Faisal Qadir
Spectrum Brands HoldingsAbout Faisal Qadir
Faisal Qadir is Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer (CFO) of Spectrum Brands Holdings (SPB), appointed on September 3, 2025; he has been with SPB since 2012 in senior finance roles including VP Strategic Finance & Enterprise Reporting, VP Investor Relations, CFO of Global Pet Care, and CFO of Home & Personal Care . He previously held finance leadership roles at The Black & Decker Corporation and Stanley Black & Decker from 2003–2012 across FP&A, Operations Finance, and Controllership; he holds an undergraduate degree from the Institute of Business Administration in Karachi and an MBA from the University of Notre Dame . His role is confirmed by execution of SPB’s November 13, 2025 8‑K as EVP & CFO and by the Q4 FY25 earnings call co-host listing . Company context: SPB delivered FY2024 net income from continuing operations of $99.3 million and Adjusted EBITDA of $371.8 million, with e-commerce sales up 18% YoY and inventory turns over 4x; these metrics inform the incentive frameworks to which executives are tied .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Spectrum Brands Holdings | Executive Vice President & Chief Financial Officer | 2025–present | Promoted to CFO as part of leadership transition; responsible for financial leadership and investor communications . |
| Spectrum Brands Holdings | Senior finance leadership (VP Strategic Finance & Enterprise Reporting; VP Investor Relations; CFO, Global Pet Care; CFO, Home & Personal Care) | 2012–2025 | Led strategic finance, enterprise reporting, IR, and divisional CFO roles across Pet Care and Home & Personal Care, supporting operations and controllership . |
| The Black & Decker Corporation / Stanley Black & Decker | Finance leadership across FP&A, Operations Finance, Controllership | 2003–2012 | Progressive finance responsibilities supporting business operations and financial planning . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| — | — | — | No external public company directorships or outside board roles were disclosed for Mr. Qadir in the CFO appointment 8‑K or the 2025 proxy materials reviewed . |
Fixed Compensation
| Component | Terms | Effective period |
|---|---|---|
| Base salary | $450,000 | Beginning Fiscal 2026 |
| Annual bonus (MIP) | Target 75% of base salary; maximum 150% of base salary | Beginning Fiscal 2026 |
| Benefits | Eligible for executive officer benefits programs as made available by the Company | Beginning Fiscal 2026 |
Performance Compensation
Annual Cash Incentive (MIP) – Program Design
| Metric | Weighting | Target definition | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBITDA | Equal-weighted (one of three metrics) | Company-set annual targets; uses defined Adjusted EBITDA with committee adjustments per policy | MIP metrics are Adjusted EBITDA, Net Sales, Adjusted Average Inventory Turns, equally weighted since FY2023 . |
| Net Sales | Equal-weighted (one of three metrics) | Company-set annual targets | As above . |
| Adjusted Average Inventory Turns | Equal-weighted (one of three metrics) | Company-set annual targets | As above . |
Note: Individual target values, actual performance, and payout factors for Mr. Qadir are not disclosed as his CFO role and MIP eligibility at the specified terms commence in FY2026 .
Long-Term Incentive Plan (LTIP) – Program Design
| Instrument/Metric | Weighting | Vesting/performance period | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Performance Stock Units (PSUs) – Adjusted EBITDA | Equal-weighted (one of three PSU metrics) | 3-year performance period; example: FY2024 awards not eligible to vest until Dec 2026 | LTIP PSU metrics are Adjusted EBITDA, Adjusted Free Cash Flow, Adjusted Return on Equity, equally weighted . |
| Performance Stock Units (PSUs) – Adjusted Free Cash Flow | Equal-weighted (one of three PSU metrics) | 3-year performance period; example: FY2024 awards vest Dec 2026 | As above . |
| Performance Stock Units (PSUs) – Adjusted Return on Equity | Equal-weighted (one of three PSU metrics) | 3-year performance period; example: FY2024 awards vest Dec 2026 | As above . |
| Time-based RSUs | Minority portion of LTIP mix at the company level | Service-based vesting per grant | The company emphasizes performance-based equity for NEOs; details by executive vary by grant year . |
| LTIP target opportunity (CFO) | Target award value 200% of base salary | Eligibility beginning Fiscal 2026 | Per Qadir Employment Agreement . |
| Change-in-control treatment | Double-trigger required for equity acceleration | Upon qualifying termination in connection with a CIC | Company-wide equity grants include double-trigger CIC provisions . |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Policy/Item | Details |
|---|---|
| Stock ownership guideline – CFO | 3x base salary; five years to achieve; counts direct holdings and unvested time-based RSUs/RS restricted stock; excludes unvested PSUs and options; ongoing 50% net-after-tax share retention for one year post-vesting for NEOs . |
| Share retention | Retain 50% of net after-tax shares until guideline met; NEOs also retain 50% of net after-tax shares for one year after vesting even after meeting guideline . |
| Anti-hedging / Anti-pledging | Robust anti-hedging and anti-pledging policies in place . |
| Clawback policy | Complies with SOX 304 and Dodd-Frank Rule 10D‑1 (mandatory recoupment on restatements); discretionary clawback for significant financial loss, reputational damage, or material misstatements affecting incentive payouts . |
| Pay-for-performance design | High portion of executive incentive opportunity is performance-based; incentive metrics differentiated across MIP and LTIP (EBITDA overlap only) . |
Employment Terms
| Term | Details |
|---|---|
| Appointment and role | Appointed Executive Vice President & Chief Financial Officer effective September 3, 2025; confirmed in earnings materials and 8‑K signature blocks . |
| Base salary | $450,000 beginning in Fiscal 2026 . |
| MIP bonus | Target 75% of base salary; maximum 150% beginning in Fiscal 2026 . |
| LTIP target | 200% of base salary beginning in Fiscal 2026 . |
| Severance (without cause / good reason / death or disability) | 1.5x annual base salary + 1x annual bonus, payable over 18 months; pro‑rata bonus for year of termination based on actual performance; 18 months continued medical coverage (COBRA election required) . |
| Equity on termination | Pro‑rata vesting of time‑based equity awards; performance‑based equity to be forfeited (consistent with company practice for new agreements since Fiscal 2019) . |
| Restrictive covenants | 18‑month non‑compete and non‑solicitation; severance conditioned on release of claims and compliance with post‑employment covenants . |
| Related party / family relationships | None disclosed; no Item 404(a) related‑party transactions; no family relationships with directors or executive officers . |
Investment Implications
- Alignment and governance quality: The CFO’s incentive opportunity is heavily at-risk and explicitly tied to operating profitability (Adjusted EBITDA), cash generation (Adjusted FCF), returns (Adjusted ROE), sales, and inventory efficiency, with equal-weighted scorecards and a double-trigger CIC standard, strong anti-hedging/anti-pledging, and a robust mandatory+discretionary clawback—collectively pointing to solid pay-for-performance alignment and downside protection for shareholders .
- Retention and transition risk: Qadir’s agreement sets FY2026 pay terms and standard severance (1.5x salary + 1x bonus) with pro‑rata vesting limited to time‑based equity and an 18‑month non‑compete/nonsolicit—creating retention hooks while limiting windfalls; near-term finance leadership transition is being staged alongside the outgoing CFO through year-end 2025 .
- Incentive design signals: Emphasis on EBITDA, FCF, and ROE alongside sales and inventory turns suggests continued focus on profitable growth, working capital discipline, and cash conversion—key levers for deleveraging and capital returns reflected in recent corporate performance narratives .
- Ownership expectations: The CFO must reach 3x salary stock ownership within five years with ongoing 50% post‑tax share retention, supporting skin-in-the-game and reducing risk of misaligned incentives; anti‑pledging and anti‑hedging further mitigate alignment red flags .