
David Maura
About David Maura
David M. Maura, age 52, has served as Chief Executive Officer and Executive Chairman (Chairman of the Board) of Spectrum Brands Holdings since July 2018; he holds a B.S. in Business Administration from Stetson University and is a CFA charterholder . Under his tenure, Spectrum reported net income from continuing operations of $99.3 million and Adjusted EBITDA of $371.8 million in Fiscal 2024, with net sales and organic net sales up 1.5% and e-commerce sales up 18% to 22% of total net sales; cumulative TSR from Sept. 30, 2020 to Sept. 30, 2024 reached $181.59 vs. peer group $132.76 . Capital allocation included repurchasing 13.2 million shares (~32% of outstanding) for ~$1.0 billion through FY2024, a 12% dividend increase to $0.47, and net debt leverage reduced to 0.056x; 2024 saw debt reduction of $1,341.4 million and issuance of $350 million in 3.375% exchangeable bonds .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Spectrum Brands Legacy / SPB Legacy | Executive Chairman (Jan 2016), CEO (Apr 2018) | 2016–2018 | Led transition pre-HRG merger; operated consumer portfolio |
| HRG Group | Managing Director & EVP Investments; Director | 2011–2016 (MD/EVP), 2011–2017 (Director) | Capital allocation, portfolio oversight in consumer sectors |
| Harbinger Capital Partners | Vice President & Director of Investments | 2006–2012 | Special situations across consumer products/retail |
| First Albany Capital | Managing Director & Senior Research Analyst | Pre-2006 | Distressed debt/special situations coverage |
| Merrill Lynch | Director & Senior High Yield Research Analyst | Pre-2006 | High yield coverage in consumer sectors |
| Wachovia Securities | Vice President & Senior Analyst, High Yield | Pre-2006 | Covers consumer product/service/retail companies |
| ZPR Investment Management | Financial Analyst | Early career | Fundamental analysis |
External Roles
| Organization | Position | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mosaic Acquisition Corp. | Chairman, President & CEO | Oct 2017–Jan 2020 | SPAC; later Vivint Smart Home combination |
| Vivint Smart Home, Inc. | Outside Director | Jan 2020–Mar 2020 | Post-deSPAC directorship |
| Boards: Ferrous Resources, Russell Hobbs, Applica | Director | Prior years | Consumer/industrial exposure |
Fixed Compensation
| Component | Fiscal 2024 Amount/Terms | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Annual Base Salary | $900,000 | CEO & Executive Chairman combined; employment agreement sets $700k Executive Chairman + $200k CEO |
| Target Annual Bonus (MIP) | 125% of base salary | Max 250% of target; pay-for-performance |
| Actual Annual Bonus Paid (FY2024) | $2,583,675 | Driven by above-target results across metrics |
| Perquisites | Financial planning/car allowance waived; life insurance, 401(k), supplemental life contributions | Waived FP/car; other amounts disclosed in All Other Compensation table |
Performance Compensation
Annual MIP (FY2024)
| Metric | Weighting | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual | Calculated Payout (% of Target) | Vesting/Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBITDA ($mm) | 33.3% | $258.28 | $286.98 | $307.07 | $319.18 | 200.00% | Cash, post-FY close |
| Adjusted Average Inventory Turns | 33.3% | 3.21 | 3.38 | 3.48 | 4.05 | 200.00% | Cash, post-FY close |
| Net Sales ($mm) | 33.3% | $2,742.48 | $2,886.82 | $2,973.42 | $2,963.88 | 188.99% | Cash, post-FY close |
Payout curve adjustments: maximum thresholds were modestly lowered in FY2024 (EBITDA ≥7% above target; Net Sales/Turns ≥3% above target), increasing probability of top-end payouts—a watchpoint for pay-for-performance rigor .
LTIP (FY2024 grants; 3-year performance ending FY2026; single vest date Dec 2026)
| Instrument | Metric(s) | Target Grant | Max Earned | Vesting | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs (70%) | Cumulative Adjusted EBITDA ($860.9/$904.7/$915.8mm thr/target/max), Adjusted Free Cash Flow ($132.4/$214.2/$227.4mm thr/target/max), Adjusted ROE (12.20%/13.60%/13.90%) | 71,342 shares | 89,178 shares | Dec 4, 2026, contingent on performance & service | Upside capped at 125% of target |
| RSUs (30%) | Time-based | 30,575 shares | N/A | Dec 4, 2026, service only | One vest date; 50% post-vest holding for 1 year |
Realized pay context: CEO realized pay in 2024 was $5,328,552 (50% of “reported” pay), reflecting the at-risk structure and multi-year vesting; PSUs granted in FY2022 paid zero at vest in Dec 2024 due to below-threshold 3-year performance .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Total Beneficial Ownership | 684,196 shares; ~2.8% of outstanding; includes 51,309 vested options |
| Stock Ownership Guidelines | CEO voluntarily increased SOG to 6x base salary effective Aug 5, 2024; 50% net after-tax share retention for 1 year post-vesting; 5-year compliance horizon |
| Anti-Hedging & Anti-Pledging | Robust prohibitions; no derivatives, short sales; pledging prohibited (existing pre-2019 pledges exempt but modifications cannot increase shares) |
| Outstanding Unvested RSUs | 15,817 (vested Dec 6, 2024); 32,530 (vest Dec 5, 2025); 30,575 (vest Dec 4, 2026) with respective market values at $95.14 close |
| Outstanding PSUs | 75,904 (FY2023 target, vest Dec 5, 2025); 89,178 (FY2024 max, vest Dec 4, 2026) |
| Options | 1,164 @ $86.38 exp. Nov 24, 2025; 51,309 @ $95.43 exp. Nov 28, 2026 |
| Insider Selling Pressure | Exercised 26,743 options on May 10, 2024; value realized $319,579; Company states he has not sold vested shares from Dec 4, 2023 or shares from May 10, 2024 exercise beyond required tax-withholding |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Key Terms |
|---|---|
| Agreement & Term | Employment agreement initially to Apr 24, 2021; auto-renews annually; sets base salaries ($700k Executive Chairman; $200k CEO) and MIP target 125% |
| Severance – CEO role only | If CEO role terminated without cause/for good reason/death/disability/CIC non-renewal: $250k time-based equity vesting (grant-date value), $500k cash paid over 12 months, pro rata MIP for year of termination |
| Severance – Executive Chairman role | 1.5x base salary + 1.0x target MIP (125% of base) over 18 months; pro rata MIP; 18 months of benefits; time-based equity fully vests; CIC during initial term adjusts cash to greater of 1.5x salary or months remaining in initial term; equity vests at target upon “CIC Termination” (double-trigger) |
| Non-Compete / Non-Solicit | 18 months post-termination; confidentiality for 7 years; cooperation/non-disparagement requirements |
| Change-in-Control (Equity Plan) | Double-trigger vesting approach emphasized; PSUs vest at target upon “CIC Termination” within defined window |
| Clawback | Complies with Dodd-Frank Section 954 and SOX 304; discretionary clawbacks for misconduct or material misstatements; applies to cash and equity, vested/unvested; no indemnification |
| Tax Gross-ups | Company does not provide golden parachute gross-ups or CIC gross-ups in existing agreements |
| Pension/Deferred Comp | No pension or non-qualified deferred comp participation reported |
Board Governance
- Board service: CEO & Chairman since 2018; Board size seven; all committees composed of independent directors; Board fully declassified in 2024 .
- Committees: Audit (Patel—Chair; Campbell, Chow, Rovit), Compensation (Polistina—Chair; James, Patel), Nominating & Corporate Governance (James—Chair; Polistina, Rovit) .
- Attendance: 100% attendance at Board and committee meetings in FY2024; directors encouraged to attend annual meetings .
- Lead Independent Director: Robust responsibilities include presiding over executive sessions, agenda/schedule approval, shareholder availability, management feedback, involvement in CEO performance review .
- Independence and dual-role implications: Maura is not independent; governance mitigants include a fully independent Lead Director, majority independent Board, independent committees, majority voting with resignation policy, anti-hedging/pledging, and annual assessments .
Director compensation for Maura: none (employee director); non-employee director program includes $105k cash retainer and ~$125k RSUs annually; Lead Independent Director receives incremental retainers .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Mix and risk: 89.7% of CEO’s annual ongoing target compensation at risk; 70% of LTIP is performance-based; MIP is 100% performance-based .
- Equity grant sizing: CEO LTIP target rose from $5.4 million (FY2023) to $6.75 million (FY2024), with realized value dependent on FY2026 performance and stock price .
- Metric framework: MIP metrics adjusted to reduce overlap with LTIP; LTIP focuses on EBITDA, FCF, ROE; MIP on EBITDA, Net Sales, Inventory Turns .
- Payout curve changes: Maximum thresholds lowered in FY2024 for MIP metrics—potentially increases top-end payouts; monitor whether targets remain challenging through cycles .
- Governance guardrails: No option repricing; minimum one-year vesting; no dividends on unearned/unvested awards; double-trigger CIC vesting; independent consultant (WTW) .
Compensation Peer Group (FY2024)
| Peers | |
|---|---|
| Central Garden & Pet; Church & Dwight; Clorox; Edgewell; Energizer; Hanesbrands; Hasbro; Helen of Troy; Mattel; Newell Brands; Nu Skin; Scotts Miracle-Gro; USANA; Medifast; YETI | Adjusted peer composition: removed Fortune Brands Innovations and Tupperware; added YETI, Medifast, USANA; WTW provided market analysis and remained independent |
Say-on-Pay & Shareholder Feedback
- 2024 say-on-pay approval ~97%—broad support; ongoing robust shareholder outreach through Okapi Partners and direct engagement; independent compensation consultant retained .
Performance & Track Record
- Operations: Inventory turns >4x; fill rates >90%; E-commerce +18% YoY; stepped-up brand investment ~$62 million .
- Capital structure: Discontinued receivable factoring; renegotiated revolver to $500 million maturing Oct 2028; $1,341.4 million debt reduction; net debt leverage 0.056x .
- Strategic focus: Becoming pure-play Global Pet Care and Home & Garden; continued HPC separation dual-track; disciplined M&A .
- Shareholder returns: ~$1.0B buybacks since HHI sale; dividend raised 12% .
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
- Dual role (CEO + Chairman): Governance mitigants in place but continued monitoring warranted .
- CIC vesting: PSUs vest at target under double-trigger CIC termination; ensure robust performance targets and shareholder alignment .
- Payout curve easing: FY2024 MIP max thresholds lowered—watch for sustained rigor across cycles .
- Related-party transactions: None disclosed; Section 16 compliance timely .
- No tax gross-ups, no option repricing: Shareholder-friendly policies .
- Insider trading: Option exercises in May 2024; company states no share sales beyond tax withholding—reduced near-term selling pressure signal, but monitor Form 4s .
Equity Ownership & Director Compensation (Board Context)
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Owners >5% | Vanguard 15.0%; Allspring 6.1%; American Century 6.1%; Pzena 5.4%; American Century Companies 5.4% |
| Director compensation (FY2024) | Non-employee directors: $105k cash + ~$125k RSUs; incremental retainers for Lead Director/Committee chairs; RSUs vest within FY; Maura receives no director pay as employee |
Investment Implications
- Alignment: High at-risk pay, stringent clawbacks, anti-hedging/pledging, share ownership/retention rules, and double-trigger CIC vesting align incentives with multi-year value creation .
- Performance linkage: Above-target MIP payments reflect strong operational execution (EBITDA, inventory turns, net sales); however, easing of MIP max thresholds merits scrutiny to ensure targets remain challenging .
- Retention and continuity: Employment terms include robust severance for Executive Chairman role and moderate CEO-role severance; 18-month non-compete supports risk mitigation; single vest LTIP in Dec 2026 creates retention pressure and alignment through FY2026 .
- Ownership and selling pressure: Significant personal stake (~2.8%) and stated lack of discretionary selling post-vest suggests aligned incentives; upcoming RSU/PSU vests in 2025–2026 are notable supply events to monitor, along with any further option exercises .
- Governance: CEO-Chair dual role balanced by a strong Lead Independent Director and fully independent committees; say-on-pay support (~97%) indicates investor approval of the compensation framework, but ongoing vigilance over metric rigor and CIC vesting outcomes is warranted .