Amy Webb
Tronox HoldingsAbout Amy Webb
Amy Webb, 53, was appointed Chief Human Resources Officer (CHRO) of Tronox in June 2024 after nearly three decades at the company across quality laboratory, operations, continuous improvement, and HR; she holds a BS in Chemistry (Mississippi State) and an EMBA (University of Alabama) . Her tenure coincides with a tough 2024 operating backdrop in which Tronox delivered net sales of approximately $3.1 billion, Adjusted EBITDA of $564 million, and ~18% Adjusted EBITDA margin, while integrating ESG metrics into executive pay and achieving a 97% Say‑on‑Pay approval in 2024 . Executive incentives emphasize TSR percentile vs peers and ROIC, with 2022 LTI vesting for the CEO at 0%, underscoring pay-for-performance discipline when targets are missed .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tronox | Chief Human Resources Officer | Appointed June 2024 | Leads people and high‑performance culture initiatives globally |
| Tronox | Vice President, Global HR Operations | Prior to June 2024 | Oversaw global HR operations and workforce programs |
| Tronox | Various roles (quality lab, operations, continuous improvement, HR) | Joined Aug 1992; multi‑functional progression | Operational excellence and HR leadership across functions |
External Roles
- Not disclosed in company filings for Amy Webb .
Performance Compensation
Executive incentives are driven by a common plan structure that applies to senior executives (including CHROs), combining annual cash AIP metrics (80% company/20% individual) and 50/50 time‑ vs performance‑based RSUs in the LTIP .
2024 Annual Incentive Program (AIP) Metrics and Outcomes
| Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout vs Target | Vesting/Timing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBITDA less Capital Expenditures | 50% | Not disclosed | Not disclosed | Company component paid at 70.1% of target | AIP pays after FY results |
| Adjusted EBITDA Margin vs TiO2 peers (Chemours TT, Kronos, LB Group) | 30% | Not disclosed | Not disclosed | Company component paid at 70.1% of target | AIP pays after FY results |
| Safety – DIFR (per 200,000 hours) | 7.5% | 0.15 | 0.17 | Not disclosed | AIP pays after FY results |
| Safety – TRIFR (per 200,000 hours) | 7.5% | 0.36 | 0.33 | Not disclosed | AIP pays after FY results |
| CO2 intensity (tCO2e per ton of TiO2; Scope 1+2 vs 2019 baseline) | 5% | 1.386 tCO2e/t (−17%) | 1.338 tCO2e/t (−20%) | Not disclosed | AIP pays after FY results |
Notes:
- Company-wide AIP company component paid at 70.1% of target for 2024; individual components vary by executive and objectives .
- 2025 targets approved: DIFR 0.15, TRIFR 0.31; CO2 intensity target 1.260 tCO2e/t (~25% reduction vs 2019 baseline) .
Long-Term Incentive Program (LTIP) – Award Design
| Component | Weight | Performance Metric | Measurement Period | Max Payout | Vesting Date |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Time‑based RSUs | 50% | Service | 3 years | NA | Vests one‑third on each Mar 5 (years 1–3) |
| Performance‑based RSUs (TSR) | 25% | Relative TSR vs capital markets peer group | Jan 1, 2024–Dec 31, 2026 | 200% of target | Mar 5, 2027 |
| Performance‑based RSUs (ROIC) | 25% | 2026 ROIC | Jan 1, 2024–Dec 31, 2026 | 200% of target | Mar 5, 2027 |
Change-in-control equity treatment: all unvested units, including performance RSUs, vest immediately at target upon CIC qualifying termination; death/disability also accelerate (perf RSUs at target) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Policy/Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Executive share ownership guideline | Executive Officers must hold stock valued at 300% of base salary; CEO 500%; Directors 500% of annual cash retainer . |
| Counting rules | All shares owned outright plus 60% of time‑based RSUs count; unvested performance‑based RSUs do not count . |
| Compliance status | As of the proxy date, all current NEOs except Mr. AlJunaidi met ownership guidelines; no status disclosed for CHRO Amy Webb . |
| Anti‑hedging/shorting policy | Directors, executive officers, and restricted list employees are prohibited from hedging, short sales, and derivatives on Company securities . |
| Clawback policy | Dodd‑Frank compliant clawback adopted Oct 2023; recoups “excess” incentive comp for 3‑year lookback upon required financial restatement (no fault required) . |
| Options vs RSUs (current) | NEOs had no outstanding stock options; equity is delivered via time‑based and performance‑based RSUs . |
| Pledging | No specific pledging policy disclosed; no pledging by Amy Webb disclosed in filings . |
Employment Terms
- CHRO employment agreement, severance, and non-compete terms for Amy Webb are not disclosed in the proxy/10‑K .
- Reference framework (for NEOs; plan-level treatment that typically applies enterprise‑wide):
- Severance (non‑CIC): CEO 2× salary+target bonus; other NEOs 1× salary+target bonus (GC 1× salary), pro‑rata annual bonus; medical continuation where applicable .
- Severance (CIC qualifying termination): CEO 3× salary+target bonus; other NEOs 2× salary + 1× target bonus; pro‑rata annual bonus; immediate vesting of all equity at target .
- Equity treatment by scenario: death/disability → accelerate at target; involuntary non‑cause before Mar 5 following grant → perf RSUs forfeited; on/after that date → prorated vesting subject to actual performance; CIC → accelerate all at target .
Fixed Compensation
- Base salary, target bonus %, and perquisites for Amy Webb are not reported (she is not a 2024 Named Executive Officer); executive officers broadly may receive financial counseling up to $10,000/year, and limited tax equalization applies mainly to executive directors for UK tax exposure .
Performance & Track Record
- Company execution in 2024 maintained best‑in‑class EBITDA margins versus non‑Chinese TiO2 peers; invested ~$370 million in capital and returned $80 million in dividends; balance sheet refinanced with no significant principal repayments until 2029 .
- Safety outcomes: TRIFR beat target (0.33 vs 0.36), DIFR slightly missed (0.17 vs 0.15), with top‑quartile targets set by HRCC; safety is 15% of AIP weighting .
- Carbon intensity reduction exceeded target (−20% vs −17%), supported by 200 MW South Africa solar project commissioned in April 2024; emissions metric is 5% of AIP .
Investment Implications
- Compensation alignment: Executive pay ties 70–86% “at‑risk” to financial, safety, and carbon metrics, plus 50% performance RSUs (TSR/ROIC), reinforcing shareholder alignment across HR leadership priorities; CEO’s 2022 LTI payout at 0% underscores rigor .
- Retention and overhang: 3‑year RSU vesting and ownership guidelines (3× salary for executive officers) support retention and long‑term alignment; absence of options reduces near‑term selling pressure from option exercises .
- Governance safeguards: Anti‑hedging, clawback, and strong Say‑on‑Pay (97% in 2024) reduce red‑flag risk and suggest investor support for pay design; monitor future Form 4 filings for Amy Webb to assess insider activity and ownership accumulation .