Laurel Hurd
About Laurel Hurd
Laurel M. Hurd (age 55) has served as President and Chief Executive Officer of Interface, Inc. (NASDAQ: TILE) and as a director since April 2022. Under her tenure, Interface delivered 2024 adjusted EBITDA of $189.0M (vs. $162.0M in 2023) and GAAP net income of $86.9M, while repaying $115M of debt in 2024, ending with total debt of $303M, net debt of $204M, and Net Debt/Adjusted EBITDA of 1.1x; Interface’s cumulative TSR (from a fixed $100 base in 2019) improved to 154.07 for 2024 from 77.74 in 2023 .
She previously led major consumer divisions at Newell Brands and has served on Thor Industries’ board since 2021 . Interface maintains an independent Board Chair structure (since March 13, 2024), with Hurd not deemed independent due to her management role .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Newell Brands | Segment President, Learning & Development (led Baby and Writing businesses) | 2019–2022 | Executive leadership across Baby and Writing divisions; product, strategy, sales execution |
| Newell Brands | Division CEO, Writing | Feb 2018–2019 | Led Writing segment (Sharpie/Paper Mate category leadership) |
| Newell Brands | CEO, Baby division | 2016–Feb 2018 | Ran Graco/Aprica/Teutonia brands; portfolio stewardship |
| Newell Brands | President, Baby & Parenting | May 2014–2016 | Oversaw Calphalon, Goody, Rubbermaid consumer brands |
| Newell Brands | VP, Global Development (Marketing & R&D for Graco/Aprica/Teutonia) | 2012–2014 | Global product development and marketing leadership |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Thor Industries, Inc. (NYSE: THO) | Director | Since Aug 2021 | Public company directorship |
Fixed Compensation
Multi-year CEO compensation (as disclosed in Summary Compensation Table):
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary ($) | 584,375 | 858,000 | 895,000 |
| Stock Awards – GDFV ($) | 3,543,485 | 2,614,777 | 2,740,892 |
| Non-Equity Incentive Plan (Annual Bonus) ($) | 941,531 | 999,570 | 1,876,144 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | 21,919 | 54,163 | 78,813 |
| Total ($) | 5,091,309 | 4,526,511 | 5,590,848 |
Additional design parameters:
- Target annual bonus opportunity: 125% of base salary (2023–2024) .
- Base salary increased 4.3% in 2024 to $895,000 (merit/benchmark alignment) .
Performance Compensation
Annual Bonus Plan Design and Payouts
- 100% formulaic; measures and weights: Adjusted Operating Income (85%), Currency-Neutral Sales (15%) .
2024 bonus mechanics and outcomes:
| Measure | Weight | Threshold | Goal | Maximum | Actual | Payout vs target |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted Operating Income ($) | 85% | 80,778,000 | 124,274,000 | 142,915,000 | 141,400,000 | 168.9% (143.6% weighted) |
| Currency-Neutral Sales ($) | 15% | 1,172,070,000 | 1,280,951,000 | 1,325,789,000 | 1,317,400,000 | 161.0% (24.2% weighted) |
| Total | 100% | — | — | — | — | 167.7% of opportunity |
2023 reference (for context): overall ~93.2% payout; Adj. Operating Income $116.4M, Currency-Neutral Sales $1,260.1M .
Long-Term Incentives (LTI)
Grant mix and metrics:
- 2022 awards: 50% time-based restricted stock (3-year cliff); 50% performance shares tied to annual Adjusted EBITDA (75% weight) and 3-year cumulative ROIC (25%) for 2022–2024; total achievement 108.3% (vested Feb 2025) .
- 2023 awards: shifted to RSUs (time-based, ratable 1/3 per year) plus PSUs with a single 3-year (2023–2025) aggregate Adjusted EBITDA goal; adopted “Rule of 75” retirement provision (pro-rata vesting) .
- 2024 awards: same structure as 2023; initial year 2024 Adjusted EBITDA thresholds: $116.3M / $166.2M / $191.1M; 2024 actual Adj. EBITDA $189.0M (aggregation with 2025–2026 to determine final PSU vesting post-period) .
2024 CEO grants (2/26/2024):
| Date | Award Type | Threshold (#) | Target (#) | Maximum (#) | Grant-Date Fair Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2-26-2024 | Performance Shares | 25,877 | 103,508 | 207,016 | 1,370,446 |
| 2-26-2024 | Time-based RSUs | — | 103,508 | 103,508 | 1,370,446 |
Clawback policy: mandatory recovery of excess incentive-based comp (cash/equity) for the prior 3 completed fiscal years following an accounting restatement; no-fault standard; implements Nasdaq Rule 5608 and SEC Rule 10D-1 .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Beneficial ownership: 229,002 common shares (as of Mar 14, 2025), less than 1% of shares outstanding; prior year 129,422 shares (as of Mar 15, 2024) .
- Stock ownership guidelines: CEO 3x salary; executives expected to comply within 4 years; all NEOs have now met the target (as of 2024 year-end) .
- Hedging/pledging: Directors and officers are prohibited from hedging and from pledging Company stock .
Outstanding awards and scheduled vesting (as of fiscal year-end 2024):
| Category | Amount |
|---|---|
| Unvested stock/RSUs (#) | 241,345 |
| Market value of unvested stock/RSUs ($) | 6,026,385 (at $24.97) |
| Unearned PSUs (#) | 305,632 |
| Market value of unearned PSUs ($) | 7,631,631 (at $24.97) |
Vesting schedule details (CEO):
- 40,352 vested on 1/12/2025; 57,134 vested on 2/24/2025; 34,503 vested on 2/26/2025; 40,351 vesting 1/12/2026; 34,503 vesting 2/26/2026; 34,502 vesting 2/26/2027 .
Insider selling pressure/overhang implications:
- Meaningful multi-year vesting cadence (2025–2027) and PSU performance dependency limit near-term forced selling; dividend equivalents paid only if/when performance awards vest .
Employment Terms
Key severance and change-in-control (CIC) protections (double-trigger):
- Termination without cause: 2x base salary + 2x target bonus, prorated bonus, and 24 months of health benefits (CEO); equity per award terms .
- CIC + qualifying termination (within 24 months): 2.5x base salary + 2.5x higher of target or 3-year average bonus (lump sum), prorated bonus, 24 months of health benefits; equity treatment per award agreements; no single-trigger vesting .
Estimated potential payments for Hurd (assumes 12/27/2024 termination; FMV $24.97):
| Scenario | Base Salary ($) | Bonus ($) | Equity Awards ($) | Health/Life/Other ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Termination without cause | 1,790,000 | 4,103,335 | 7,937,723 | 48,592 |
| CIC + qualifying termination | 2,237,500 | 4,662,711 | 15,156,926 | 48,592 |
| Retirement/Resignation | — | 1,865,835 | — | — |
| Death/Disability | — | 1,865,835 | 7,937,723 | — |
Restrictive covenants: non-compete up to 24 months depending on termination circumstances .
Board Governance
- Director since 2022; not independent (employee director) .
- Executive Committee: Chair (2024–2025 committee rosters); not listed on Audit, Compensation & Talent Development, Nominating & Governance, or Innovation & Sustainability Committees .
- Board leadership: Independent Chairman since March 13, 2024; Lead Independent Director structure in place prior to that; all directors met at least 75% attendance in 2024 .
- Dual-role implications: CEO is not Chair; independent Board leadership mitigates CEO/Chair concentration risk; independence status properly disclosed .
Say-on-Pay and investor engagement:
- Say-on-Pay support ~94% at 2024 annual meeting; committee made no material changes in 2024 given strong support .
- Ongoing shareholder outreach led by the CEO with top holders .
Compensation benchmarking and peer alignment:
- Peer group refreshed in 2024 (e.g., added American Woodmark, Gibraltar, Quanex, Tredegar); Pearl Meyer advises; base salaries targeted around median with total cash opportunity between 50th–75th percentile for performance achievement .
Performance & Track Record
Selected performance indicators during Hurd’s tenure:
- 2024 vs 2023: Adjusted EBITDA $189.0M vs $162.0M; Net Income $86.9M vs $44.5M; TSR value rose to 154.07 from 77.74; deleveraging with $115M debt repaid in 2024 .
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Net Income ($M) | 44.5 | 86.9 |
| Adjusted EBITDA ($M) | 162.0 | 189.0 |
| TSR value (base $100 in 2019) | 77.74 | 154.07 |
| Total Debt ($M) | 417 | 303 |
| Net Debt ($M) | 307 | 204 |
| Net Debt / Adjusted EBITDA (x) | 1.9x | 1.1x |
Focus areas in incentive design reflect this: annual plan emphasizes Adjusted Operating Income and Currency-Neutral Sales; PSUs emphasize multi-year Adjusted EBITDA and ROIC (2022 awards), then 3-year aggregate Adjusted EBITDA (2023–2024 awards) .
Director Compensation (for Board context; not applicable to Hurd as an employee director)
- 2024 outside director cash retainer $80,000; committee retainers ($10,000 Audit; $7,500 other committees; higher for chairs); stock grants typically 7,015 restricted shares (Kennedy 9,247 as Chair); no options granted .
- Prohibition on hedging/pledging applies to directors .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Increased performance at-risk mix: Hurd’s 2024 pay rose primarily on higher performance bonus and continued sizable equity; no discretionary bonuses; clawback in place .
- Shift to RSUs and 3-year aggregate EBITDA PSUs (from single-year PSUs) increases retention and long-term earnings quality focus; retirement-friendly “Rule of 75” adopted, but still pro-rata vesting only .
- No tax gross-ups; double-trigger CIC; no option repricing; dividends not paid on unvested performance awards, only deferred equivalents paid on vesting .
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
- Governance positives: independent Chair; strong Say-on-Pay support (~94%); clawback policy; no hedging/pledging .
- Change-in-control economics: 2.5x salary+bonus multiple; meaningful equity acceleration; standard among peers, but material in a sale scenario .
- Related party transactions: none disclosed involving Hurd; company discloses policy and an instance related to a director’s family member (not Hurd) .
Compensation Peer Group (2024 update)
ACCO Brands; American Woodmark; Apogee Enterprises; Armstrong World Industries; Enviri; Gibraltar Industries; HNI; MillerKnoll; Quanex Building Products; Steelcase; Tredegar; VSE .
Equity Ownership & Director Service Summary
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Director since | 2022 (non‑independent) |
| Board/Committees | Executive Committee (Chair); not listed on Audit, Compensation & Talent Development, Nominating & Governance, or Innovation & Sustainability |
| External board | Thor Industries (since Aug 2021) |
| Beneficial ownership | 229,002 shares as of Mar 14, 2025 (<1% of outstanding) |
| Ownership guidelines | CEO 3x salary; all NEOs have met target by 2024 year-end |
| Hedging/pledging | Prohibited for officers/directors |
Investment Implications
- Alignment and retention: High at-risk pay with multi-year PSU design (3-year aggregate EBITDA) and meaningful unvested equity (>$13.6M combined RSUs/PSUs at 12/27/24) create retention hooks and align incentives with profitability and deleveraging; hedging/pledging bans reinforce alignment .
- Performance leverage: Annual plan heavily weights Adjusted Operating Income, with 2024 execution at ~168.9% on this metric; PSUs tied to EBITDA and ROIC/aggregate EBITDA support continued margin and cash flow focus, key for debt paydown and TSR sustainability .
- Governance risk moderated: Independent Chair structure and double-trigger CIC reduce governance and takeover-related risk; Say-on-Pay support suggests investor acceptance of program design .
- Sale/CIC scenario: CEO CIC benefits (2.5x salary+bonus plus equity acceleration) are material; evaluate in potential strategic scenarios for dilution/overhang, though double-trigger mitigates automatic payouts .