Thomas R. Peck, Jr.
Executive Vice President, Chief Information and Digital Officer at SYY
Executive
About Thomas R. Peck, Jr.
Thomas R. Peck, Jr. is Executive Vice President and Chief Information and Digital Officer at Sysco, serving in this role since 2021; he was previously EVP, Chief Information and Digital Officer at Ingram Micro (2018–2020) . He is 58 years old . Sysco’s FY2025 performance context for incentive alignment: sales rose 3.2% to $81.4B, adjusted operating income was $3.5B, GAAP EPS was $3.73 and adjusted EPS was $4.46; adjusted EBITDA increased 2.4% year-over-year, while EBITDA decreased 1.2% on a GAAP basis . Over recent years, Sysco’s shareholder return index reached 164 (fixed $100 basis), framing pay-versus-performance analysis .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sysco Corporation | EVP, Chief Information and Digital Officer | 2021–present | Leads multi-year technology transformation critical to Sysco’s Algorithm for Growth; one-time PSU granted to focus retention and delivery |
| Ingram Micro Inc. | EVP, Chief Information and Digital Officer | 2018–2020 | Enterprise-scale CIO experience in global distribution/technology services |
External Roles
- None disclosed in the cited filings for Thomas R. Peck, Jr. .
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 678,480 | 726,354 | 760,385 |
| Target Annual Incentive (% of Base) | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| Annual Incentive Paid ($) | 645,847 | 687,000 | 504,000 |
Notes:
- FY2025 AIP payout reflects aggregate plan result of 66.34% for all NEOs, applied with a 1.00 individual modifier .
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) – FY2025 Design and Outcomes
| Metric | Weight | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual Result | % of Target |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Income (adjusted) | 50% | $3.516B | $3.742B | $3.899B | $3.523B | 51.52% |
| Sales Revenue | 20% | $80.421B | $83.181B | $85.152B | $81.370B | 67.19% |
| Local Case Growth | 10% | 0.50% | 4.00% | 6.00% | 0.60% | 51.40% |
| USBL Cost per Piece | 10% | 103% of Target | 100% | 97% of Target | 102% | 70.00% |
| Engagement Improvement | 10% | -1% | 1% | 3% | 2% | 150.00% |
- FY2025 AIP total payout factor was 66.34% for NEOs (applied to Peck’s base × target %) and paid shortly after July 31, 2025 decision .
Long-Term Incentive Plan (LTIP) – FY2025 Mix, Metrics, and Grants
| Component | LTIP Mix | Performance Metrics / Vesting | FY2025 Grants (Peck) |
|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs | 50% of LTIP | 3-year performance (FY2025–FY2027) on Adjusted EPS (37.5%), ROIC (37.5%), Revenue (25%); TSR modifier ±25% vs S&P 500; cliff vest at end of period; dividends accrue only if earned | Target 17,642 PSUs (Aug 21, 2024), grant-date fair value $76.54/PSU |
| RSUs | 30% of LTIP | Time-based, vest ratably over 3 years; dividend equivalents paid at vest | 10,585 RSUs (Aug 21, 2024), vests 1/3 on Aug 21 of 2025/2026/2027 |
| Stock Options | 20% of LTIP | 10-year term; vest ratably over 3 years | 27,876 options @ $76.54 strike (Aug 21, 2024), vest schedule as above |
One-time PSU award for technology transformation:
- Value $1.5M; binary payout (0% if any metric unmet; 100% if all met) over 3-year period (performance period 1/31/2025–1/31/2028); special termination treatment to enhance retention (forfeiture upon retirement/resignation; pro-rata at target on death; pro-rata at actual performance on disability; full vest at target upon termination without cause following change in control) .
FY2023 PSU payout (certified in FY2025 for FY2023–FY2025 cycle):
- EPS (50%) result: $4.26 average adjusted EPS vs $4.46 target → 48.69% payout; Market Share Growth (50%) result: 1.45x vs 1.40x target → 110% payout; TSR modifier: 25.2nd percentile → -23.20%; aggregate payout 56.14% .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Ownership/Grant Detail (as of Sept 17, 2025 or June 28, 2025) | Amount |
|---|---|
| Common shares owned directly | 45,456 |
| Options (within 60 days exercisable/other outstanding) | 119,454 underlying options (aggregate for Peck across option series) |
| Total beneficial ownership (direct + options + RSUs considered per table method) | 164,910 shares |
| % of outstanding shares | <1% |
| Outstanding FY2024 PSUs (target incl. dividend equivalents) | 18,009 |
| Outstanding FY2024 RSUs (unvested) | 10,585 |
| Outstanding FY2024 Options (unexercisable) | 27,876 (exp. 8/20/2034; $76.54 strike) |
| Outstanding Special PSUs (Feb 2025; target) | 21,072 |
| Older options (examples) | 1,613/3,225 exercisable/unexercisable @ $69.95 (9/10/2033); 7,388/14,776 @ $73.53 (8/9/2033); 16,931/8,466 @ $85.57 (8/17/2032); 36,231 @ $76.94 (8/18/2031); 30,532 @ $76.14 (2/10/2031) |
Alignment policies:
- Stock ownership guideline for EVPs: 4× base salary; all NEOs exceeded or are on track within 5 years .
- Hedging and pledging prohibited for directors and executive officers; trades only via pre-approved Rule 10b5-1 plans during open windows and subject to cooling-off periods; pre-approval by Chair, Governance Chair, and CLO .
- Clawback: Dodd-Frank compliant plus enhanced policy to recoup incentive comp on restatement or misconduct causing material financial or reputational harm; applies to cash incentives and outstanding equity/deferrals (SERP/EDCP/MSP contributions may be subject) .
Employment Terms
Severance and change-of-control:
- Standard EVP Severance Agreement (Peck):
- Non-CIC termination without cause or resignation for good reason: 2× base salary; pro-rated AIP based on actual performance; COBRA premium reimbursement for 18 months; up to 12 months outplacement .
- CIC termination without cause or resignation for good reason (double trigger within 24 months): 2× (base + target AIP); pro-rated AIP based on actual performance; COBRA reimbursement for 18 months; up to 12 months outplacement; double-trigger accelerated vesting consistent with plan rules .
Quantification at June 28, 2025:
| Scenario (Thomas R. Peck, Jr.) | Severance ($) | PSU Payments ($) | RSU/Option Acceleration ($) | Insurance ($) | Other ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Involuntary Termination w/o Cause or Resignation for Good Reason | 1,530,000 | — | — | 13,896 | 66,438 |
| Termination w/o Cause following a Change in Control | 3,060,000 | 4,302,285 | 1,524,944 | 13,896 | 66,438 |
| Death | — | 2,935,286 | 1,524,944 | 1,200,000 | 41,438 |
| Disability | — | 2,935,286 | 1,524,944 | 2,199,000 | 41,438 |
Other governance and pay practice safeguards:
- No excise tax gross-ups upon change in control; double trigger vesting required .
- FY2026 AIP sharpened focus (removed Engagement metric) with financial/SBO weights 70%/30% .
- Independent consultant (Semler Brossy) supports peer benchmarking and pay-for-performance alignment .
- Say-on-pay approval was 93.80% in 2024 (93.37% in 2023) .
Compensation Structure Analysis
| Component (Thomas R. Peck, Jr.) | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stock Awards ($) | 1,448,101 | 2,029,257 | 3,718,003 |
| Option Awards ($) | 614,607 | 514,479 | 535,498 |
| Non-Equity Incentive ($) | 645,847 | 687,000 | 504,000 |
- Shift toward equity-based compensation in FY2025 (stock awards up ~83% vs FY2024) increases at-risk, multi-year alignment; cash incentive declined consistent with below-target AIP outcomes (66.34%) .
- LTIP target opportunity set at 350% of base for EVPs (Peck: $2,677,500 target), with PSU-heavy mix and TSR modifier capping at 200% .
Investment Implications
- Strong retention and execution alignment: Binary, special PSUs for technology transformation (0%/100%), combined with standard PSU metrics (EPS/ROIC/Revenue) plus TSR modifier, create high-performance sensitivity and retention hooks through FY2028; forfeiture provisions on retirement/resignation reduce near-term voluntary exit risk .
- Selling pressure mitigants: Required stock ownership (4× salary), 10b5-1 plan-only trading, blackout windows, and hedging/pledging prohibitions limit opportunistic selling and promote long-term holding behavior .
- Pay-for-performance discipline: FY2025 AIP paid below target (66.34%) across metrics; FY2023 PSU cycle paid 56.14% after negative TSR modifier, evidencing downside realization when performance lags, which supports valuation discipline .
- Change-in-control economics: Double-trigger CIC payout for Peck (illustrative $3.06M cash plus equity acceleration) is material but aligned with market EVP norms and lacks excise tax gross-ups, moderating shareholder risk; the special PSUs vest at target in CIC termination consistent with retention objectives .
- Macro linkage: Sysco’s FY2025 growth (sales +3.2%, adj. EBITDA +2.4%) and International strength underpin incentive targets; however, GAAP EBITDA (-1.2%) and operating income pressure highlight execution risk in achieving multi-year PSU metrics, pertinent for evaluating realized comp vs targets .
Overall, Peck’s package is heavily equity and performance weighted with explicit technology-transformation deliverables, clear retention architecture, and robust governance safeguards—signals consistent with sustained execution incentives and moderated short-term selling risk .