Bill MacNevin
SSR MININGAbout Bill MacNevin
Executive Vice President – Operations and Sustainability at SSR Mining since January 2023; age 59. He has 35+ years of international mining leadership across Placer Dome, Newmont, and Barrick Gold, including CEO of Barrick Nevada and Executive General Manager of the Pueblo Viejo JV; education includes James Cook University and a Graduate Diploma in Mineral Processing Technology from Latrobe University . 2024 corporate STI performance was 63.75%, with MacNevin’s total STI payout at 91% of target due to a 200% individual performance score weighted at 20% . TSR rebounded strongly post-Çöpler incident: SSRM delivered 122.9% total shareholder return from Feb 13, 2024 to Mar 31, 2025 .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Placer Dome | Various senior operational roles | Career began 1988 | Built foundational processing/ops expertise across geographies |
| Barrick Gold | General Manager at Lumwana; CEO of Barrick Nevada | Returned to Barrick in 2013 | Led large-scale operations; applied pressure oxidation/process leadership |
| Barrick Gold | Executive General Manager, Pueblo Viejo JV | Prior to 2019 | JV leadership; execution on complex processing assets |
| Barrick Gold | Processing & Engineering Lead | 2019 | Portfolio-wide processing/engineering oversight |
| Newmont | Senior operational roles | Joined 2009 | Operated across major precious metals assets |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| None disclosed | — | — | No public company directorships disclosed; MacNevin is not listed as a director in the proxy’s director ownership table |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $525,000 | $600,000 |
| Target STI (% of salary) | 75% | 75% |
| STI Target ($) | $393,750 | $450,000 |
| STI Actual ($) | $334,971 | $409,500 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | $9,900 | $27,600 |
Performance Compensation
Short-Term Incentive (STI) – 2024 Company Scorecard
| 2024 STI Goal | Metric Weight | Threshold | Target | Upper Target/Stretch | 2024 Performance | 2024 Payout % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TRIFR (Safety) | 5% | 2023 actual 2.10 | 5% reduction to 2.00 | 10% reduction to 1.90 | Fatality | 0.00% |
| Leadership in the Field (LIF) | 5% | CC&V 7,900 interactions (2023 actual) | 8,900 (+10%) | 10,000 (+20%) / Stretch | 11,394 | 10.00% |
| Water Efficiency | 5% | 2023 actual 89% | +2% & 2 Marigold projects | +3% & 3 Marigold projects | 90% | 3.75% |
| Sustainability | 5% | Program baselines | Engagement tracked quarterly, commitments defined | Stretch achievements | Stretch | 10.00% |
| Gold-Equivalent Ounces Produced | 30% | 540k (lower guidance) | 570k (midpoint) | 600k/630k stretch | 399,267 | 0.00% |
| AISC per ounce (IFRS) | 30% | $1,625 (upper guidance) | $1,600 (midpoint) | $1,575/$1,545 stretch | $1,873 | 0.00% |
| Strategic (Board-defined) | 20% | Board determination | Board determination | Upper/200% | 200% | 40.00% |
| Total Corporate Score | 100% | — | — | — | — | 63.75% |
STI Outcome for MacNevin – 2024
| Component | Weight | Score | Result |
|---|---|---|---|
| Corporate | 80% | 63.75% | 51.00% of target |
| Individual | 20% | 200% | 40.00% of target |
| Total STI Factor | — | — | 91.00% of target |
| STI Target ($) | — | — | $450,000 |
| STI Paid ($) | — | — | $409,500 |
Long-Term Incentives (LTIP) – 2024 Design and Grants
| Element | Target Award (% of Salary) | Grant Date | Units/Notional | Fair Value ($) | Vesting | Settlement |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs | 87.5% | Apr 1, 2024 | Target 120,523; Max 241,046 | $525,000 | 3-year cliff; 3-year performance goals | Cash; performance 0–200%, metrics include production, ROIC, relative TSR |
| RSUs | 87.5% | Apr 1, 2024 | 120,523 | $525,000 | Time-based; 1/3 each year over 3 years | Shares |
| 2024 Allocation | 50% PSUs / 50% RSUs (vs. typical 60/40) | — | — | — | Rationale: align incentives amid 2024 challenges; increased LTIP % for MacNevin with added responsibilities | — |
PSU governance guardrails: For 2022 PSUs (historical reference), metrics were equally weighted across production, ROI (target 5%), and relative TSR; absolute negative TSR caps the TSR component at 100%, and bottom quartile relative TSR yields 0% payout; total PSU payout capped at 200% .
One-Time Retention Award
| Award | Amount | Approval Date | Vesting Terms |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cash retention bonus | $900,000 | March 6, 2024 | Vests June 6, 2025; payable if employed through payment date or terminated without Cause prior to payment |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Share Ownership Guidelines and Holdings (Dec 31, 2024)
| NEO | Base Salary ($) | Requirement ($) | Common Shares Owned (#) | RSUs Unvested (#) | PSUs Subject to Vesting (#) | Total Holdings Value ($) | Compliance |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bill MacNevin | $600,000 | $1,200,000 | 34,417 | 161,430 | 76,273 (50% counted for guideline) | $1,893,951.72 (at $6.96/share) | Yes |
Policy notes:
- Executive ownership guidelines: CEO 5x salary; other NEOs 2x salary; RSUs counted at full value; 50% of PSUs counted; expected to use after-tax proceeds from equity to meet guidelines .
- Anti-hedging policy; robust insider trading policy; clawback compliant with SEC rules; double-trigger change-in-control vesting in share plans; no options granted; no tax gross-ups .
Beneficial Ownership (March 10, 2025, based on 202,537,757 shares outstanding)
| Holder | Common Shares (#) | Other Shares Acquirable ≤60 days (#) | Total Beneficial Ownership (#) | % of Class |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bill MacNevin | 56,142 | 20,087 | 76,229 | 0.038% |
Pledging/hedging:
- No pledging disclosures identified in proxy; anti-hedging policy prohibits derivative transactions to offset declines in equity value .
Employment Terms
Potential Payments Upon Termination or Change in Control (as of Dec 31, 2024; assumes $6.96 share price)
| Scenario | Cash Salary/Bonus Elements ($) | Equity/Benefits ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resignation | $392,486 prorated bonus | — | $392,486 |
| Termination for Cause | — | — | — |
| Termination without Cause or Resignation for Good Reason | Lump sum: 24 months base + 24 months average bonus or target bonus if <2 years | Prorated equity vesting; benefits continuation up to 24 months | $3,905,552 total |
| Retirement | $392,486 prorated bonus | Board discretion on RSUs/PSUs vesting | $392,486 |
| Disability | $392,486 prorated bonus | $2,185,266 equity; benefits cease; legacy U.S. plan exceptions noted | $2,577,752 |
| Death | $392,486 prorated bonus | $2,185,266 equity; immediate vesting | $2,577,752 |
| Qualifying Termination within 12 months post-Change-in-Control | Lump sum: 24 months base + 24 months average bonus or target bonus if <2 years | Full acceleration of RSUs/PSUs (PSUs at 100% performance); benefits to earlier of 24 months or new coverage | $4,562,723 total |
Restrictive covenants:
- Employment agreements include post-employment restrictive covenants; severance may be suspended/terminated upon breach .
Compensation Committee Analysis
- Peer group (2024): Alamos Gold, B2Gold, Centerra, Coeur, Dundee Precious Metals, Eldorado, Endeavour, Hecla, Hudbay, IAMGOLD, Equinox, Lundin Gold, OceanaGold, Pan American Silver .
- 2024 changes: Removed Agnico Eagle, Kinross, Newcrest; added Dundee, Hudbay, Lundin Gold .
- Consultants: Transitioned to Pay Governance in Oct 2024 ($64,415 fees); earlier advisor Compensation Advisory Partners ($61,326.25) .
Say-on-Pay & Shareholder Feedback
- 2024 Say-on-Pay approval: 55.81% vs ~95.26% average prior six years; Company undertook expanded shareholder outreach .
- 2025 proxy outreach: ISS recommended “FOR” Say-on-Pay and directors; Company contested Glass Lewis views and highlighted TSR recovery and retention award rationale .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: STI outcome tied to production, cost, and strategic execution; MacNevin’s 91% payout reflects strong individual performance amid challenged corporate metrics in 2024 (AISC and production misses) .
- Retention risk mitigated: $900k one-time retention bonus through June 2025 supports leadership stability post-Çöpler incident ; LTIP for MacNevin raised to 175% of salary (50/50 PSUs/RSUs) with added responsibilities .
- Selling pressure: PSUs settle in cash, reducing forced selling; RSUs settle in shares and vest annually, which may result in sell-to-cover activity; MacNevin meets 2x salary ownership guideline, improving alignment .
- Change-in-control economics: Double-trigger vesting and 24 months salary+bonus provide moderate protection without single-trigger windfalls; robust clawback and anti-hedging policies temper risk .
- Governance signal: Weak 2024 Say-on-Pay (55.81%) is a red flag; however, peer group recalibration and consultant transition suggest responsiveness to investor feedback . TSR rebound (122.9% since Feb 2024) indicates execution momentum that could support incentive realizations and sentiment .