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Albert Chao

Executive Chairman of the Board at WESTLAKEWESTLAKE
Executive
Board

About Albert Chao

Albert Y. Chao (age 75) is Executive Chairman of Westlake Corporation, serving as CEO from 2004 to 2024 and director since June 2003; he holds a bachelor’s degree from Brandeis University and an MBA from Columbia University . In 2024, Westlake’s TSR was 50.0%, EVA rate-of-return was 7.5%, SG&A was ~$878 million, and net income was $647 million, which drove incentive outcomes under Westlake’s plans . Westlake is a controlled company with TTWF LP owning 72.3% of common stock; the board separates Executive Chairman, Senior Chairman, and CEO roles, with Albert Chao non‑independent due to management status and family ties .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Mobil Oil CorporationController’s GroupFinancial/process experience prior to Westlake founding
Hercules IncorporatedTechnical DepartmentTechnical/operations foundation in chemicals
Gulf Oil CorporationPlastics GroupPlastics market expertise
China General Plastics GroupAssistant to ChairmanStrategic insight and Asia market exposure
Plastics fabrication business in SingaporeDeputy Managing DirectorInternational operations leadership
Westlake CorporationAssisted founding (1985)Co‑founding family leadership in global expansion

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Westlake Chemical Partners GP LLCExecutive Chairman since July 2024; Director since March 2014; President & CEO March 2014–July 20242014–presentGovernance/oversight of MLP general partner; strategic alignment with Westlake

Fixed Compensation

Metric202220232024
Base Salary ($)1,207,396 1,252,965 1,172,923
Metric20242025
AIP Target Bonus % of Salary105% (reduced from 135% upon transition) 105%
Base Salary ($, set Feb 2025)1,060,000
LTI Target (% of Salary)550% 400% (reduced beginning 2025)

Notes:

  • Base salary decreased to $1,019,000 effective July 15, 2024 upon transition to Executive Chairman; subsequently increased to $1,060,000 in Feb 2025 .

Performance Compensation

AIP Metric (2024)Threshold/TargetActualResult/Payout
TSR vs 2024 Peer GroupAuthorize if within top two‑thirds50.0% TSR; within top two‑thirds Threshold met (AIP gating satisfied)
EVA Rate of Return≥ 33% of WACC7.5% (vs 8.75% capital charge benchmark) Corporate EVA bonus multiple ≈ 0.86x
SG&A ($)≤ $953.6 million~$878 million Threshold met
Final AIP Payout – Albert ChaoTarget multiple × banking × individual performance167% of target bonus (paid typically in March)
2024 LTI Grants (Feb 16, 2024 unless noted)Grant DetailVestingGrant Date Fair Value ($)
RSUs16,010 units 100% on Feb 16, 2027 2,313,205
Stock Options44,324 options @ $144.485 Ratable: Feb 16, 2025/2026/2027 2,313,270
PSUs (Target)16,058 target units; payout based on greater of Relative TSR or EVA multiple Performance period 2024–2026; settle by Mar 15, 2027 2,944,877
PSU Program DesignThresholdTargetMaximum
Relative TSR Percentile≥ 33rd ≥ 50th ≥ 75th
EVA Bonus Multiple≥ 0.5x ≥ 1.0x ≥ 2.0x
Payout Rate25% of target 100% of target 200% of target
Historical PSU OutcomeMetricResultPayout
2022 Grant (Jan 1, 2022–Dec 31, 2024)Relative TSR rank71.4% 185.6% of target (vested Feb 18, 2025)
QIP (Quarterly Incentive Plan, 2024)Target AchievementEVA Rate of ReturnPayout to Albert Chao
General employees & NEOs (8% target of quarterly eligible earnings) 82.7% 7.5% (above 5.25% target) $77,073

Equity Ownership & Alignment

Beneficial Ownership (as of Mar 10, 2025)Shares% of ClassPledged
Albert Y. Chao1,140,193 <1% None
Stock Ownership PolicyRequirementHedging/PledgingStatus
Executives/directors must retain 100% of vested shares (net of taxes) until holdings equal 6x salary for Albert Chao; anti‑hedging and prior notice for any pledging6x base salary for Albert Chao Hedging/shorting/puts/calls prohibited; none currently pledge None of directors or executives currently pledge
2024 Outstanding Awards (Albert Chao)TypeUnitsKey Dates/TermsFMV at 12/31/2024 ($)
RSUs (vested Feb 18, 2025)RSU17,972 Vested Feb 18, 2025 2,060,490
RSUs (vest Feb 17, 2026)RSU16,555 Vest Feb 17, 2026 1,898,031
RSUs (vest Feb 16, 2027)RSU16,010 Vest Feb 16, 2027 1,835,547
PSUs – 2022 grant (earned 185.6%)PSU (earned)33,456 Earned/vested Feb 18, 2025 3,835,730
PSUs – 2023 grant (in progress)PSU (unearned)16,605 (assumed at target) Performance period to 12/31/2025; vest Feb 2026 1,903,763
PSUs – 2024 grant (in progress)PSU (unearned)16,058 (assumed at target) Performance period to 12/31/2026; vest Feb 2027 1,841,050
2024 OptionsStock Options44,324 Exercise price $144.485; vest ratably 2025–2027; expire 2/16/2034 — (unvested)
Cumulative Prior Options (various)Stock OptionsMultiple lines Exercise prices $44.42–$122.65; expirations 2026–2033
2024 Realized ActivityEventUnitsValue
Shares acquired on vesting (RSUs/PSUs)Vesting59,548 $8,603,793
Options exercisedExercise45,298 $3,556,936

Employment Terms

CategoryKey Terms
Employment AgreementsNo employment agreements for NEOs; offer letters outline principal terms
Termination BenefitsDeath: unvested options/RSUs/PSUs vest (PSUs at target); Normal Retirement: prorated vesting; Termination without Cause: limited prorated option vesting; AIP Final Award paid in specified cases
Change-in-Control (CIC)If awards not assumed/replaced: vest/pay at CIC (performance awards at achieved levels); if assumed/replaced: double‑trigger prorated vesting within 24 months upon termination without Cause or for Good Reason; definitions of CIC, Cause, Good Reason specified
Potential Payments (as of 12/31/2024)DeathNormal RetirementCIC Non‑AssumptionInvoluntary Termination Post‑CIC Assumption
Albert Chao – AIP Final Award ($)3,221,406 3,221,406 3,221,406 3,221,406
Stock Option Acceleration ($)126,201 120,557 126,201 120,557
RSU Acceleration ($)5,794,067 3,685,539 5,794,067 3,685,539
PSU Acceleration ($)5,811,494 (target) 5,386,523 (prorated) 7,580,573 5,386,523 (prorated)
Total ($)14,953,168 12,414,025 16,722,247 12,414,025
280G/4999 MitigationParachute cap to mitigate excise tax exposure

Board Governance

  • Roles and tenure: Executive Chairman since July 2024; CEO 2004–2024; director since June 2003; nominee for Class III with term to 2028 .
  • Independence and controlled company: TTWF LP controls 72.3% of shares; Albert Chao is non‑independent; Westlake utilizes certain NYSE controlled company exemptions .
  • Committees: Corporate Risk & Sustainability Committee includes all board members (Albert serves); Audit, Compensation, and Nominating committees are composed of independent directors .
  • Executive sessions: Non‑management directors meet regularly; independent directors meet at least annually; presiding director rotates .
  • Attendance: Board held 12 meetings in 2024; all directors attended ≥75% of meetings; almost all attended the 2024 annual meeting .
  • Director compensation: Management directors (Albert, James, John) receive no additional compensation for board service; independent director retainers and RSUs disclosed (policy), but not applicable to Albert .

Compensation Peer Group

Peer group used for 2024 compensation decisions includes chemicals and building products companies such as Dow, DuPont, Celanese, Eastman, Huntsman, LyondellBasell, PPG, Sherwin‑Williams, Builders FirstSource, Masco, Owens Corning, RPM, and others; the Committee seeks Westlake’s median ranking in the group with Willis Towers Watson support .

Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback

  • 2023 say‑on‑pay received >96% approval; Committee did not change approach based on votes; frequency every three years supported by shareholders .

Related Party / Consultant Use

  • The Compensation Committee engaged Willis Towers Watson (WTW) for 2024 executive compensation advice ($162k), plus ~$2.1 million for other services; Committee assessed no conflict of interest (Feb 2025) .
  • Committee interlocks: Company buys/leases products from Air Liquide (Mr. Graff until July 2024); ~$45 million paid and ~$12 million sold to Air Liquide in 2024 .

Performance & Track Record

  • Leadership transition: On July 15, 2024, Albert Chao transitioned to Executive Chairman and Jean‑Marc Gilson became CEO as part of a long‑planned succession; Albert remains actively engaged .
  • Five‑year cumulative TSR: Westlake 75.43% vs S&P 500 Chemicals 46.15% over five years, reflecting value creation under long‑term leadership .
  • Pay vs performance context: Compensation is strongly correlated with TSR, with EVA moderating payouts via banking to smooth cyclicality .

Risk Indicators & Red Flags

  • Controlled company with concentrated family ownership may raise independence concerns; however, key committees are independent .
  • Anti‑hedging/pledging policy in place; none currently pledge—reduces alignment risk .
  • CIC provisions are double‑trigger for assumed awards, limiting windfalls absent termination; 280G mitigation reduces gross‑up risk exposure .

Fixed Compensation – Additional Detail

Component2024 ($)2023 ($)2022 ($)
Stock Awards (RSUs/PSUs grant date fair value)5,258,082 4,819,447 4,610,575
Option Awards (grant date fair value)2,313,270 2,030,507 1,943,071
Non‑Equity Incentive (AIP + QIP)1,864,073 3,553,139 4,169,146
All Other Compensation315,533 (incl. dividends) 315,428 312,152

Performance Compensation – PSU/Vesting Cadence

Grant YearInstrumentTarget UnitsVested/EarnedVest/Settlement
2022PSUs185.6% payout based on TSR rank 71.4% Vested Feb 18, 2025; settled by Mar 15, 2025
2023PSUsIn progress (assumed at target in disclosure) Vest Feb 2026 if performance met
2024PSUs16,058 In progress (greater of TSR vs EVA multiple) Vest Feb 2027 if performance met

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: Large long‑tenured insider ownership (1.14 million shares), strict retention and anti‑hedging/pledging policy, and performance‑based pay (AIP gated by TSR/EVA/SG&A; PSUs tied to TSR/EVA) support shareholder alignment; upcoming RSU/PSU vestings (2026–2027) and regular option vesting are non‑cash initially but can create periodic selling pressure upon settlement/exercise depending on tax/liquidity needs .
  • Pay mix transition: Post‑CEO transition, base and LTI targets were reduced (AIP target 105%, LTI 400% vs 550%), moderating compensation leverage while maintaining strategic influence as Executive Chairman—likely lowers incentive‑driven volatility in realized pay while retaining at‑risk components .
  • Retention/CIC: No employment agreement and banking of AIP can smooth cycles; CIC protections are primarily double‑trigger for assumed awards, which lowers windfall risk but still provide meaningful prorated vesting—termination scenario values for Albert are sizable (e.g., $16.7M under CIC non‑assumption) .
  • Governance risk: Controlled company status and family ties present independence considerations; however, independent committees and separated Chairman/CEO roles, plus regular executive sessions, mitigate some concerns; sustained TSR outperformance suggests disciplined capital allocation despite cyclicality .