Yann Le Pallec
About Yann Le Pallec
Yann Le Pallec, 56, is President of S&P Global Ratings (effective November 1, 2024), based in Paris, and has led core analytical, research, and operations teams across 28 countries since joining S&P in 1999; he holds a master’s degree in business from ESSEC in France . Under his division’s leadership in 2024, Ratings delivered non-GAAP ICP Adjusted Revenue of $4,373 million (+31.3% YoY) and a 64.1% non-GAAP ICP Adjusted EBITA Margin, while the Company posted FY2024 revenue of $14.208B (+14%), GAAP net income of $3.852B (+47%), GAAP diluted EPS of $12.35 (+50%), and 2024 TSR of ~13% (in-line with peer group, below S&P 500) . He previously served as Executive Managing Director and Head of Global Ratings Services, Global Head of Corporate Ratings, and led EMEA ratings functions, reflecting a track record of scaling analytics and execution across sovereign, corporate, financial institution and structured finance coverage .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| S&P Global Ratings | President | 2024–present | Leads Ratings division; drove 2024 outperformance in division-level revenue and margin . |
| S&P Global Ratings | Executive Managing Director, Head of Global Ratings Services | 2017–2024 | Oversaw analytics, research, operations (~2,200 staff across 28 countries) . |
| S&P Global Ratings | Executive Managing Director, Global Head of Corporate Ratings | 2016–2017 | Led global coverage of >4,000 nonfinancial corporates . |
| S&P Global Ratings | Head of EMEA Ratings | 2011–2016 | Managed ~900 ratings analysts and support staff across ~12 offices in EMEA . |
| S&P Global Ratings | Head of EMEA Corporate & Government Ratings | 2010–2011 | Led EMEA corporate/government ratings teams . |
| S&P Global Ratings | Head of EMEA Government & Insurance Ratings | 2009–2010 | Led regional sovereign and insurance ratings . |
| S&P Global Ratings | Head of EMEA Insurance Ratings | 2005–2009 | Led regional insurance coverage . |
| S&P Global Ratings | Head of Paris & Frankfurt Insurance Ratings | 2003–2005 | Led country teams across Paris/Frankfurt . |
| S&P Global Ratings | Director, Paris Insurance Ratings (previously Associate Director) | 1999–2003 | Early leadership in European insurance ratings . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| CRISIL Ltd (BSE-listed) | Chair of the Board | Current | Chairs a global analytics company; CRISIL Ratings is a leading agency in India . |
| S&P Global | Executive Sponsor, PRIDE People Resource Group | Current | Executive sponsorship for LGBTQ+ inclusion . |
Fixed Compensation
- Company program sets executive base salary, target annual incentive, and LTI using a proxy peer group (e.g., ICE, Moody’s, CME, MSCI, ADP, Visa, etc.) and surveys; pay is positioned across 25th–75th percentiles with internal consistency, considering scope, responsibilities, and performance .
- 2024/2025 pay mix for executives emphasizes variable, incentive-based pay; CEO/NEO mix is disclosed, and the Committee maintains an annual pay-for-performance framework with benchmarking via Pay Governance LLC .
Note: The proxy discloses detailed 2024/2025 pay levels for NEOs; individual base salary and bonus targets for Yann Le Pallec are not separately disclosed in the filing .
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Structure (division presidents, including Ratings)
| Component | Metric/Design | Weighting | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Financial – Enterprise | Non-GAAP ICP Adjusted Revenue | 17.5% | Adjusted for FX, M&A; enterprise-level . |
| Financial – Enterprise | Non-GAAP ICP Adjusted EBITA Margin | 17.5% | Adjusted for FX, M&A; enterprise-level . |
| Financial – Division | Division non-GAAP ICP Adjusted Revenue | 17.5% | Division-level adjustments; Ratings-specific . |
| Financial – Division | Division non-GAAP ICP Adjusted EBITA Margin | 17.5% | Division-level adjustments; Ratings-specific . |
| Business-building – Enterprise & Division | Growth & Innovation; Customer at the Core; Data & Technology; Lead & Inspire; Execute & Deliver (KPIs) | 30% (15% enterprise; 15% division) | Scored with qualitative/quantitative KPIs; capped payouts at 200% . |
2024 Funding Outcomes
| Segment | Financial Funding | Business-Building Category Fundings |
|---|---|---|
| Enterprise (Company) | 166.84% | Growth & Innovation 100%; Customer at the Core 125%; Data & Technology 125%; Lead & Inspire 125%; Execute & Deliver 100% . |
| Ratings (division) | 198.51% (Revenue $4,373m; Margin 64.1%) | Growth & Innovation 125%; Customer at the Core 150%; Data & Technology 125%; Lead & Inspire 125%; Execute & Deliver 100% . |
Long-Term Incentives (LTI)
| Instrument | Metric/Target | Weighting | Vesting/Max |
|---|---|---|---|
| Performance Share Units (PSUs) | 3-year cumulative non-GAAP ICP Adjusted EPS | 70% | Cliff vest at cycle end; max 200% payout; 2024–2026 design . |
| Restricted Stock Units (RSUs) | Time-based | 30% | Ratable vesting across 3 years (e.g., March grants: 33/33/34) . |
| Prior PSU outcome | 2022–2024 PSU payout (Founders Grants) | — | Earned at 40.07% for cycle . |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Stock ownership guidelines: CEO 7x salary; CFO 4x; other covered executives 3x; 100% retention of net shares until met; unvested RSUs count; unvested PSUs do not .
- Prohibition: Directors/executives cannot hedge or pledge Company stock; short sales and derivatives are banned; no margin accounts permitted .
- Clawbacks: Dodd-Frank restatement policy; expanded Pay Recovery Policy (misconduct/material negative impact); plus Ratings-specific Pay Recovery Policy applicable to the President of S&P Global Ratings (material violations/failures, KPI recalculations) .
Note: The proxy’s “Company Stock Ownership of Management” reports holdings for Directors and NEOs; individual beneficial ownership for Yann Le Pallec (executive officer but not a Director/2024 NEO) is not listed in that table .
Employment Terms
- No single-trigger vesting on change-in-control; equity awards use double-trigger (CIC plus qualifying termination); RSUs generally convert/rollover; PSUs convert to time-vesting RSUs based on target or actual performance depending on cycle completion (≥50% complete uses actual or the greater of actual/target starting 2024 grants) .
- Severance programs (Senior Executive Severance Plan/Management Severance Plan) provide defined salary/benefit continuation and lump sums; CIC severance equals base salary plus target bonus with continued benefits and 10% benefits in-lieu gross-up equivalent (the Company does not provide tax gross-ups) .
- Insider trading policy bans hedging/pledging for executives; clawback policies extended to broader misconduct; President of Ratings is specifically covered by Ratings Pay Recovery Policy .
Performance & Track Record
- Company FY2024: revenue $14.208B (+14% YoY), GAAP net income $3.852B (+47% YoY), GAAP diluted EPS $12.35 (+50%), capital return >$4.4B; 2024 TSR ~13%, 5-year cumulative TSR +7% vs peer group, −4% vs S&P 500 .
- Ratings FY2024: non-GAAP ICP Adjusted Revenue $4,373m (+31.3% YoY), non-GAAP ICP Adjusted EBITA Margin 64.1% .
- 2024 STIC pool funded at 151.29% overall; enterprise financials 166.84% and strong business-building KPI scores; PSUs remain variable (2022–2024 payout 40.07%) .
Say-on-Pay & Compensation Governance
- 2024 say-on-pay approval: ~95.6% support; ongoing shareholder engagement; annual advisory vote .
- Independent Compensation Committee; Pay Governance LLC as advisor; strong policies (ownership guidelines, anti-hedging/pledging, clawbacks, double-trigger equity) .
Expertise & Qualifications
- Education: Master’s in Business, ESSEC (France) .
- Technical/industry: Extensive leadership across corporate, sovereign, insurance, and multi-region ratings; manages global analytics and operations .
- External recognition/responsibilities: Chairs CRISIL Ltd; Executive Sponsor for PRIDE resource group .
Fixed Compensation
Not disclosed for Yann. Company-level methodology and benchmarking described above; individual NEO pay tables and grants are disclosed but do not include Yann’s specific 2024 figures .
Performance Compensation
| Metric | Weighting | Target/Design | Payout/Result | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise non-GAAP ICP Adjusted Revenue | 35% (split 17.5% enterprise + 17.5% division for division presidents) | Adjusted for FX/M&A | Enterprise funding 166.84%; Ratings division 198.51% (with revenue $4,373m) | Annual cash; 2024 pool funded 151.29% overall . |
| Enterprise non-GAAP ICP Adjusted EBITA Margin | 35% (split same as above) | Adjusted for FX/M&A | Enterprise margin contribution to 166.84% funding; Ratings margin 64.1% . | |
| Business-building KPIs (5 categories) | 30% (15% enterprise; 15% division) | KPI scoring | Enterprise: 100/125/125/125/100; Ratings: 125/150/125/125/100 | Annual cash . |
| PSUs (non-GAAP ICP Adjusted EPS) | 70% of LTI | 3-year cumulative EPS | Max 200%; 2022–2024 PSU payout 40.07% | Cliff at cycle end . |
| RSUs (time-based) | 30% of LTI | Time-based | Value tied to stock price | 33/33/34 over 3 years (typical) . |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Ownership guideline for covered executives: 3x base salary; 100% net share retention until met .
- Anti-hedging/pledging policy: no short sales, derivatives, or pledges/margin accounts for executives .
- Clawbacks: Dodd-Frank restatement recovery; expanded Pay Recovery; Ratings-specific clawback applies to President of Ratings .
Employment Terms
- Equity treatment: Double-trigger on CIC; PSUs convert to time-vesting RSUs with target/actual performance basis; RSUs roll over if assumed and vest on qualifying termination within 24 months post-CIC .
- Severance frameworks: Senior Executive and Management plans define salary continuation and lump sum payments; Company does not provide tax gross-ups; certain benefits may be cut back to avoid excise taxes .
- No fixed-term employment contracts for NEOs; program annually risk-assessed to discourage excessive risk-taking .
Investment Implications
- Strong alignment and risk controls: Mandatory ownership multiples, 100% retention until met, and bans on hedging/pledging reduce misalignment and selling pressure; multi-pronged clawbacks (including Ratings-specific) heighten accountability .
- Compensation geared to profitable growth: 2024 enterprise financial funding at 166.84%, and Ratings division financial funding at 198.51% indicate high variable pay tied to revenue and margin execution; however, long-term PSU variability (2022–2024 payout 40.07%) tempers near-term windfalls and promotes sustained EPS performance .
- Retention dynamics: Three-year PSUs/RSUs and double-trigger CIC provisions foster retention through multi-year vesting; absence of single-trigger and no tax gross-ups are shareholder-friendly .
- Execution backdrop: Company-level 2024 growth (+14% revenue, +47% net income, +50% EPS) and Ratings’ outperformance support confidence in divisional leadership; investors should monitor future PSU cycles and KPI scoring to gauge sustained value creation .