Matteo Tarditi
UNITED NATURAL FOODSAbout Matteo Tarditi
Matteo Tarditi, 52, is President and Chief Financial Officer of UNFI since April 2024. He spent 26 years at GE, serving as CFO across seven business units (Renewable Energy, Energy Connections, and divisions of Power, Oil & Gas, Aerospace, Healthcare), with a focus on operational excellence, efficiency, transformations, and M&A integrations; he holds a Master of Science in Finance and Business Administration from Università Bocconi, and is a Lean Six Sigma Black Belt . FY2025 performance under the annual incentive plan met/exceeded corporate Adjusted EBITDA ($552mm vs $550mm target) and Free Cash Flow ($239mm vs $150mm target), while retail metrics underperformed; prior PSU cycle (FY2023–2025) paid 45% after a -10% Relative TSR modifier driven by -6,001 bps versus the S&P MidCap 400, though Tarditi did not participate in that grant .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| General Electric (GE) | CFO across seven business units and large divisions (Renewable Energy, Energy Connections, Power, Oil & Gas, Aerospace, Healthcare) | 26 years | Drove operational excellence, efficiency, increased productivity in complex transformations and M&A integrations; implemented processes improving forecast accuracy and accountability |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Università Bocconi | MS in Finance & Business Administration | n/a | Technical finance training underpinning CFO leadership |
| Lean Six Sigma | Black Belt Certification | n/a | Process improvement expertise applied to forecasting and continuous improvement |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | FY2024 | FY2025 | FY2026 (effective Nov 9, 2025) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $800,000 | $800,000 | $848,000 (6% increase) |
| Cash Sign-on Bonus ($) | $250,000 | — | — |
| Reported Salary in SCT ($) | $246,154 (partial-year) | $800,000 | — |
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan – FY2025 Metrics and Outcomes
| Performance Metric (in millions) | Weight | Target | Actual | Performance as % of Target | Weighted Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBITDA | 20% | $550 | $552 | 100.4% | 20.4% |
| Free Cash Flow | 10% | $150 | $239 | 159.4% | 15.0% |
| Retail Adjusted EBITDA | 40% | $19 | $6 | 31.3% | — |
| Retail Free Cash Flow | 30% | $9 | $5 | 55.4% | 16.6% |
| Named Executive Officer | Target Annual Incentive ($) | Actual Paid ($) |
|---|---|---|
| Matteo Tarditi | $800,000 | $969,472 |
Long-Term Incentive Program Structure (Grants in December 2024)
| Component | Weight | Vesting | Key Performance Metrics |
|---|---|---|---|
| RSUs | ~40% of LTI value | Ratably over 3 years, beginning one year after grant date (Dec 19, 2025 for FY2025 RSUs) | Time-based vesting |
| PSUs | ~60% of LTI value | Cliff at end of three-year performance period (FY2025–FY2027) | 3-year cumulative Core Adjusted EPS (60%) and 3-year cumulative Free Cash Flow (40%); ±10% Relative TSR modifier; PSU payout capped at 200% regardless of TSR modifier for awards on/after Dec 19, 2024 |
Grants of Plan-Based Awards – FY2025 (Approved Oct 31, 2024; Granted Dec 19, 2024)
| Grant Type | Threshold | Target | Max | Units/Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Annual Cash Incentive ($) | $400,000 | $800,000 | $1,200,000 | FY2025 AIP opportunity |
| PSUs (shares) | 22,892 | 45,784 | 91,568 | FY2025–FY2027 performance cycle |
| RSUs (shares) | — | — | — | 30,522; Grant Date FV $799,982 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Ownership Detail | Value |
|---|---|
| Beneficially Owned Shares (Oct 22, 2025) | 26,902; less than 1% of outstanding |
| Stock Ownership Guidelines | 3x base salary for executive officers; compliance required within 5 years; vested/unvested RSUs counted; PSUs not counted |
| Compliance Status | As of Aug 2, 2025, executive officers were in compliance or on track within the 5-year accumulation period; 5-year clock reset after 18 months of sustained stock price decline |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited for executive officers under Insider Trading Policy |
| LTI Target (FY2025) | $2,000,000 |
| LTI Target (FY2026 – New Plan Benefits) | $2,500,000; units to be determined at Dec 18, 2025 closing price |
Outstanding Equity Awards at FY2025 Year-End (Market Value at $27.01/share on Aug 1, 2025)
| Grant Date | Award Type | Shares/Units | Market Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 6/7/2024 | RSU | 24,864 | $671,577 |
| 6/7/2024 | RSU | 22,660 | $612,047 |
| 12/19/2024 | RSU | 30,522 | $824,399 |
| 6/7/2024 | PSU (shown at max) | 111,888 | $3,022,095 |
| 12/19/2024 | PSU (shown at max) | 91,568 | $2,473,252 |
| Options | — | — | — (no options disclosed) |
RSUs vest in three equal annual installments beginning one year after grant; PSUs cliff-vest at 3 years based on performance; PSU payout max capped at 200% for grants on/after Dec 19, 2024 .
Note: Attempted to fetch Form 4 activity for insider trading patterns; access error prevented retrieval, so the above ownership relies on proxy disclosures as of Aug 1, 2025 .
Employment Terms
- No employment agreements with any executive officers (including CEO) .
- Change-in-control provisions are double-trigger (require both CoC and termination); plan prohibits repricing; one-year minimum vesting with limited exceptions; defined treatment for death, disability, retirement; dividends on unvested awards not payable until vesting .
- Severance: For executives other than CEO, severance agreements limited to 1x base salary + bonus and cover executive officers and a small group under pre-existing agreements; moving to an executive severance plan starting FY2026 .
- Clawbacks/Recoupment: NYSE-mandated executive clawback policy plus broader recoupment of performance-based compensation, and forfeiture of time/performance-based incentives for misconduct resulting in material financial or reputational harm .
- Trading Policies: Prohibition on hedging, short sales, and pledging; trading limited to open windows with preclearance; 10b5-1 plans permitted during open windows .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- FY2026 adjustments emphasize equity alignment and retention: base salary raised to $848,000 (+6%) and target LTI raised from $2.0mm to $2.5mm; annual cash incentive targets unchanged; AIP maximum increased from 150% to 200% to better align with market and incentivize outperformance .
- FY2025 LTI mix balanced (40% RSUs/60% PSUs) and shifted PSU metrics to cumulative 3-year Core Adjusted EPS and Free Cash Flow based on investor feedback; Relative TSR acts as modifier within ±10% .
- Executive compensation program highlights: no employment agreements, no tax gross-ups, robust ownership guidelines and clawbacks, and prohibition on repricing, hedging, and pledging .
Performance & Track Record
- FY2025 corporate performance contributed positively to AIP via Adjusted EBITDA ($552mm) and Free Cash Flow ($239mm), while retail metrics underperformed, shaping payout outcomes .
- Prior PSU cycle (FY2023–2025) paid 45% after a -10% Relative TSR modifier; Tarditi did not receive these PSUs due to start date post-grant, reflecting programmatic pay-for-performance discipline .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Strong equity-heavy pay mix (RSUs/PSUs) tied to cumulative EPS and FCF supports deleveraging and cash generation priorities; hedging/pledging prohibitions and ownership guidelines add alignment with shareholders .
- Retention risk: 2026 merit raise and LTI uplift signal retention focus; severance framework (1x base+bonus for non-CEO execs) is shareholder-friendly but provides limited downside protection, implying retention relies on equity value creation .
- Trading signals: Upcoming RSU vesting tranches (beginning Dec 19, 2025) and three-year PSU cliff in FY2027 may create calendar-based sell pressure around vesting; monitor 10b5-1 plans and Form 4 filings to assess any systematic selling patterns .
- Execution risk: PSU metrics concentrate accountability on Core Adjusted EPS and FCF; with retail metrics underperforming in FY2025 AIP, sustained improvement in retail remains a lever for full payout realization; clawbacks and double-trigger CoC terms mitigate governance risk .