Edward Farid
SSR MININGAbout Edward Farid
F. Edward Farid is Executive Vice President and Chief Strategy Officer of SSR Mining, appointed March 7, 2024, after serving as EVP, Chief Corporate Development Officer since September 2020; he previously joined Alacer Gold in 2017 and played a pivotal role in the at‑market merger with SSR Mining . He has nearly two decades of mining and investment banking experience and holds a Bachelor of Commerce in Finance from McGill University; age 40 . Company performance context during his tenure includes 2024 cumulative TSR of 36.33 vs. peer group 94.21, net income of $(352.6)M, and gold‑equivalent production of 399,267 ounces, which influenced incentive outcomes and pay‑versus‑performance alignment .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| SSR Mining | EVP, Chief Strategy Officer | 2024–present | Leads business strategy, M&A, portfolio, JVs, capital markets, financing, and commercial metal sales; role expanded during Çöpler recovery and CC&V acquisition evaluation . |
| SSR Mining | EVP, Chief Corporate Development Officer | 2020–2024 | Drove value‑accretive initiatives and portfolio management post‑merger . |
| Alacer Gold | Corporate development leadership | 2017–2020 | Pivotal in at‑market merger with SSR Mining . |
| Bulge‑bracket bank | Senior investment banker (precious/base metals) | pre‑2017 | Originated/advised/executed landmark financings and M&A in metals sectors . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| — | — | — | No public company board roles disclosed for Farid in the proxy . |
Fixed Compensation
| Element | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 580,000 | 550,000 |
| Target STI (% of salary) | 75% | 75% |
| STI Min/Max (% of salary) | 0% / 150% | 0% / 150% |
| Actual STI Paid ($) | 395,850 | 342,672 |
| Share‑Based Awards Grant‑Date Fair Value ($) | 1,015,000 | 825,000 |
| Other Compensation ($) | 27,600 | 23,704 |
| Total Compensation ($) | 2,018,450 | 1,741,376 |
- One‑time retention cash incentive approved March 6, 2024: $870,000, vesting June 6, 2025 if employed through the payment date or if terminated without Cause before then .
Performance Compensation
Short‑Term Incentive (STI) Framework and Results (Corporate)
| 2024 STI Goal | Metric Weight | Threshold | Target | Stretch | 2024 Performance | Payout % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TRIFR | 5% | 2.10 | 1.90 | Fatality=0 | Fatality | 0.00% |
| Leadership in the Field (CCV interactions) | 5% | 8,900 | 10,000 | — | 11,394 | 10.00% |
| Water Efficiency | 5% | 89% | +2% & 2 projects | +3% & 3 projects | 90% | 3.75% |
| Sustainability | 5% | Plans defined | Quarterly reporting; commitments; grievance process | Stretch criteria met | Stretch | 10.00% |
| Gold‑equivalent ounces produced | 30% | 540k | 570k | 630k | 399,267 | 0.00% |
| AISC per ounce (IFRS) | 30% | $1,625 | $1,600 | $1,545 | $1,873 | 0.00% |
| Strategic initiatives (Board‑defined) | 20% | Board | Board | Board | 200% | 40.00% |
| Total Corporate Score | 100% | — | — | — | — | 63.75% |
- Farid’s STI weighting: 80% corporate, 20% individual; individual performance factor 200%, producing a composite payout score of 91.00% of target for 2024 .
Long‑Term Incentive (LTI) Structure and Grants
| Component | 2024 Target (% of salary) | 2024 Grant Date | Units Granted (#) | Settlement | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs | 87.5% | 1‑Apr‑2024 | 116,505 | Cash | Cliff vest Apr 1, 2027; 3‑yr performance (Production, ROI, Relative TSR; payout 0–200%) . |
| RSUs | 87.5% | 1‑Apr‑2024 | 116,505 | Shares | Time‑based; vest dates: Apr 1, 2025; Oct 1, 2025; Apr 1, 2026; Oct 1, 2026; Apr 1, 2027 . |
- PSU metric details: equal weighting of gold‑equivalent production (vs budgets), ROI target 5% (Board‑set at grant), and relative TSR with caps if absolute TSR negative or bottom quartile performance; total PSU payout capped at 200% .
- 2022 PSU performance (vested Mar 7, 2025): overall score 25.74%; Farid payout $65,398 (based on 26,562 PSUs at vest date VWAP $9.57) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Ownership Item | Amount |
|---|---|
| Common Shares Beneficially Owned (#) | 101,620 |
| Shares Acquirable Within 60 Days (#) | 19,417 |
| Total Beneficial Ownership (#) | 121,037 |
| Ownership as % of Outstanding | 0.060% (out of 202,537,757 shares) |
| RSUs Unvested (#) | 97,087 (2024 grant) + 14,913 (2023 grant) + 5,908 (2022 grant) |
| PSUs Unvested (#) | 116,505 (2024 grant) + 33,547 (2023 grant) |
| Stock Ownership Guideline | 2× salary; includes full RSU value and 50% of granted PSUs |
| Compliance Status | Meets guideline; total holdings value $2,099,316.96 vs $1,160,000 requirement (assumes $6.96 share price) . |
| Hedging/Pledging | Anti‑hedging policy prohibits derivative transactions; no pledging disclosure specific to Farid . |
- RSUs settle in shares (potential secondary‑market supply at vest), PSUs settle in cash (no direct share issuance on vest) .
Employment Terms
| Provision | Term |
|---|---|
| Severance (without Cause or for Good Reason) | Lump sum equal to 24 months’ base salary + 24 months’ average annual bonus; prorated bonus for employed portion; RSUs/PSUs prorated vesting; insurance benefits continue up to 24 months . |
| Change‑of‑Control (double trigger, within 12 months) | Same cash severance multiples; all unvested RSUs vest; all unvested PSUs vest at 100% performance . |
| Restrictive Covenants | Non‑compete: 1 year; Non‑solicit: greater of 1 year or months of termination pay; indefinite confidentiality & non‑disparagement . |
| Clawback Policy | SEC‑aligned clawback of incentive comp for restatements (3 prior fiscal years) and discretionary clawback for certain bad acts . |
| Anti‑Hedging/Insider Trading | Robust insider trading policy; anti‑hedging of derivative securities . |
| Tax Gross‑Ups | No tax gross‑ups to executives . |
| Options | Company does not grant options; NEO equity is RSUs/PSUs . |
- Illustrative potential payouts for Farid (as of Dec 31, 2024): without Cause/Good Reason total $3,605,891; with Change‑in‑Control total $4,105,110; resignation $298,412 (bonus) .
Performance Compensation Details (Scorecards)
Farid 2024 STI Outcome Summary
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| Target Bonus (% of salary) | 75% |
| Corporate Score | 63.75% |
| Individual Score | 200% |
| Composite Payout (% of target) | 91.00% |
| Actual STI Cash ($) | 395,850 |
2022 PSU Performance Components
| Metric | Target | Performance | Weighting | Score | Weighted Result |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Production (3 years aggregate) | 2,090,243 oz eq. | 1,729,980 oz eq. | 33.333% | 3.51% | 10.541% |
| ROI (annual targets 5%) | 5.00% / 5.00% / 5.00% | 1.63% / 8.54% / (6.79)% | 33.333% | 0% / 200% / 0% | 66.667% |
| Relative TSR | 25th/50th/75th percentile | Percentile achieved: 0.00% | 33.333% | 0% | 0% |
| Total PSU Score | — | — | — | — | 25.74% |
| Farid PSU Payout ($) | — | — | — | — | 65,398 |
Investment Implications
- Pay‑for‑performance design remains intact: 2024 corporate STI paid 63.75% amid Çöpler shutdown, elevated AISC, and lower production; Farid’s STI outcome (91% of target) reflects high individual performance against strategic imperatives, while LTI PSUs include ROI and relative TSR safeguards that capped payouts in weak TSR scenarios .
- Near‑term vesting and potential selling pressure: RSUs vest on Apr 1, 2025 and Oct 1, 2025, with additional tranches through 2027; PSUs settle in cash, reducing direct share issuance; monitor Form 4s around vest dates for potential supply from RSU settlements .
- Retention and change‑of‑control economics: A $870,000 retention bonus through June 6, 2025 and double‑trigger CIC terms mitigate retention risk but create known cash obligations; severance multiples (24 months salary+bonus) are substantial, particularly in a strategic transaction context .
- Governance and compensation risk signals: Anti‑hedging and SEC‑aligned clawback policies are strong; absence of tax gross‑ups and no options is shareholder‑friendly; however, 2024 say‑on‑pay approval was 55.81%, prompting enhanced disclosure and ESG metric weighting increases (ESG to 30% in 2025 STI), which may influence future incentive structures and payouts .