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Brady Murphy

Brady Murphy

Chief Executive Officer at TETRA TECHNOLOGIESTETRA TECHNOLOGIES
CEO
Executive
Board

About Brady Murphy

Brady M. Murphy, 65, is President & CEO of TETRA Technologies and has served as a director since 2018; he became CEO in 2019. He holds a B.S. in Chemical Engineering from Penn State and completed Harvard Business School’s Advanced Management Program . Under his leadership in 2024, TETRA reported revenue of $599 million, adjusted EBITDA of $99.4 million, RONCE of 15.1% (20.5% in 2023; 13.4% in 2022), and 3% TSR over 2022–2024 .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
HalliburtonSenior leadership roles incl. SVP Global BD & Marketing; SVP Eastern Hemisphere; SVP Europe/Sub-Saharan Africa26 yearsGlobal operations, market expansion, deepwater and unconventional expertise
Paradigm Group B.V.Chief Executive OfficerLed upstream technology firm; strategic technologies for energy industry
TETRA TechnologiesChief Operating Officer (prior to CEO)Operational leadership foundation prior to CEO role
Gerhart IndustriesVarious positionsEarly career operational grounding

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Current public company boardsNoneNo external public boards listed

Fixed Compensation

Metric202220232024
Salary ($)649,615 683,077 724,231
Stock Awards ($)1,275,156 1,298,177 1,430,129
Non-Equity Incentive Plan Compensation ($)3,083,611 3,123,070 2,783,479
All Other Compensation ($)6,100 6,600 11,500
Total ($)5,014,482 5,110,924 4,949,339
Base Salary and Bonus TargetAs of Dec 31, 2023Effective Apr 20, 2024
CEO Base Salary ($)700,000 735,000
Target Annual Cash Incentive (% of Base)125%
Threshold / Stretch (% of Base)37.5% / 250%

Performance Compensation

Annual Incentive Metric (2024)WeightTargetActualPayout BasisHSE ModifierActual Payout ($)
Adjusted EBITDA for Compensation Purposes100% $117.97m $101.84m (86.3% of target) 61.7% of target -$28,350 (5% deduction) $538,644
Long-Term Incentive Structure (2024 grants)CEO Target Value ($)WeightingVesting / Performance
Time-based RSUs1,500,000 50% of LTI 1/3 on first anniversary; 1/6 every six months to Feb 2027
Cash, performance-based (RONCE and RTSR)1,500,000 50% of LTI (RONCE 50%; RTSR 50%) 3-year performance period ending Dec 31, 2026; RTSR capped at 100% if absolute TSR negative
2024 RSU Grant DetailGrant DateShares (#)Grant Date Fair Value ($)Vesting
Annual RSU award2/19/2024362,977 1,430,129 1/3 on 2/19/2025; 1/6 semi-annually to 2/2027
2022 LT Cash Award – RTSR PortionTarget ($)Peer PercentileEarned (% of Target)Stock Price Mod Factor ($ applied to 50%)Total Earned ($)
CEO (period ended 12/31/2024)675,000 54th percentile 116.7% 96,618 884,118

Note: CEO and other NEOs elected to settle portions of earned LT cash awards (including stock price modification factor portions) in RSUs in March 2025; CEO received 371,666 RSUs that vest one year from grant .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

Beneficial Ownership (as of record)Shares (#)% of Outstanding
Brady M. Murphy2,598,397 1.95%
Outstanding Unvested Equity at 12/31/2024Grant/TypeUnvested RSUs (#)Market Value ($)
RSUs granted 2/21/2022Time-based RSUs77,003 275,671
RSUs granted 2/22/2023Time-based RSUs172,173 616,379
RSUs granted 2/19/2024Time-based RSUs362,977 1,299,458
RSUs granted 3/8/2024 (in lieu of 2021 LT cash)RSUs109,379 391,577
RSUs granted 3/15/2024 (in lieu of 2023 annual cash)RSUs222,927 798,079
2024 Option Exercises and Stock VestedOptions Exercised (#)Value on Exercise ($)Stock Awards Vested (#)Value Realized ($)
Brady M. Murphy769,622 2,889,821
  • Stock ownership guidelines require CEO to hold 5x base salary; newly appointed officers have 5 years to comply; all covered officers are in compliance .
  • Hedging is prohibited; pledging only with prior approval; no hedging transactions have been approved by General Counsel .
  • Options: Company currently does not grant options broadly; Murphy has zero options previously granted under the 2018 Plan .

Employment Terms

TermProvision
Employment agreementAt-will; no fixed term; no severance outside double-trigger CIC
Change-in-Control (CIC) multiple2.99x base salary + target annual bonus for Murphy; 2x for other NEOs
CIC triggersDouble-trigger: Qualifying Termination (without Cause or for Good Reason) within 2 years post-CIC
Additional CIC benefitsEarned but unpaid prior bonuses; prorated current-year target annual bonus; target LT bonus for each outstanding award; COBRA-equivalent premiums for 3 years (Murphy)
Equity treatmentFull acceleration upon qualifying CIC termination, subject to plan terms
Non-compete / Non-solicit2-year post-termination restrictions if CIC benefits received
ClawbackExecutive Incentive Compensation Recoupment Policy updated Oct 2023 to comply with SEC/NYSE; applies to incentive-based compensation and misconduct
Potential Payments upon CIC Termination (assumed 12/31/2024)Cash Severance ($)Bonus Payment ($)Accelerated RSUs ($)Health Benefits ($)Total ($)
Brady M. Murphy4,944,713 5,118,750 3,381,163 774,434 14,219,060

Board Governance

  • Board service: Murphy is a director, non-independent; he serves on no standing committees, reflecting separation of CEO from committee oversight .
  • Structure: TETRA separates Board Chair and CEO roles; executive sessions of independent directors occur at each regular meeting; all directors attended ≥75% of Board/committee meetings in 2024 .
  • Committee independence: Audit, HCMCC, and Nominating/Governance committees are fully independent; HCMCC uses an independent consultant (Pay Governance) .
  • Director compensation: Murphy receives no additional compensation for Board service; non-employee directors earn cash retainers and annual RSU grants vesting in one year .

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Mix and trajectory: 2024 salary increased 6% YoY ($724k vs $683k in 2023), stock awards rose (~$1.43m vs $1.30m), and non-equity incentive declined ($2.78m vs $3.12m), increasing equity share while lowering cash variable pay .
  • Annual incentive rigor: Threshold performance tightened from 60% to 75% of target; 2024 Adjusted EBITDA underperformed target (86.3%), resulting in a 61.7% payout with a 5% HSE deduction .
  • Long-term alignment: 50/50 split between RONCE and RTSR with caps if absolute TSR is negative; CEO elected RSUs in lieu of cash for portions of earned awards, increasing alignment and potential future supply upon vest .
  • Governance safeguards: Double-trigger CIC; no tax gross-ups; hedging prohibited; strong ownership guidelines; 2024 say-on-pay support >92% .

Equity Ownership & Alignment – Policies

  • Stock ownership guidelines: CEO 5x salary; directors 5x annual retainer; all officers/directors in compliance .
  • Trading policy: Prohibits short sales, derivatives, and hedging; pledging only with prior approval and financial capacity; no hedging approvals to date .

Performance & Track Record

  • Pay vs Performance disclosure: 2024 “compensation actually paid” to CEO was $4.20m vs SCT total $4.95m; cumulative TSR value of initial $100 investment at $182.65 as of 2024; net income $108.3m and adjusted EBITDA $99.4m (company-level) .
  • Business execution: Bromine and lithium initiatives advanced; deepwater CS Neptune projects and Brazilian contracts; water treatment tech milestones; 2024 revenue $599m, adjusted EBITDA $99.4m .

Compensation Peer Group (Benchmarking and RTSR)

  • 2024 Compensation & Performance Peer Group includes Aris, Core Labs, Dril-Quip, Forum, Flotek, Hawkins, KLX Energy Services, NESR, Nine Energy, Newpark, Oil States, Ranger, Mammoth, Select Energy, Expro; HCMCC uses peer data to ensure competitiveness but does not specifically benchmark base, annual, or LTI values .
  • RTSR measurement and payout scales: Target at 50th percentile (100% payout), stretch at 75th percentile (200%); absolute TSR cap applied to RTSR-linked awards .

Director Compensation (Context)

  • Non-employee director compensation (2024): $90k cash retainer; $110k annual RSU grant (Board Chair $150k/$150k); RSUs vest in one year; committee chair retainers: Audit $20k; HCMCC $15k; Nominating/Governance $15k .
  • Murphy, as CEO-director, received no additional director pay .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: Strong use of multi-year RSUs and returns-based cash (RONCE/RTSR) supports pay-for-performance; CEO’s election to take RSUs in lieu of cash increases future vesting events that can create share supply around vest dates (e.g., 371,666 RSUs vesting one year from March 2025) .
  • Retention and CIC risk: 2.99x CIC multiple, full equity acceleration upon qualifying termination, and 3-year COBRA premiums for CEO could increase turnover cost in a change-of-control; however, double-trigger and non-compete/non-solicit mitigate perverse incentives .
  • Governance quality: Separation of Chair/CEO, independent HCMCC, clawback, prohibitions on hedging/pledging without approval, and strong say-on-pay (>92%) point to investor-friendly structures reducing governance risk .
  • Performance tethering: Annual bonus tightly linked to Adjusted EBITDA with higher threshold; 2024 underperformance lowered payout, demonstrating responsiveness of cash incentives to results. Long-term RTSR and RONCE metrics maintain strategic focus on efficient capital deployment and shareholder returns .