Matt Dunn
About Matt Dunn
Matt Dunn is Simpson Manufacturing’s Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer, appointed effective January 1, 2025, after joining in June 2024 as Senior Vice President, Finance; he is 45 and holds BA degrees in Finance and Accounting from Cedarville University . Company performance during 2024 included net sales of $2.2B, operating margin of 19.3%, diluted EPS of $7.60, revenue growth of 0.8%, and ROIC of ~14.9% . The Company’s 2024 pay-versus-performance table shows a $100 initial investment growing to $215.81 for Simpson versus $224.90 for its peer index as of 2024 year-end .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Helen of Troy | SVP Finance, North America | Mar 2023–May 2024 | Led financial performance for largest region of a ~$2B consumer products company |
| Helen of Troy | SVP Finance & Operations – Beauty | Nov 2018–Feb 2023 | Drove finance and operations across Beauty portfolio |
| Inventure Group LLC | President – SINE Wall Division | 2016–2018 | Ran a civil construction products division; P&L leadership |
| Procter & Gamble | Finance roles (increasing seniority) | 12 years | Corporate finance and strategy across high-profile brands |
| Kimberly-Clark | Operations finance | 3 years | Plant/operations finance foundation |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| None disclosed | — | — | No related-party transactions or family relationships requiring disclosure; no arrangements underlying selection |
Fixed Compensation
| Component | 2025 Target/Amount | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary | $575,000 | Per offer letter dated Oct 17, 2024 |
| Target Cash Profit Sharing (CPS) | $431,250 | Earned 0–200% of target based on plan metrics |
| Target Long-Term Incentive (LTI) | $862,500 | Mix of PSUs (0–200% earned) and RSUs |
| Benefits/Perquisites | Customary senior executive benefits | Same basis as other senior executives |
Performance Compensation
Short-Term Incentive (CPS/EOCPS)
| Metric | Weighting | Target Structure | Payout Mechanics | Modifier | Vesting/Timing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Qualified Operating Income (QOI) | 40% Quarterly / 60% Annual | Threshold at 70% of target; maximum 130% annual/140% quarterly curves | 0–200% of target; quarterly awards with year-end true-up | MBO goals can adjust Q4/True-Up/Annual by ±20% (overall cap 200%) | Paid quarterly and after year-end (by Mar 15 of subsequent year) |
| 2024 QOI Goals vs Actual | Q1: T=117,960 / A=106,427 | Q2: T=158,749 / A=144,206 | Q3: T=162,020 / A=138,335 | Q4: T=110,141 / A=85,325 | Year: T=548,870 / A=474,293 |
Long-Term Incentive (PSUs/RSUs)
| Component | Metric | Weighting | Performance Period | Target/Payout | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs (2024 design reference) | Revenue Growth | 50% | 3-year (annual goals set for each year in 2024-2026; average measured) | 0–200% of target | Vests after measurement; shares prorated if early vesting (e.g., change-in-control) |
| PSUs (2024 actuals) | Revenue Growth | — | 2024 | 0.8% (for year one of the cycle) | Result component used in 3-year average |
| PSUs (2024 design reference) | ROIC | 50% | 3-year (annual goals; average measured) | 0–200% of target | Same as above |
| PSUs (2024 actuals) | ROIC | — | 2024 | 15.0% (for year one of cycle) | Result component used in 3-year average |
| PSUs (2025 grant approach) | Aggregate metrics | — | Reverts to 3-year cumulative goals set at grant | 0–200% of target | Standard plan terms |
| RSUs | Time-based | — | 3 years | Fixed grant; no performance metric | Ratable vest in equal annual installments on 1st, 2nd, 3rd anniversaries |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership | Not listed among named individuals in the ownership table as of Jan 31, 2025; no Dunn line item disclosed |
| Stock Ownership Guidelines | CFO: 3x base salary; unvested RSUs count as Eligible Shares; PSUs excluded |
| Holding Requirement | Until guideline met, must hold ≥50% of net shares acquired from grants |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited for all directors, officers, employees (e.g., swaps, collars, margin accounts, pledging) |
| Clawback | Executive Compensation Recovery Policy compliant with Section 10D/NYSE; recovery of erroneously awarded performance-based comp after restatements |
| Deferred Compensation | Eligible execs can defer base, CPS, RSUs, PSUs; settled in cash or shares per elections; rabbi trust funded |
Employment Terms
| Term | Detail |
|---|---|
| Start at Simpson | Joined June 2024 as SVP Finance; CFO from Jan 1, 2025 |
| Role Scope | Oversees finance, risk management, capital allocation, budgeting, cash strategies, audit/tax teams, M&A evaluation/due diligence |
| Severance Plan (Tier 2 – CFO) | Non-CIC: 1.0x (base + annual CPS target) paid over 12 months; COBRA reimburse up to 12 months |
| Severance Plan (Tier 2 – CFO) | CIC (double-trigger): 2.0x (greater of CIC-year or termination-year base + CPS target); paid over 24 months or lump sum if Section 409A CIC; COBRA reimburse up to 24 months |
| Non-Compete / Non-Solicit | Company may require non-compete equal to Non-CIC period (12 months for Tier 2); broad non-solicit and confidentiality obligations |
| Equity Change-in-Control | Double-trigger accelerated vesting for PSUs/RSUs upon “sale event”; PSU shares prorated and paid post-measurement period; Section 409A timing constraints apply |
| 280G Treatment | Cut-back to avoid excise tax if it increases after-tax value; ordered reduction consistent with Section 409A |
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: Dunn’s incentive mix ties near-term CPS to Qualified Operating Income with MBO modifiers and caps, and long-term PSUs to Revenue Growth and ROIC with 0–200% payout ranges, reinforcing operational discipline and capital efficiency .
- Retention/overhang: RSUs vest in equal tranches over three years, which structurally discourages immediate disposition; anti-hedging/pledging policies further limit near-term selling pressure signals .
- Change-of-control economics: As Tier 2, the CFO’s CIC protection (2.0x base plus CPS target and 24 months COBRA reimbursement) combined with double-trigger equity vesting offers continuity incentives while avoiding tax gross-ups via 280G cut-back mechanics .
- Ownership alignment: CFO guideline at 3x salary and required post-vest holding of net shares enhances alignment; clawback policy adds downside governance for restatement scenarios .
Shareholder context: Say-on-Pay received ~99.5% support in 2024, and executive pay design emphasizes distinct STI vs LTI metrics with payout caps and longer performance cycles, suggesting continued investor backing of compensation governance .