Steven M. Guberman
About Steven M. Guberman
Executive Vice President, Chief Transformation Officer and Nationally Managed Business at US Foods (NEO). US Foods delivered Net Sales of $37.9B (+6.4% YoY) and Adjusted EBITDA of $1.74B (+11.7% YoY) in FY 2024, with cumulative 5-year TSR value of $161.34 per $100 invested, underscoring pay-for-performance alignment in incentive design . Age and education are not disclosed in the proxy; tenure as NEO spans FY 2022–2024 .
Past Roles
Not disclosed in the proxy for Steven M. Guberman .
External Roles
Not disclosed in the proxy for Steven M. Guberman .
Fixed Compensation
Multi-year compensation detail:
| Metric | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 550,800 | 565,569 | 570,000 |
| Stock Awards – Grant Date Fair Value ($) | 1,750,032 | 1,350,022 | 1,350,010 |
| AIP – Non-Equity Incentive Plan Compensation ($) | 597,522 | 590,549 | 504,721 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | 31,775 | 32,000 | 40,406 (perqs $26,606; 401(k) $13,800) |
2024 AIP targets and payouts:
| Item | FY 2024 |
|---|---|
| Eligible Earnings ($) | 570,000 |
| AIP Target (%) | 100% |
| AIP Target Award ($) | 570,000 |
| AIP Actual Award ($) | 504,721 |
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) – FY 2024 Design and Outcome
| Metric | Weight | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual | Payout Contribution |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBITDA | 70% | $1.609B | $1.720B | $1.868B | $1.741B | 114% weighted |
| Distribution Cost Per Case | 15% | -$0.102 | -$0.026 | $0.081 | -$0.115 | 0% weighted |
| IND Market Share | 15% | +20 bps | +60 bps | +100 bps | +27 bps | 38% weighted |
| AIP Business Performance Factor | — | — | — | — | — | 86% before safety |
| Safety Modifier (AFR/IFR) | — | -10% (no improvement) | 0% (+14% YoY) | +10% (+31% YoY) | +19% YoY | +3.13% → 89% total |
Long-Term Incentive Plan (LTIP) – PRSUs/RSUs Mix and Performance Metrics
- 2024 LTIP: 50% RSUs and 50% PRSUs; PRSUs tied to Adjusted EBITDA growth rate (70%) and ROIC (30%), with annual growth targets for 2024–2026; payout determined by simple average of annual results (0–200%) .
- 2023 LTIP: identical 50/50 mix; PRSUs with annual growth targets for 2023–2025 (0–200%) .
- Realized performance:
- 2022 PRSUs vested at 157.95% based on 3-year Adjusted EBITDA and Adjusted ROIC growth; Steven earned 26,667 units .
- 2021 Value Creation Awards (TSR stock price hurdles) vested at target; Steven earned 25,373 units (vested March 29, 2025) .
Award-level detail:
| Award | Grant Date | Type | Units/Value | Vesting / Performance Terms |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY 2024 LTIP | 3/25/2024 | RSUs | 12,514 | Time-based; 3 equal annual tranches (2025–2027) |
| FY 2024 LTIP | 3/25/2024 | PRSUs | 12,514 (target) | 3-year performance (2024–2026); average annual Adjusted EBITDA and ROIC growth; 0–200% payout |
| FY 2023 LTIP | 3/27/2023 | RSUs | 12,556 (unvested) | Time-based; remaining vest 3/27/2025 and 3/27/2026 |
| FY 2023 LTIP | 3/27/2023 | PRSUs | 18,834 (target unearned) | 3-year performance (2023–2025); vests 2026 at 0–200% of target |
| FY 2022 LTIP | 3/28/2022 | RSUs | 5,628 (unvested) | Final tranche vested 3/28/2025 |
| FY 2022 LTIP | 3/28/2022 | PRSUs | 16,833 (target unearned at FY-end) | Vest 3/28/2025; paid at 157.95% of target |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Beneficial ownership: 131,121 shares; less than 1% of outstanding .
- Options and RSUs (near-term/exercisable):
- Options exercisable within 60 days: 270,326 .
- Unvested RSUs expected within 60 days: 16,077 .
- Stock ownership guidelines: executives must hold 3x base salary; all executive officers were in compliance or on track at end of FY 2024; 50% net shares retention until guideline met; “in-the-money” vested options excluded from guideline calc starting April 1, 2025 .
- Anti-hedging/anti-pledging policy: executives prohibited from hedging or pledging USFD stock, aligning with shareholder interests .
Outstanding awards and option profile (as of FY 2024 year-end):
| Instrument | Quantity | Strike | Expiration |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stock Options (2016) | 64,409 | $23.18 | 6/23/2026 |
| Stock Options (2017) | 33,468 | $30.39 | 6/03/2027 |
| Stock Options (2018) | 25,721 | $33.56 | 3/26/2028 |
| Stock Options (2019) | 34,651 | $34.56 | 3/25/2029 |
| Stock Options (2020) | 85,252 | $13.29 | 3/23/2030 |
| Stock Options (2021) | 26,825 | $36.95 | 3/29/2031 |
Employment Terms
Executive severance agreements (double-trigger structure, no fixed-term employment):
- Without cause or for good reason: accrued base salary; prorated AIP; salary continuation for 18 months; fixed bonus equal to 1.5x AIP target; lump-sum COBRA premium for severance period .
- Change in control + qualifying termination (within 18 months): accrued base salary; prorated AIP; lump sum 24 months base salary; fixed bonus equal to 2x AIP target; COBRA premiums for 24 months; equity vesting at target if awards are not assumed or upon qualifying termination (RSUs fully vest; PRSUs vest at target) .
- Restrictive covenants: non-disclosure, non-competition, non-solicitation, non-interference; severance subject to clawback upon covenant breach or fraud-related restatement .
- Clawback policy: Dodd-Frank compliant recovery of erroneously awarded incentive compensation for 3 preceding fiscal years upon accounting restatement .
Scenario-specific cash and equity value illustrations (as of 12/27/2024):
| Scenario | Cash Compensation ($) | Equity Value ($) | COBRA/Benefits ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Good Reason (no CIC) | 2,214,721 | — | 23,530 | 2,238,251 |
| Not For Cause (no CIC) | 2,214,721 | 1,283,747 | 23,530 | 3,521,998 |
| CIC + Not For Cause | 2,850,000 | 8,747,876 | 31,373 | 11,629,249 |
| Disability/Death | 504,721 | 8,361,552 | 632,000 (LTD) | 9,498,274 |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Mix shift and at-risk pay: 50% PRSUs in LTIP and AIP weighted to Adjusted EBITDA, cost efficiency (Distribution Cost Per Case), market share (IND Market Share), plus safety modifier, tightening pay-for-performance linkage .
- Say-on-Pay support: 94% approval in 2024, indicating investor endorsement of design .
- No stock options granted in 2024; equity grants limited to RSUs/PRSUs, consistent with broader market governance preferences .
- No excise tax gross-ups; no supplemental retirement benefits; clawback policy implemented; anti-hedging/pledging policies in effect .
Equity Vesting & Potential Selling Pressure
- Near-term RSU vesting: 5,628 units (final 2022 RSU tranche) on 3/28/2025; 12,556 (2023 RSUs) over 2025–2026; 12,514 (2024 RSUs) over 2025–2027—could create periodic tax-withholding sales .
- PRSU events: 16,833 (2022 PRSUs) vested at 157.95% in March 2025; 18,834 (2023 PRSUs) contingent until 2026; 12,514 (2024 PRSUs) contingent until 2027 .
- Options: sizable in-the-money inventory across 2016–2021 vintages; exercise decisions may align with blackout windows and ownership guideline retention requirements .
Related Policies and Perquisites
- Perquisites: 2024 total $40,406 (includes executive allowance and spousal airfare to Company event; plus 401(k) match) .
- Pension: only NEO with defined benefit plan history; pension benefits paid out as part of plan termination in 2024; prior year actuarial change disclosed .
Company Performance Context (Alignment Signals)
- FY 2024 highlights: Net Sales $37.9B (+6.4%), Adjusted EBITDA $1.74B (+11.7%), Adjusted EBITDA margin expanded +22 bps to 4.6%, Net Income $494M; Net leverage at 2.8x; $341M capex; ~$1B share repurchases .
- Strategic metrics embedded in incentives: Adjusted EBITDA, ROIC, Distribution Cost Per Case, IND Market Share, safety .
- Pay versus performance: cumulative TSR index value $161.34 (Company) vs $188.59 (peer group) over five years; CAP tracks equity performance .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: High proportion of at-risk pay (AIP and PRSUs) linked to EBITDA growth, ROIC, market share and safety suggests strong performance orientation; Say-on-Pay support reinforces governance quality .
- Selling pressure: Multiple RSU tranches vest 2025–2027 and realized PRSUs in 2025 may prompt periodic sales for tax; options inventory across older grants could be exercised opportunistically; monitor Form 4s around vest/exercise windows .
- Retention/transition risk: Double-trigger CIC and standard severance (1.5x AIP target; 18 months salary) with restrictive covenants indicate balanced protection and retention; lack of tax gross-ups reduces red flags .
- Governance safeguards: Anti-hedging/pledging and clawback policy mitigate misalignment and restatement risk; executive ownership guidelines (3x salary) and retention requirements bolster “skin-in-the-game” .