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John Wood

President, Systems Test Group at TERADYNETERADYNE
Executive

About John Wood

John F. Wood is 68 and serves as President, Systems Test Group at Teradyne. He has held this role since November 2023 after serving as General Manager & Vice President of the Systems Test Group from November 2018 to October 2023 . Company performance context during his tenure: in 2024 Teradyne reported Net Income of $542.4 million, PBIT of 20.4%, and a five-year TSR value of $188.52 per $100 initial investment versus $247.21 for the peer index; the company’s two-year rolling revenue growth metric for the 2024 variable cash plan measured -5.70% against a 7% target .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
TeradynePresident, Systems Test GroupNov 2023–present Leads Systems Test Group operations and execution
TeradyneGeneral Manager & Vice President, Systems Test GroupNov 2018–Oct 2023 Managed STG product, engineering and go-to-market activities

Fixed Compensation

Not disclosed for John Wood in the latest proxy. Base salaries shown for named executive officers (NEOs) only .

Performance Compensation

Teradyne’s executive program (applies to executive officers, with NEO outcomes disclosed) mixes annual variable cash and long-term equity (PSUs, RSUs, options). Core metrics and 2024 outcomes:

Variable Cash (2024 company-wide framework and results)

MetricWeightingTargetActualPayout (as % of metric)Vesting/Timing
Two-year rolling Revenue Growth29.25% 7% -5.70% 3% Cash, annual payout
PBIT (non-GAAP)19.5% 21% 20.4% 95% Cash, annual payout
Vital Goals (weighted average across divisions)48.75% N/A (confidential) N/A (confidential) 136% Cash, annual payout
Gender Representation (US/global YoY increase)2.5% 24.8% / 19.1% 24.9% / 21.0% 200% Cash, annual payout
Total payout (company-wide result for NEO framework)91% Cash, annual payout

Notes:

  • Vital Goals include measurable strategic KPIs (design-ins, market share, bookings, margin, product milestones) but targets are undisclosed for competitive sensitivity .
  • In 2024, the weighting of PBIT was reduced and Vital Goals increased to better balance profitability with strategic progress .

Long-term PSUs (design and recent outcomes)

PSU GrantMetricMeasurement PeriodThresholdTargetMaximumActualPayout
2022 PSUsRelative TSR vs NYSE Composite (50% tranche)2022–2024 Underperformance ≤25% → 50% vest Match index → 100% vest Outperform ≥25% → 200% vest -39.6% vs index 0%
2022 PSUs3-year cumulative PBIT (50% tranche)2022–2024 10% 23% 34% 23.0% 100%
2023 PSUsRelative TSR & PBIT2023–2025N/A N/A N/A In progress In progress
2024 PSUsRelative TSR & PBIT2024–202611% / 21% / 39% PBIT goals Target framework set As above In progress In progress

Time-based RSUs vest over four years; options vest over four years and expire after seven years . Annual equity grants are timed per policy to avoid closed trading windows and material non-public information releases .

Compensation Peer Group (used for benchmarking and equity sizing)

Peer Group (2024)
Cadence Design Systems; Cognex; Entegris; Fortive; Keysight Technologies; KLA-Tencor; Marvell Technology; Microchip Technology; MKS Instruments; ON Semiconductor; PTC; Qorvo; Rockwell Automation; Skyworks Solutions; Teledyne Technologies; Trimble Navigation; Zebra Technologies

Compensia is the independent compensation consultant; benchmarking generally aims around the 50th percentile for equity values .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

  • Beneficial ownership: Mr. Wood had 1,801 shares counted in the “within 60 days” category (options exercisable/RSUs vesting within 60 days as of March 14, 2025). Total beneficial ownership beyond this was not itemized in the named table .
  • Stock ownership guidelines: Other executive officers must hold 2x base salary in company stock, with five years to comply; must retain at least 50% of net-settled shares until compliant; unvested RSUs and unexercised options excluded from compliance calculation .
  • Anti-hedging/anti-pledging: Hedging (short sales, collars, swaps, etc.) and pledging/margin accounts are prohibited for employees and directors .

Employment Terms

  • Change-in-control (CIC): Teradyne maintains double-trigger CIC agreements for NEOs providing immediate vesting of unvested equity (PSUs at target), prorated target cash incentive, two years of salary continuation (base + target variable cash), and two years of health benefits, subject to non-compete/non-solicit covenants; no excise tax gross-ups and payments reduced to avoid 280G excess parachute payments .
  • Severance: Only CEO and CFO have specific severance agreements; other NEOs (and broader executives) may receive standard severance at the company’s discretion with customary restrictive covenants; an Executive Retirement Policy (adopted January 2024) provides continued vesting of time-based RSUs and options post-retirement (age ≥65, ≥10 years of service) and performance-PSUs vesting based on actual results with prorations for awards granted <365 days before termination, subject to compliance with post-employment obligations .
  • Clawback: Incentive compensation is subject to recovery in the event of a financial restatement in compliance with Nasdaq and SEC rules .
  • Equity grant timing: Grants are scheduled outside closed windows; no option grants around filings disclosing material non-public information .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: The program ties a substantial portion of at-risk pay to multi-year TSR and cumulative PBIT, plus annual PBIT and strategic Vital Goals—supporting pay-for-performance and long-term value creation; 2022 PSUs paid 50% overall (TSR 0%, PBIT 100%), consistent with mixed market-relative outcomes .
  • Retention/pressure: Anti-pledging and mandatory ownership/retention rules reduce forced selling risk and align executives with shareholders . Mr. Wood’s disclosed near-term vesting count (1,801 shares within 60 days) indicates a modest immediate equity cadence; detailed grant/payout data are not disclosed for him, limiting precise assessment of sell pressure .
  • CIC/severance governance: Double-trigger CIC and absence of tax gross-ups for NEOs reflect shareholder-friendly standards; however, Wood-specific CIC/severance terms are not disclosed, which warrants monitoring via future proxies or Form 4s for retention risk signals .
  • Performance trajectory: 2024 outcomes (PBIT near target, Vital Goals above target, revenue growth below target) yielded below-target cash payouts overall (91%), reinforcing discipline; continued PSU cycles in 2023–2026 will be important markers of execution in Systems Test under Wood’s oversight .