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Udit Batra

President and Chief Executive Officer at WATERS CORP /DE/WATERS CORP /DE/
CEO
Executive
Board

About Udit Batra

Udit Batra, Ph.D., is President & CEO of Waters Corporation and a Director since September 1, 2020; age 54, with a BS from the University of Delaware and a PhD in Chemical Engineering from Princeton University . Prior roles include CEO of Merck KGaA’s Life Science business (MilliporeSigma) (2014–2020) and executive posts at Merck KGaA, Novartis, Johnson & Johnson, McKinsey & Co., and Merck & Co. . Under Waters’ pay-versus-performance framework, compensation actually paid to Batra has been aligned with company TSR and adjusted organic net income; cumulative TSR from year-end 2019 to year-end 2024 was 158% versus 90% for the peer group, with 2024 adjusted non-GAAP organic net income of $709.1 million (vs. GAAP net income $637.8 million) . Management commentary highlights high single-digit sales growth and double-digit adjusted EPS growth for 2025, with momentum into 2026 .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Merck KGaA (MilliporeSigma)CEO, Life Science; Executive Board Member2014–2020Guided strategic transformation and integration with Sigma-Aldrich; oversaw global IT and bioethics panel .
Merck KGaAPresident & CEO, Consumer Health2011–2014Led consumer health portfolio; global leadership .
NovartisCorporate Strategy; Country President (ANZ Pharma); Global Public Health & Market Access2006–2011Built corporate strategy; led country operations; market access .
Johnson & JohnsonGlobal Brand Director, Wound Care2004–2005Global brand leadership in consumer health .
McKinsey & Co.Senior Engagement Manager2001–2004Healthcare, consumer, non-profit advisory .
Merck & Co., Inc.Research Fellow1996–2001Technical R&D grounding in pharma .

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsNotes
Public company boardsNoneNo current or past 5-year public boards .

Fixed Compensation

Multi-year CEO compensation (USD):

Metric202220232024
Salary$1,038,472 $1,097,500 $1,100,000
Non-Equity Incentive Plan Compensation$2,056,778 $0 $1,197,119
All Other Compensation$19,500 $69,444 $24,300
Total$9,409,550 $8,742,180 $11,148,038

Notes:

  • “Compensation Actually Paid” in 2024 was $14,563,626; CAP methodology per SEC Item 402(v) and driven by equity fair value changes .

Performance Compensation

ComponentDesignMetric(s)WeightingPeriodVesting
Annual Incentive (AIP)Cash; pay-for-performanceAdjusted non-GAAP organic constant currency revenue growth (OCCRG); Adjusted non-GAAP organic net income growth (ONIG)Not disclosedAnnualPaid following performance year .
PSUsEquity with performanceRelative TSR (rTSR); three-year OCCRGNot disclosed3 fiscal yearsCliff vest after performance period .
RSUs & OptionsTime-based equityStock price alignment5-year vesting horizon for RSUs and optionsVests over five years; PSUs after 3-year period .

Selected realized equity in 2024:

  • Shares acquired on vesting: 14,511; value realized: $5,021,386 for Batra .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

ItemDetail
Stock awards vested (2024)14,511 shares; $5,021,386 value realized .
Deferred compensation (401(k) Restoration Plan)Aggregate ending balance $224,341 for Batra (2024); no executive or company contributions in 2024; participant-directed earnings .
Vesting normsNon-qualified stock options and RSUs generally vest over five years; PSUs vest after three-year performance period .
Hedging/pledgingNot disclosed in available documents.

Employment Terms

ProvisionOutside Change-in-Control (CIC)CIC (double-trigger)
SeveranceContinued salary + target annual bonus for 24 months; lump-sum equivalent of 24 months benefits premiums; pro-rata annual bonus if employed on/after July 1 of year; subject to release and restrictive covenantsLump sum equal to: 36× monthly base salary + same amount × target bonus percentage (or accrued bonus % if higher) + 36 months benefits premiums; offsets any severance under employment agreement; equity awards and capital accumulation benefits vest/become exercisable upon such termination in connection with CIC; subject to release .
Restrictive covenantsNoncompetition and non-solicitation for 1–2 years post-termination depending on circumstances; confidentiality and IP protection .
Trigger definitionTermination by company other than Cause or resignation for Good Reason; double-trigger within 9 months prior (after substantive discussions) or 18 months post CIC .

Board Governance

AttributeDetail
Board roleDirector since 2020; CEO; committees: none .
IndependenceNot independent (CEO) .
Compensation Committee2025 Compensation Committee members referenced: Christopher A. Kuebler (Chair), Flemming Ornskov, Mark P. Vergnano, which recommended inclusion of CD&A in the proxy .
Director pay (program context)Non-employee directors received cash, restricted stock, and option awards (e.g., 2024 totals: Ornskov $480,157; Baddour $336,157), while Batra received no director compensation .

Director Compensation (for non-employee directors)

DirectorCash FeesStock AwardsOption AwardsTotal
Flemming Ornskov, M.D., M.P.H.$260,500 $109,759 $109,898 $480,157
Linda Baddour$116,500 $109,759 $109,898 $336,157
Daniel Brennan$101,500 $109,759 $109,898 $321,157

Note: Dr. Batra did not receive compensation for director service; his compensation is reported as CEO .

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • High at-risk pay mix: In 2024, performance-based compensation (target annual incentive plus LTI grant date value assuming PSU target) represented ~90% of Batra’s target total direct compensation; other NEOs ~78% .
  • Metrics tied to pay: AIP uses OCCRG and ONIG; PSUs use rTSR and three-year OCCRG, linking pay to top-line growth, profitability, and shareholder return .
  • Equity-heavy LTI with long vesting: 5-year vesting for RSUs/options and 3-year for PSUs supports retention and long-term alignment; CAP sensitive to stock price movement .
  • Realized equity: Significant 2024 vesting value ($5.0M) indicates ongoing equity conversion events that can create periodic selling needs for tax withholding or diversification .

Say-on-Pay & Shareholder Feedback

  • 2025 proxy included advisory vote on executive compensation; institutional N-PX filings show votes cast on WAT’s say-on-pay and director elections, but company-level approval percentages are not disclosed in the available documents .

Expertise & Qualifications

  • Chemical engineering PhD with two decades of senior leadership in global life sciences and consumer health; led large-scale integrations and strategic transformations at Merck KGaA (MilliporeSigma) .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: The ~90% at-risk pay structure and PSUs linked to rTSR/OCCRG indicate strong pay-for-performance alignment; CAP tracks TSR and adjusted net income over time .
  • Retention vs cost: Robust double-trigger CIC protections (3× salary plus target bonus-equivalent and full equity acceleration upon qualifying termination) enhance retention but increase potential change-of-control costs; non-compete/non-solicit covenants support post-termination protection .
  • Equity cadence: Five-year time-vesting and three-year performance vesting create predictable windows of vesting; 2024 vesting value ($5.0M) underscores ongoing conversion that can lead to sell-to-cover activity and potential short-term insider selling pressure around vesting dates .
  • Governance: Dual role as CEO and Director (non-independent) is mitigated by independent committee oversight, including a Compensation Committee chaired by an independent director .
  • Performance backdrop: Waters has delivered high single-digit sales growth and double-digit adjusted EPS growth in 2025, with momentum into 2026, which supports incentive attainment prospects .