Philip Whitehead
About Philip Whitehead
Philip M. Whitehead, 47, is President and CEO of Molson Coors EMEA&APAC (effective January 2025). He previously served as Managing Director, Western Europe (Dec 2019–Jan 2025), Managing Director, UK & Ireland (Sep 2016–Dec 2019), Chief Supply Chain Officer for 12 European markets (Oct 2014–Sep 2016), Commercial Director (Jan 2011–Oct 2014), and joined Molson Coors in 2008 as Logistics Director . Compensation and incentives at Molson Coors emphasize pay-for-performance with MCIP tied to Underlying Income Before Income Taxes, Underlying Free Cash Flow (FCF), Underlying Net Sales Revenue (NSR), and People & Planet, and LTIP emphasizing PSUs with a Relative TSR modifier; 2024 enterprise MCIP paid at 97% and the EMEA&APAC unit (the business he now leads) paid at 101% based on 2024 results, while the 2022–2024 PSU cycle achieved maximum TSR and above‑target financials (details below) .
Key performance context (company- and EMEA&APAC-level):
- 2024 enterprise MCIP payout: 97%; EMEA&APAC MCIP payout: 101% .
- 2022–2024 PSU results: Relative TSR 81st percentile (200% of target), Cumulative Underlying Pre‑Tax Income $4,292mm vs $3,906mm target (149%), Cumulative Underlying NSR $34,705mm vs $33,860mm target (150%) .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Dates | Scope/Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Molson Coors | President & CEO, EMEA&APAC | Jan 2025–present | Oversees EMEA&APAC region leadership and performance . |
| Molson Coors | Managing Director, Western Europe | Dec 2019–Jan 2025 | Regional commercial leadership in Western Europe . |
| Molson Coors | Managing Director, UK & Ireland | Sep 2016–Dec 2019 | Country P&L and go‑to‑market leadership in UK & Ireland . |
| Molson Coors | Chief Supply Chain Officer (12 European markets) | Oct 2014–Sep 2016 | Led supply chain for 12 European markets . |
| Molson Coors | Commercial Director | Jan 2011–Oct 2014 | Commercial leadership roles prior to supply chain role . |
| Molson Coors | Logistics Director | 2008–Jan 2011 | Joined Molson Coors in logistics leadership . |
External Roles
- Not disclosed in the 2025 Proxy for Mr. Whitehead .
Fixed Compensation
- Structure: Base salary used to provide competitive fixed pay; annual targets reviewed each year by the Compensation & HR Committee/Board .
- MCIP target design (role comparator): In 2024, the EMEA&APAC leader role (held then by Sergey Yeskov) had a 90% of salary MCIP target, with basis 75% EMEA&APAC business unit and 25% individual goals; this illustrates the role design that typically applies to the EMEA&APAC head, though Mr. Whitehead’s specific target was not disclosed .
| Role (2024) | Target Award (% salary) | Basis of MCIP Award |
|---|---|---|
| President & CEO, EMEA&APAC (held by S. Yeskov in 2024) | 90% | 75% EMEA&APAC; 25% Individual |
Performance Compensation
Annual MCIP – 2024 Metric Framework and Outcomes
Enterprise (company-wide):
| Metric | Weight | Threshold | Target | Max | Actual | Payout (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Underlying Income Before Income Taxes ($mm) | 45% | 1,433 | 1,592 | 1,831 | 1,621 | 112% |
| Underlying FCF ($mm) | 18% | 1,023 | 1,203 | 1,564 | 1,248 | 112% |
| Underlying NSR ($mm) | 27% | 11,459 | 11,936 | 12,414 | 11,693 | 62% |
| People & Planet Scorecard | 10% | — | — | — | — | 95% |
| Total payout | — | — | — | — | — | 97% |
EMEA&APAC business unit (local currency):
| Metric | Weight | Threshold | Target | Max | Actual | Payout (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Underlying Income Before Income Taxes (€mm) | 45% | 138 | 162 | 211 | 172 | 120% |
| Underlying FCF (€mm) | 18% | 139 | 163 | 212 | 157 | 83% |
| Underlying NSR (€mm) | 27% | 2,130 | 2,219 | 2,308 | 2,203 | 86% |
| People & Planet Scorecard | 10% | — | — | — | — | 95% |
| Total payout | — | — | — | — | — | 101% |
Program highlights and weighting summary:
- 2024 MCIP metrics and qualitative scorecard used across enterprise and business units; framework balanced profitability, cash, top‑line, and ESG .
Long-Term Incentives (LTIP) – Structure and Results
LTIP award mix (2024):
| Award Type | 2024 Allocation | Shareholder Alignment |
|---|---|---|
| PSUs | 50% | Earned on multi‑year performance; 2024 grants based on Cumulative Underlying EPS with an 80–120% Relative TSR modifier . |
| RSUs | 25% | Value tied to stock price at vesting . |
| Stock Options | 25% | Value realized only if stock price increases from grant date . |
PSU framework and realized results (2022–2024 PSU cycle):
| Performance Metric | Weight | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Results | Score |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Relative TSR (vs S&P 500 Consumer Staples) | 50% | 25th %ile | 50th %ile | 75th %ile | 81st %ile | 200% |
| Cumulative Underlying Income Before Income Taxes ($mm, constant currency) | 25% | 3,515 | 3,906 | 4,687 | 4,292 | 149% |
| Cumulative Underlying NSR ($mm, constant currency) | 25% | 32,167 | 33,860 | 35,553 | 34,705 | 150% |
Grant mechanics and vesting:
- RSUs granted in 2024 vest on the third anniversary of grant; stock option exercise price equals NYSE closing price on grant date; no timing around MNPI and no off‑cycle grants for NEOs in 2024 .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Ownership policy and restrictions:
- Executive stock ownership guidelines: CEO 6x salary; Other NEOs 3x; Other Senior Executives 3x; five years to meet; RSUs count; options/PSUs do not. The proxy indicates compliance across categories as of disclosure date .
- Hedging/short sales: Prohibited for directors, executive officers, and employees .
- Pledging: Prohibited absent pre‑approval; insider pledges require Audit Committee approval; Audit Committee evaluates pledging risk and maintains contingency plans; outstanding pledges are disclosed in Beneficial Ownership footnotes .
Beneficial ownership disclosure:
- The proxy itemizes directors/NEOs and “all current directors, director nominees and executive officers as a group” but does not itemize Mr. Whitehead individually (he was not a 2024 NEO and is not a director); thus, his individual share/option holdings and any pledges are not disclosed in the proxy .
Broader stock overhang/market structure:
- Coors family entity ACC has 14.6 million Class B shares pledged (~7.2% of market cap as of record date); Audit Committee assessed these pledges are not reasonably likely to be materially adverse and maintains response plans .
- Share pool: Proposal to increase Incentive Compensation Plan reserve by 5,000,000 shares (subject to shareholder approval) .
Employment Terms
- Clawbacks: (i) Global Incentive Compensation Clawback Policy (Rule 10D‑1 compliant) covering executive officers for restatements, and (ii) Global Clawback Policy for Misconduct (2025) covering all current/former employees, allowing recovery of cash/equity awards for materially injurious misconduct .
- Change-in-control and severance: U.S. NEOs covered by a double‑trigger CIC program; no excise tax gross-ups; participation requires confidentiality and non‑compete covenants; benefits also conditioned on release of claims; U.S. Severance Pay Plan provides additional protection. Applicability to non‑U.S. executives is not specified; Mr. Whitehead’s individual terms are not disclosed .
- Equity practices: No repricing of options without shareholder approval; no dividends on unvested/unearned awards or on options/SARs .
Investment Implications
- Alignment and incentives: Compensation architecture tightly links pay to profitability (Underlying Pre‑Tax Income), cash generation (Underlying FCF), top‑line (Underlying NSR), and relative TSR; the 2024 EMEA&APAC payout (101%) shows variable pay is sensitive to regional performance relevant to Mr. Whitehead’s mandate .
- Ownership discipline: 3x salary ownership requirement for senior executives and strict anti‑hedging/anti‑pledging policies reduce misalignment and hedging/pledging risk; clawbacks (restatement and misconduct) further constrain downside governance risk .
- Retention and vesting pressure: RSUs vest on three‑year schedules and options require appreciation, which support retention; however, Mr. Whitehead’s individual grant sizes, vesting schedules, and severance/CIC terms are not disclosed—limiting precision in assessing personal selling pressure or parachute economics .
- Share supply/dilution and market risk: Proposed 5,000,000‑share plan increase could modestly raise equity overhang for future awards; significant family share pledges exist but are actively overseen by the Audit Committee with contingency plans .
- Governance backdrop: Strong say‑on‑pay support (94.3% in 2024) and use of independent compensation consultant lend credibility to compensation design, aiding investor confidence in the incentive framework Mr. Whitehead operates under .