Melissa K. Kremer
About Melissa K. Kremer
Melissa K. Kremer is Executive Vice President and Chief Human Resources Officer (CHRO) at Target. She is the SEC signatory on multiple Item 5.02 8‑K filings (e.g., January 18, 2024; September 19, 2024; May 21, 2025; August 20, 2025), evidencing her role and authority over executive appointments, transitions, and compensatory arrangements . As CHRO, her remit includes leading Target’s internal executive compensation team that supports the Compensation & Human Capital Management Committee, and partnering on management development and succession planning across senior leadership . Company performance context for the latest year: Comparable sales growth 0.1%, after‑tax ROIC 15.4%, GAAP/Adjusted EPS change −0.9%, and $2.9B capital invested in 2024—key benchmarks that underpin executive incentive design . Age, education, and prior career history are not disclosed in the 2024/2025 proxy statements or cited 8‑K filings .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Target Corporation | EVP & CHRO (SEC signatory on executive filings) | 2024–2025 (documented) | Led internal executive compensation support and partnered on succession planning |
No earlier roles disclosed in the 2024/2025 DEF 14A or cited 8‑K filings .
External Roles
No public company directorships or external roles for Ms. Kremer are disclosed in the 2024/2025 proxy statements or cited 8‑K filings .
Fixed Compensation
- Framework: Executive pay emphasizes performance—Annual TDC for Non‑CEO NEOs is ~83% performance‑based; CEO ~93%—and the same process applies to other Leadership Team members (including the CHRO) even when individual pay is not separately disclosed .
- Base salary: For NEOs, base salary is the smallest portion of Annual TDC (<20%); Committee reviews annually; this design is the reference framework for broader leadership compensation .
| Pay component | Design details | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Base salary | <20% of Annual TDC for NEOs; smallest pay element | |
| Performance-based share of pay | CEO 93%; Non‑CEO NEOs 83% (Annual TDC) | |
| Governance of broader leadership pay | CD&A process applies to Leadership Team beyond NEOs |
Performance Compensation
- Short‑Term Incentive Plan (STIP): 67% financial/33% team scorecard; financial metrics are Merchandise Sales (50%) and Incentive Operating Income (50%); payouts range 0–200% of goal; team scorecard assessed against strategic priorities .
- Long‑Term Incentives (LTI): 100% relative performance—PSUs (typically 60% of LTI value) tied to Adjusted Merchandise Sales growth, EPS growth, and ROIC vs retail peers; PBRSUs (typically 40%) tied to relative TSR with 75–125% payout band; awards cliff‑vest at the end of 3‑year performance periods .
| Incentive | Metric | Weighting | Target/Payout Range | Vesting | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| STIP (financial) | Merchandise Sales | 50% of financial (67% of STIP overall) | 0–200% of goal | Annual cash | |
| STIP (financial) | Incentive Operating Income | 50% of financial (67% of STIP overall) | 0–200% of goal | Annual cash | |
| STIP (team) | Team scorecard (strategic priorities) | 33% of STIP | Committee‑assessed | Annual cash | |
| PSUs | Adjusted Merchandise Sales CAGR vs peers | Part of PSUs | 0–200% of goal | 3‑year, cliff | |
| PSUs | EPS CAGR vs peers | Part of PSUs | 0–200% of goal | 3‑year, cliff | |
| PSUs | ROIC vs peers | Part of PSUs | 0–200% of goal | 3‑year, cliff | |
| PBRSUs | Relative TSR vs peers | 100% of PBRSUs | 75–125% of goal | 3‑year, cliff |
Target emphasizes GAAP‑based metrics or explains deviations (e.g., Adjusted Sales and Incentive Operating Income) to maintain transparency .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Stock ownership guidelines: Leadership Team members must hold Target stock equal to 3x base salary; compliance expected within 5 fiscal years, with retention requirements if below thresholds .
- Anti‑hedging/pledging: Leadership Team and directors are prohibited from hedging or pledging Target stock; all are in compliance per the proxy .
| Ownership policy | Requirement | Enforcement/Timing | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Leadership Team guidelines | 3x base salary | Achieve within 5 fiscal years; retain shares until compliant | |
| Hedging / Pledging | Prohibited for Leadership Team and Board | Company policy; compliance affirmed |
Individual beneficial ownership, vested/unvested breakdown, and pledging status for Ms. Kremer are not disclosed in the 2024/2025 proxies .
Employment Terms
- Clawbacks: Recovery of incentive cash, equity, and severance for intentional misconduct causing material financial/reputational harm or restatements; separate SEC/NYSE‑compliant clawback adopted for restatements .
- Change‑in‑control treatment: Equity requires double‑trigger (CIC plus qualified termination); PSUs/PBRSUs accelerate at 100% goal payout; RSUs accelerate 100%—standard terms documented in proxy tables .
- Employment contracts/tax gross‑ups: No employment contracts and no tax gross‑ups provided to NEOs; leading practices cited .
- Severance (NEOs): Income Continuation Plan provides up to 2x (base salary + average of last 3 years STIP), $30k outplacement, paid over 24 months, subject to release/covenants .
| Term | Provision | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Clawback scope | Incentive cash, equity awards, severance recoverable; SEC/NYSE restatement clawback also adopted | |
| CIC vesting | Double‑trigger; PSUs/PBRSUs at 100% goal; RSUs 100% | |
| Contracts / gross‑ups | No employment contracts; no tax gross‑ups | |
| Severance (NEOs) | ICP: up to 2x base + 3‑yr avg STIP; $30k outplacement; 24 months |
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Pay‑for‑performance architecture (Sales, Incentive Operating Income, EPS, ROIC, TSR) and GAAP‑anchored metrics support disciplined execution; clawbacks and no‑hedging/pledging policies reduce governance and misalignment risk .
- Retention/transition risk: The CHRO directly influences succession planning and executive compensation design—central to leadership continuity and retention; robust say‑on‑pay support (93.2% in 2024; 94.1% in 2023) indicates investor endorsement of compensation structure, lowering governance overhang .
- Insider selling pressure: Anti‑pledging/hedging reduces forced selling risk; individual trading/ownership details for Ms. Kremer are not disclosed in proxies/8‑Ks, limiting direct assessment .