Joerg Ambrosius
About Joerg Ambrosius
Executive Vice President and President of Investment Services since September 2024, with global oversight of client management, sales, product, marketing and sustainability; previously Chief Commercial Officer and head of State Street’s European business. Tenure recognized from July 1, 2001; Managing Director of State Street Holdings Germany GmbH since November 12, 2008; member of State Street’s Executive Committee and registered executive officer of State Street Corporation . Company performance context for incentives: 2024 fee revenue +6.3% YoY to $10,075mm, total revenue +6.2% to $13,000mm, pre-tax margin 27.6%, EPS $8.67, ROE (GAAP) 11.1%, and TSR exceeded the KBW Bank Index on 3- and 5-year bases .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| State Street Corporation | President of Investment Services (EVP) | Sep 2024–Present | Leads all client-facing activities globally; accountable for strategy, execution, client experience, and revenue/margin growth targets . |
| State Street Corporation | Chief Commercial Officer; head of European business | Pre-2024–Sep 2024 | Advanced financial/strategic outcomes, strengthened global sales and client management capabilities . |
| State Street Holdings Germany GmbH (SSHG) | Managing Director | Nov 2008–Present | Responsible for lawful operation of SSHG within European holding group; oversees continental European IS strategy and regulatory compliance . |
External Roles
No external public company directorships or committee roles disclosed for Mr. Ambrosius in State Street filings .
Fixed Compensation
| Component | 2024 (USD) | 2025 Target (EUR) | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary | Included in Annual Fixed Pay $2,579,000 | €650,000 | 2024 “Annual Fixed Pay” includes salary + fixed allowance; 2025 base per German service agreement. |
| Fixed Allowance | Included in Annual Fixed Pay $2,579,000 | €2,500,000 (delivered via €625,000 US fixed pay + €1,875,000 EU role-based allowance) | 10/24/2025 variation letter reduced EU role-based allowance to €1,875,000; US employment letter adds €625,000 fixed pay to keep total fixed allowance €2.5mm. |
| Total Fixed Pay | $2,579,000 | €3,150,000 | Sum of base salary and fixed allowance for 2025 target. |
Performance Compensation
Incentive Delivery Mix (2024)
| Vehicle | Amount (USD) | Vesting / Retention | Design Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Immediate Cash | $651,052 | Paid immediately | Part of cash-based incentive; Germany requirement: 15% immediate cash . |
| Deferred Cash (DVAs) | $868,070; dividends credited $86,499 | Vests in 5 equal annual installments beginning Feb 2026; notionally invested in MMF | Germany requirement: 20% DVAs . |
| Deferred Stock Awards (DSAs) | $1,085,000 | For Ambrosius: immediately vested, subject to 12‑month post-vest retention | Germany equity retention requirement . |
| Performance-Based RSUs | $1,736,000 | Earned over 3-year performance period; vests in one installment post-certification | Design below. |
| Total Incentive (Actual vs Target) | Actual $4,340,000; Target $3,472,000 | — | Corporate factor 115% and +10% individual modifier drove 125% of target . |
Performance-Based RSU Design (2025–2027 cycle)
| Metric / Modifier | Target | Range / Modifier | Weighting | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fee Revenue Growth (CAGR) | 3.0% for 100% payout | Threshold 1.0%, Target 3.0%, Max defined in matrix; bilinear interpolation; payout 0–150% | Not explicitly specified in filings | One installment after 3-year performance period . |
| Average Pre-Tax Margin | 27.5% for 100% payout | Threshold/Target/Max per matrix; bilinear interpolation | Not explicitly specified in filings | Same as above . |
| Relative TSR vs KBW Bank Index | +25%/0/–10%/–25% based on percentile rank | Modifier added/subtracted to earned %; capped at 150% | Modifier | Applied to earned % . |
| ROE (non‑GAAP) | Downward-only modifier 0 to –100% | Linear interpolation | Modifier | Applied to earned % . |
Prior-cycle outcome: performance-based RSUs granted for 2021 performance earned at 61.5% of target (design: equal weighting across ROE, pre-tax margin, fee revenue growth, plus modifiers) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Beneficial ownership: 14,509 shares; each NEO individually owns <1% of outstanding common stock (288,590,984 shares as of Mar 3, 2025) .
- Stock ownership guideline: 5x base salary; Ambrosius exceeds pro-rata guideline but not full; required to hold 50% of net shares until guideline met; then 100% hold if still below guideline after phase-in .
- Prohibitions: No short selling, hedging, options trading, pledging, or speculative transactions in State Street securities .
- 10b5‑1 plans: No adoption by Ambrosius in Q3 2025 (only one EVP adopted a plan; none other executive officers) .
- 2024 stock vesting realized: 12,170 shares vested ($892,282), comprising DSAs 8,740 and performance RSUs 3,430 (CRSUs not applicable to Ambrosius) .
- Germany equity retention: All equity-based incentive comp (PBRSUs, DSAs) subject to 12-month post-vest retention; DSAs immediately vested .
Employment Terms
- US Employment Agreement: Effective Jan 1, 2025; Bank title EVP; fixed pay €625,000; covenant not to compete after employment ends; governing law Massachusetts .
- Germany Service Agreement: Effective Jan 1, 2025; fixed annual gross salary €650,000; role-based allowance permitted; benefits include company car, accident insurance, pension continuation, capital-forming benefits (€40/month), meal allowance (€46.50/month grossed-up) .
- Non-solicitation: 18 months post-termination (with California/New York carve-outs); reduced by any notice period served .
- Non-compete: 12 months following termination for Cause; ends upon involuntary termination not for Cause in Massachusetts; restricted area/capacity defined; notice upon resignation: 180 days (with garden leave option) .
- Severance: Involuntary termination without Cause—Ambrosius not entitled to formulaic cash severance; maximum severance under local regulations estimated equal to current base salary until retirement age 67; maximum current-year incentive equals actual 2024 incentive under local regulations; deferred incentive awards continue to vest per original terms .
- Change of Control: Double-trigger required for acceleration and cash payments; PBRSUs valued using “adjusted fair market value” ($100.55) and paid based on certified performance; DVAs and service-based restrictions lapse/accelerate for U.S. NEOs; health & welfare benefits and outplacement for two years (U.S. context) .
- Clawback: NYSE 303A.14 Compensation Recovery Policy adopted; recovery of erroneously awarded incentive-based compensation upon accounting restatement; all awards subject to broader clawback/forfeiture aligned with banking regulations .
Compensation Committee Analysis (Program context)
- Peer groups: Compensation Peer Group (19 companies) includes direct peers Northern Trust and BNY Mellon; KBW Bank Index used for relative performance and TSR modifier; Broadridge removed from Compensation Peer Group for 2024 .
- Consultant: Meridian Compensation Partners (independent); additional data from Willis Towers Watson and McLagan .
- Say-on-Pay: ~93% support at 2024 annual meeting; ongoing shareholder outreach (contacted ~57% of shares outstanding) .
Performance & Track Record
- HRC rated Ambrosius’ 2024 individual performance “Above Expectations”, citing improved fee and servicing fee revenue vs 2023, strengthened pipeline and sales operations, and improved client sentiment; applied +10% individual modifier; total incentive awarded at 125% of target .
- Business initiatives: At Barclays conference, Ambrosius highlighted private markets as growth driver (Q2 YoY revenue +19%; segment ~10% of fee revenue) and progress on Alpha front‑to‑back platform toward 2025 goals .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Heavy deferred and equity-based incentives (DSAs with 12-month retention; PBRSUs 3‑year performance + TSR/ROE modifiers) tightly couple realized pay to fee revenue growth and margin outcomes over time; stock ownership guideline and hold requirements further align interests .
- Retention risk: 180‑day notice, 18‑month non-solicit, and 12‑month non‑compete (for Cause) reduce attrition risk; Germany severance mechanics (base until 67 under max local regs) and continued vesting of deferred awards under certain separations temper exit incentives .
- Selling pressure: Immediate vest DSAs plus 12‑month retention and Germany deferrals (DVAs 5‑year) moderate near‑term selling; no 10b5‑1 plan adoption by Ambrosius in Q3 2025 suggests limited pre‑scheduled sales in near term .
- Pay-for-performance focus: PBRSUs tied to 3% fee revenue CAGR and 27.5% pre‑tax margin targets, with relative TSR and ROE modifiers, indicate management confidence in structural fee/margin expansion; prior cycle earned at 61.5% shows downside risk if targets are missed .
- Governance safeguards: Robust clawbacks, double‑trigger CoC, prohibition on hedging/pledging, and strong say‑on‑pay support reduce governance red flags and compensation inflation risk .