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Grant Freeman

President at Thryv Holdings
Executive

About Grant Freeman

Grant Freeman, age 46, is President of Thryv Holdings, Inc. (THRY) since September 1, 2023; prior roles include Chief Customer Officer (2021–2023) and VP of Client Success (2018–2021). He holds a BA in Marketing from Penn State University and brings 20+ years in SMB SaaS and digital marketing, with documented impact at Thryv including double‑digit client growth and 18%+ active user engagement under his leadership . Company performance metrics used to fund 2024 incentives were Adjusted EBITDA $161.95m, Free Cash Flow $60.67m, and Reported SaaS Net Revenue $330.06m; broader 2024 pay-versus-performance shows SaaS Net Revenue $343.5m, TSR index value 105.71 vs Russell 2000 145.65, and net loss $(74.2)m .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Thryv Holdings, Inc.PresidentSep 2023–presentLeads profitable SaaS growth and operations
Thryv Holdings, Inc.Chief Customer OfficerOct 2021–Aug 2023Drove double‑digit client growth; 18%+ YoY active user engagement
Thryv Holdings, Inc.VP, Client SuccessNov 2018–Sep 2021Led acquisition, retention, onboarding, monetization for software segment
DexYPAsst. VP – Training, Recruiting & Thryv Software SalesApr 2015–Oct 2018Built sales/onboarding capabilities for SMB software
Hibu/YellowbookSenior leadership rolesPrior to 2015Led digital media and sales; trained teams across 23 states

External Roles

No external public company board roles disclosed in company filings reviewed for Freeman .

Fixed Compensation

Metric202220232024
Base Salary ($)350,577 392,885 500,000; 2% increase vs prior setting
Allowance ($)
Executive Physical ($)
401(k) Match ($)— (included in All Other) 15,840 16,560
All Other Compensation ($)12,559 15,840 16,560

Performance Compensation

Short‑Term Incentive (STI) – Plan Design (2024)

MetricWeightingTargetVesting/Settlement
Adjusted EBITDA25%$166.00m payout=100% Cash, annual
Free Cash Flow25%$55.00m payout=100% Cash, annual
Reported SaaS Net Revenue25%$316.00m payout=100% Cash, annual
Individual Performance25%100% (gate at $150m Adj. EBITDA) Cash, annual

Short‑Term Incentive (STI) – 2024 Results

MetricWeightingActual 2024Payout %
Company performance (weighted across Adj. EBITDA, FCF, SaaS Net Rev)75%EBITDA $161.95m; FCF $60.67m; SaaS Net Rev $330.06m 102.4%
Individual performance25%Target (100%) 100%
Resulting Freeman STI ($)$356,300

Over Performance Plan (OPP) – 2024

MetricWeightingThreshold vs STI MaxActual 2024Payout %
Adjusted EBITDA30%≥$173.50m $161.95m0.0%
Free Cash Flow40%≥$60.00m $60.67m4.4%
Reported SaaS Net Revenue30%≥$321.00m $330.06m60.4%
Weighted Average Payout25.7%
Resulting Freeman OPP ($)$89,950

Long‑Term Incentive – Equity Grants (2024)

Award TypeGrant DateUnitsFair Value ($)Vesting
PSUsJan 5, 202465,825 1,200,000 3‑yr performance, cliff on Jan 5, 2027
RSUsJan 5, 202443,883 800,000 1/3 annually on Jan 5, 2025/2026/2027

PSU Performance Framework (2024–2026 cohort)

MetricWeightThresholdTargetMaxPayout Range
Relative TSR30%40th percentile 50th percentile 65th percentile 50–150%
Absolute TSR30%8.0% 10.0% 12.5% 50–150%
SaaS Revenue CAGR40%15% 18% 22% 50–150%

Equity Ownership & Alignment

As of April 15, 2025CountNotes
Shares owned directly58,072 Beneficial ownership table
Options exercisable within 60 days75,556 55,556 at $13.82 exp. 11/18/2029; 20,000 at $10.35 exp. 12/11/2030
Total beneficial ownership133,628; <1% of outstanding (*) Based on 43,731,034 shares outstanding; “*” denotes <1%
Unvested RSUs (12/31/2024)43,883; $649,468 MV Jan 5 annual tranches
Unvested PSUs (at target, 12/31/2024)65,825; $974,210 MV Cliff on Jan 5, 2027
  • Stock ownership guidelines: Executive Committee expected to hold 3× base salary within five years; selling limited to ≤50% of compensatory equity until compliant .
  • Anti‑hedging/anti‑pledging: Directors and employees (including officers) prohibited from hedging or pledging THRY securities .

Employment Terms

Scenario (as of Dec 31, 2024)Cash Severance ($)STI ($)Benefits Cont. ($)RSUs Vest ($)PSUs Vest ($)Outplacement ($)Total ($)
Resignation for Good Reason or Termination without Cause1,275,000 356,300 1,138 483,662 1,168,382 7,250 3,291,733
Death/Disability483,662 1,168,382 1,652,045
Good Reason/No Cause in connection with Change in Control1,700,000 356,300 1,138 1,078,742 2,492,660 7,250 5,636,091
  • Severance program: Freeman participates in EVP Severance Plan (salary continuation + 1.5× target STI; enhanced to 104 weeks + 2× target STI within 2 years post‑CoC) .
  • Equity treatment: Pro‑rata vesting for RSUs/PSUs on qualified separation; immediate vesting at target for RSUs/PSUs upon change‑in‑control plus qualifying termination .
  • Restrictive covenants: Non‑compete and employee/customer non‑solicit for 12 months post‑termination .
  • Clawback: Board‑adopted policy compliant with SEC Rule 10D‑1/Nasdaq Rule 5608 (Nov 29, 2023) .

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Mix shift to RSUs/PSUs: Since 2022, annual equity grants comprise RSUs and PSUs; no new options issued beginning FY2021, aligning incentives to multi‑year SaaS/TSR performance .
  • 2024 pay changes: Freeman’s base salary set at $500,000 with a 2% increase; STI target 70% of base; OPP target also 70% of base, reinforcing pay‑for‑performance .
  • Performance rigor: 2024 STI gate at $150m Adjusted EBITDA for funding individual component; OPP only pays above STI max thresholds, capping total at 200% of STI target .
  • Option repricing history: 2019 options were repriced in 2020 from $16.20 to $13.82 with vesting delay—a governance sensitivity from prior years, not repeated in current design .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: Freeman’s equity exposure includes meaningful unvested PSUs/RSUs and strict anti‑hedging/pledging and ownership guidelines; however, direct ownership remains <1% of shares outstanding, indicating alignment is primarily via incentive equity rather than absolute stake .
  • Near‑term selling pressure: RSU tranches vest annually on Jan 5 (2025–2027), which can create predictable insider sale windows; company limits sales to ≤50% of compensatory equity until guideline compliance, mitigating abrupt selling .
  • Retention/M&A optionality: Severance economics (78 weeks + 1.5× STI target, enhanced under CoC) and accelerated vesting at target upon CoC termination support management retention while creating clear incentives in strategic transactions .
  • Performance signals: 2024 STI payout above target (company component 102.4%, individual 100%) and OPP 25.7% reflect over‑achievement in SaaS revenue and FCF against stringent thresholds—positive operational momentum in the SaaS pivot Freeman leads .