–present | Executive finance leadership post-SPAC; oversee capital allocation and bank holding company financial governance |
| Social Finance (pre-SoFi Technologies) | CFO | Sep 2020–May 2021 | Led finance during transition and integration into public company structure |
| Social Finance | Interim CFO | Apr 2020–Sep 2020 | Stabilized finance function during leadership transition |
| Social Finance | Head of Business Operations | Jun 2018–Apr 2020 | Built operations discipline supporting growth and risk controls |
| Uber Technologies | Global Head of FP&A, Corporate Finance & FinTech | Nov 2015–Jun 2018 | Led planning and corporate finance; fintech initiatives at scale |
| Goldman Sachs | VP, TMT Investment Banking | Jul 2012–Nov 2015 | Executed capital markets and M&A for tech/media/telecom clients |
External Roles
No external board roles or committee positions disclosed for Lapointe in the latest proxy .
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $500,000 | $500,000 | $500,000 |
| Target Bonus (% of salary) | 100% | 100% | 100% |
Notes:
- Base salaries for CEO and CFO were maintained at 2022 levels in 2024; CFO’s base salary remained $500,000 .
Performance Compensation
Annual Cash Bonus Plan – Structure and 2024 Results
| Performance Metric | Weighting | 2024 Achievement vs Target | Metric Payout % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted Net Revenue | 35% | 105% | 118% |
| Adjusted EBITDA | 35% | 93% | 109% |
| New Members | 15% | 134% | 138% |
| ROTE | 15% | 101% | 115% |
| Aggregate Funding (pre-committee adjustment) | — | — | 118% |
| Committee-Adjusted Aggregate Funding | — | — | 117.5% |
| Executive | Target Bonus (% of salary) | Target Bonus ($) | Funding at 117.5% ($) | Individual Multiplier (%) | Actual Paid ($) | Payment % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Christopher Lapointe (CFO) | 100% | $500,000 | $587,500 | 106% | $625,000 | 125% |
Plan design notes:
- Weights: 35% adjusted net revenue, 35% adjusted EBITDA, 15% ROTE, 15% new members; linear payout between thresholds .
- Risk Management Effectiveness Assessment incorporated; all NEOs received satisfactory ratings for 2024 (no negative modifier) .
Equity Awards and Vesting
| Grant Type | Grant Date | Shares Granted | Grant Date Fair Value ($) | Vesting Terms |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| RSU (Annual) | Feb 13, 2024 | 847,253 | $6,794,969 | 16 equal quarterly tranches; vesting begins June 14, 2024; 1/16th each quarter, service-based |
| RSU (Annual) | Feb 8, 2023 | 796,374 | $5,733,893 | 12 equal quarterly tranches beginning June 14, 2023 |
| RSU (Annual) | Mar 18, 2022 | 335,366 | $3,310,062 | Quarterly time-based vesting per grant agreement |
Stock vested during 2024:
| Name | Shares Acquired on Vesting (#) | Value Realized on Vesting ($) |
|---|---|---|
| Christopher Lapointe | 838,341 | $8,114,357 |
Program evolution:
- PSUs introduced in 2024 for CEO and extended to other NEOs in 2025 (25% of annual equity), moving to 50% PSUs for CEO and NEOs in 2026; PSU agreements clarified performance measurement (90-trading-day average), death/disability treatment, and termination rights alignment with severance plans .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership (3/28/2024) | 993,316 shares; less than 1% of outstanding |
| Outstanding Unvested Awards (12/31/2024) | RSUs: 63,720 ($981,288); 331,823 ($5,110,074); 688,394 ($10,601,268). Equity Incentive Plan Awards: 276,963 ($4,265,235). Values at $15.40/share |
| Options | No option holdings disclosed for Lapointe; no NEO stock options exercised in 2024 |
| Ownership Guidelines | Executives subject to Section 16 must hold ≥3x base salary; must retain ≥50% of net profit shares until compliant. Majority compliant as of 12/31/2024; others retaining to meet policy |
| Hedging/Pledging Policy | Hedging generally prohibited except pre-approved forward/option contracts; pledging prohibited unless both Compliance Officer and Board approve |
| Notable Pledging Transaction (2025) | Entered prepaid variable forward (PVF) on 500,000 shares; received $11,771,830 upfront; pledged shares; maturity ~Nov 12, 2027; floor $25.38, cap $50.58; retains voting/dividend rights during term |
| Tax Withholding Events (2025) | Shares withheld to satisfy taxes upon PSU vesting (Nov 5, 2025 Form 4) |
Insider selling pressure context:
- Quarterly RSU vesting and Form 4 tax-withholding entries indicate regular share withholding needs; PVF creates future delivery obligations in 2027 that may result in share settlement depending on price at maturity (potential overhang) .
Employment Terms
| Provision | Terms |
|---|---|
| Promotion letter (CFO effective 9/14/2020) | If terminated without Cause or resigns for Good Reason: lump-sum equal to 12 months base salary + 100% annual bonus (higher of target or reasonably projected actual), 12 months paid health coverage, and 12 months’ RSU vesting acceleration |
| Change of Control (CoC) | If terminated without Cause or resigns for Good Reason within 3 months prior to or after CoC: lump-sum equal to 18 months base salary + 150% annual bonus (higher of target or projected actual), 18 months paid health coverage, and full RSU vesting acceleration. Equity awards auto-accelerate if otherwise canceled for no consideration upon CoC |
| Executive Severance Plan | “Double-trigger” structure for CoC; salary continuation and bonus provisions when terminated without Cause outside CoC; no excise tax gross-ups; “better-of” benefits vs individual agreements |
| Potential Payments (as of 12/31/2024) | Qualifying Termination: Cash $1,125,000; Equity acceleration $8,331,277; Health $39,897; Total $9,496,174. Qualifying Termination with CoC: Cash $1,687,500; Equity acceleration $16,692,630; Health $59,846; Total $18,439,975. CoC only: Equity acceleration $16,692,630 |
| Executive Notice Period | 60 days’ advance written notice by either party (except for Cause); company may relieve duties during notice period while continuing pay/benefits |
| Clawback Policy | Effective Oct 2, 2023; recovery of erroneously awarded incentive compensation upon restatement; July 2024 amendments allow recoupment on misconduct and include time-based equity |
| Hedging/Pledging Restrictions | Short sales, derivatives trading generally prohibited; pledging allowed only with Compliance Officer and Board approval; forward/option-based monetization allowed if approved and compliant |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Cash vs equity mix: For 2024, salary $500,000 and annual bonus $625,000 vs stock awards $6,794,969 → equity remained the dominant component of total compensation, with quarterly time-based RSU vesting supporting retention .
- Performance metric evolution: 2024 added ROTE metric, replacing “new products”; payout capped at 200% of target across NEOs, enhancing risk controls .
- Peer group governance: Company revised compensation peer group in 2023 to remove outsized names and align size comparability; introduced PSU awards in long-term incentives, expanding to NEOs in 2025 and 2026 .
Multi‑Year Summary Compensation (NEO extract for Lapointe)
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary ($) | $500,000 | $500,000 | $500,000 |
| Bonus ($) | $100,000 | — | — |
| Stock Awards ($) | $3,310,062 | $5,733,893 | $6,794,969 |
| Non‑Equity Incentive Plan Compensation ($) | $660,000 | $670,000 | $625,000 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | — | — | — |
| Total ($) | $4,570,062 | $6,903,893 | $7,919,969 |
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
- Pledging/Hedging: Entered a PVF and pledged 500,000 shares in November 2025; although permitted with approvals, pledging is typically viewed as an alignment risk given potential forced share delivery at maturity .
- Regular tax withholding dispositions: Form 4 shows withholding associated with PSU vesting (non-open market), indicating recurring share reductions for taxes .
- No excise tax gross‑ups; double‑trigger CoC mitigates windfall concerns .
Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback
- 2024 say‑on‑pay approval: ~90.5% votes in favor for 2023 compensation .
- Actions in response to proxy advisor feedback: Introduced payout caps in the annual bonus plan and PSUs in long-term incentives; refined peer group .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: High equity mix with multi‑year RSU vesting and PSU expansion supports retention and performance linkage; ownership guidelines require 3x salary and 50% net‑share retention until compliant .
- Near‑term supply overhang risk: Quarterly RSU vesting and tax withholding events plus the 2025 PVF pledge (maturing in 2027) can create predictable share delivery/withholding flows, potentially adding technical selling pressure around vest dates and at PVF maturity depending on price path .
- Protection structures: Double‑trigger CoC terms and clawback policy reduce governance risk; no tax gross‑ups is shareholder‑friendly .
- Execution profile: Annual bonus metrics tied to adjusted net revenue, EBITDA, new members, and ROTE with above‑target aggregate payout in 2024 (117.5% adjusted) reflects operational momentum; continued PSU integration will further tie pay to tangible book value growth and relative TSR outcomes .