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Robert R. Franklin, Jr.

Robert R. Franklin, Jr.

Chief Executive Officer at Stellar Bancorp
CEO
Executive
Board

About Robert R. Franklin, Jr.

Robert R. Franklin, Jr. is Chief Executive Officer of Stellar Bancorp, Inc. (STEL) and Executive Chairman of Stellar Bank; he serves as a Class III director of the Company and director of the Bank (age 70). He became CEO/director at the October 1, 2022 merger of equals between Allegiance and CBTX, having previously served as CBTX’s Chairman, President and CEO (2013–2022) . Education: B.B.A. in Finance, University of Texas at Austin (1977) . 2024 performance highlights under his leadership: net income $115.0 million; diluted EPS $2.15; ROAA 1.08%; ROE 7.34%; ROATCE 11.91%; dividend raised to $0.14; tangible book value per share up 12% to $19.05; Tier 1 leverage rose to 11.31%; noninterest-bearing deposits 39.2%; NCOs 0.09% of average loans . Long-horizon TSR from 1/1/2020 through 12/31/2024 approximated 100.49 vs 123.92 for the peer index referenced in 2024 (S&P 600), indicating relative underperformance over that span .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic impact
CBTX, Inc.Chairman, President & CEO2013–2022Led growth culminating in 2022 MOE with Allegiance to form Stellar Bancorp .
VB Texas, Inc.Chairman, President & CEO2006–2013Merged VB Texas, Inc. with CBTX in 2013, providing platform for later MOE .
Horizon Capital BankPresidentUntil 2005Led operations until sale to Cullen/Frost Bankers, Inc. in 2005 .
American BankPresident1988–2001Led until sale to Whitney Holding Corp. in early 2001 .
Regional/Community banksVarious roles>40-year Houston banking careerExtensive lending, ALM and O&G credit expertise paired with community banking leadership .

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic impact
Junior Achievement of Southeast TexasBoard memberCurrentCommunity/education engagement in Houston market .
Texas Bankers AssociationFormer board memberPrior serviceIndustry advocacy and governance exposure .
Local private schoolBoard servicePrior serviceCommunity leadership; local relationships .

Fixed Compensation

Component202220232024
Base salary ($)573,750 745,000 785,000
Target annual bonus (% of salary)85% (employment terms) 85% (employment terms) 95% (raised +10 pts)
Actual annual incentive ($)— (AIP shown as $0 in SCT) 527,972 (AIP); plus $92,613 discretionary integration bonus 763,151 (AIP at 102.33% of target)

Notes:

  • Committee increased CEO’s target bonus by 10 percentage points in 2024 to improve competitiveness .
  • Majority of CEO pay is variable/at-risk; program emphasizes pay-for-performance .

Performance Compensation

  • Annual cash incentive (AIP) design (2024): three metrics, straight-line interpolation; minimum 0%, target 100%, max 150% .
MetricWeightMinimumTargetMaximumActual (2024)Payout logic
ROATCE50%7.0%11.25%–12.25%14.0%12.00%Near midpoint of target range .
Pre-tax, pre-provision ROAA30%1.10%1.40%–1.55%1.75%1.35%Slightly below target band .
Net charge-offs / Avg Loans (bp)20%3525 to 2059Better than target (lower is better) .
  • 2024 AIP result: 102.33% of target; CEO payout $763,151 (95% target on $785k base) .
  • Long-term incentives (granted Mar 15, 2024): 60% PSUs / 40% RSAs for CEO .
    • RSAs: 16,404 shares; vest 1/3 on Mar 15, 2025/2026/2027 .
    • PSUs: target 24,607; earned 0–200% based on 3-year relative TSR vs S&P U.S. SmallCap Bank Index; threshold 20th percentile; target 45th–55th; max 75th; cliff-vest after the period (Dec 31, 2026) if employed .
  • 2022 and 2023 PSA/PSU cohorts: 2022 PSAs estimated earned at 210% of target as of 12/31/2024; 2023 PSAs estimated at 100% of target; changes/vesting per plan and transaction provisions .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

ItemDetail
Beneficial ownership (3/26/2025)357,444 shares (289,032 held directly; 34,505 PSAs outstanding; 33,907 RSAs outstanding; PSUs not included) — <1% of shares outstanding .
Shares outstanding52,266,729 (3/26/2025) .
PledgingHistorical pledge disclosed: 101,600 shares pledged (2024 proxy); policy discourages pledging and requires prior notice; CG&N Committee oversees outstanding pledges .
Ownership guidelinesAdopted Feb 26, 2025: CEO 5x base salary; directors 5x cash retainer; other execs 2x; 5-year accumulation window .
Post-vest holdingOne-year post-vest hold for 2025-and-later equity grants for executives .
HedgingProhibited for executive officers; preclearance and window trading required .
Director payEmployee directors (incl. CEO) receive no director fees; director equity is separate and time-vested for non-employees .

Vesting/selling pressure calendar:

  • RSAs: annual tranches each March 15, 2025–2027 .
  • PSUs: cliff in 2026 (12/31/2026) with shares delivered after certification; additional cohorts in 2025/2027 per plan cycles .

Employment Terms

TermKey provisions
Agreement/termCEO employment agreement effective at MOE; annual auto-renewals each Oct 1 unless 60-day notice .
Minimum base/targetsMinimum base $645,000; target bonus 85% of base; target annual equity 125% of base (plan targets; committee may exceed) .
Severance (no CIC)Greater of $1.5 million or 2x base salary; pro-rata target bonus; 18 months COBRA; accelerated service-based vesting for specified awards; performance awards remain subject to actual performance; release required .
Change-in-control planSeparate CoC Severance Plan: CEO multiple = 3.0x (base + target bonus), pro-rata target bonus, 18 months benefit contribution, outplacement up to $25k; reduction to avoid excess parachute tax if better after-tax; 3 months pre–18 months post CoC window .
Non-compete2 years post-employment within 50-mile radius of any bank location .
Non-solicit2 years (customers and employees) .
ClawbackExecutive officer clawback policy adopted Oct 2, 2023 per SEC/NYSE rules .
Post-vest holdOne-year hold for equity vesting in 2025 and beyond .
Illustrative payoutsAs of 12/31/2024: totals shown for various scenarios (e.g., Involuntary Termination in connection with CoC: $8.26 million total for CEO, including equity and benefits) .

Performance & Track Record

  • 2024 financial and balance sheet outcomes (see About): earnings quality, capital, TBV growth, dividend increase, deposit mix, asset quality .
  • Pay Versus Performance (2019–2024 trend excerpts): Cumulative TSR since 1/1/2020 at 100.49 vs peer 123.92; Net income $115.0 million; EPS $2.15 in 2024 .
  • Section 16(a) compliance: one inadvertent late filing in 2024 for Mr. Franklin (and Mr. Retzloff) related to PSA forfeitures .

Selected performance table

Metric202220232024
Net income ($mm)51.40 130.50 115.00
EPS ($)1.48 2.45 2.15
TSR (Cumulative since 1/1/2020; $100 basis)100.17 96.64 100.49

Major initiatives/achievements:

  • Completed MOE integration and core conversion; shareholder say-on-pay support ~96.5% in 2024; updates to corporate governance (declassification proposal, director resignation policy, shareholder rights enhancements) and adoption of ownership guidelines .

Board Governance

  • Roles: CEO and Class III director of Company; Executive Chairman of the Bank; not listed as a standing committee member (committee matrix) .
  • Board structure: Executive Chairman (Retzloff); CEO (Franklin); Lead Independent Director (Beckworth); 12 of 14 directors are independent per NYSE/SEC; independent executive sessions held 4x in 2024 .
  • Classified board phase-out: Board proposes declassification, with all directors up for annual elections by 2028 .
  • Meetings/attendance: Board met 5 times in 2024; all directors except one attended ≥75% of Board/committee meetings; 12 directors attended 2024 annual meeting .
  • Director compensation (context): Employee directors (e.g., CEO) receive no director compensation; non-employee director program includes cash retainers and annual restricted stock (target $60k) .

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Mix and alignment: Majority of CEO comp is variable/at-risk across AIP and performance-based equity; 2024 program increased CEO target bonus to 95% and weighted LTI 60% to PSUs measured on multi-year relative TSR, reinforcing long-term alignment .
  • Metric rigor: 2024 AIP balanced profitability (ROATCE, PTPP ROAA) and credit cost discipline (NCO/Loans). Targets acknowledged macro headwinds vs 2023 actuals; payout modestly above target (102.33%), consistent with mixed results (PTPP ROAA slightly below target; ROATCE within target; credit costs favorable) .
  • Governance safeguards: No excise tax gross-ups; hedging prohibited; clawback adopted in 2023; no option repricing without shareholder approval; minimum vesting and one-year post-vest holding adopted in 2025 .
  • Peer benchmarking: 2024 peer group includes regional banks such as IBOC, NBHC, Renasant, ServisFirst, Trustmark, Veritex, etc.; Committee used independent advisors (NFP, then Aon) .

Related Party Transactions

  • Ordinary-course banking transactions with insiders occur on market terms; Company policies (including Regulation O, Sections 23A/23B) and Related Person Transactions Policy require Audit Committee review and fairness .

Equity Ownership & Director/Executive Policies

  • Stock ownership guidelines (CEO 5x salary) and post-vest one-year hold adopted in 2025, enhancing alignment; pledging discouraged and overseen by CG&N Committee; CEO historically pledged 101,600 shares (2024), a governance consideration mitigated by policy oversight .

Compensation Peer Group (2024)

1st Source; Amerant; BancFirst; Berkshire Hills; CVB Financial; Enterprise Financial Services; FB Financial; First Financial Bankshares; First Busey; Independent Bank Group; International Bancshares; National Bank Holdings; Origin Bancorp; Renasant; Sandy Spring; Seacoast Banking; ServisFirst; Southside Bancshares; Trustmark; Veritex .

Say-on-Pay & Shareholder Feedback

  • 2024 say-on-pay approval ~96.5%; outreach to top holders focused on governance and comp; responses generally supportive; governance enhancements enacted (declassification proposal, director resignation policy, special meeting rights, shareholder bylaw amendment rights) .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: Elevated at-risk mix (ROATCE/PTPP ROAA/credit costs in cash bonus; multi-year relative TSR in PSUs) and adoption of ownership guidelines and post-vest hold strengthen alignment with long-term value creation .
  • Retention risk: Robust severance protections (non-CIC and CIC) and restrictive covenants reduce turnover risk; CEO’s CIC multiple (3.0x) is at the higher end but standard for bank CEOs of similar size, balanced by clawback and governance controls .
  • Selling pressure windows: Time-based RSAs vest annually (March 15, 2025–2027); PSUs cliff at year-end 2026; historical share pledge exists; policy oversight on pledging/insider trading reduces disorderly sale risk; watch Form 4s around vest dates .
  • Execution: 2024 delivered healthy capital, TBVPS growth, credit quality and dividend increase; AIP paid near target reflecting balanced performance; however, longer-run TSR since 2020 trails peer index — sustained improvement in profitability (PTPP ROAA) and credit/leverage discipline could drive future PSU outcomes and relative TSR .