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Neil Blumenthal

Neil Blumenthal

Co-Chief Executive Officer at Warby Parker
CEO
Executive
Board

About Neil Blumenthal

Neil Blumenthal, age 44, is Co-Founder, Co-CEO (since 2010), Director (since May 2009), and Co-Chair of the Board (since June 2021) at Warby Parker (WRBY). He holds a BA from Tufts University and an MBA from The Wharton School. In 2024 under his leadership, Warby Parker delivered net revenue of $771.3 million (+15.2% YoY), Adjusted EBITDA of $73.1 million (+$20.8m YoY) with 9.5% margin, and generated $98.7 million in operating cash flow and $34.7 million in free cash flow, while expanding to 276 stores . Since the September 2021 direct listing, cumulative TSR measured as a $100 initial investment stood at $44 by year-end 2024 vs $94 for the peer index, underscoring the long-term equity sensitivity of his pay-for-performance program .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Warby Parker Inc.Co-Chief Executive Officer2010–PresentCo-led omnichannel growth and margin improvement initiatives
Warby Parker Inc.Director2009–PresentBoard oversight since early formation
Warby Parker Inc.Co-Chair of the Board2021–PresentCombined Co-CEO + Co-Chair leadership; Board appointed Lead Director to strengthen independence

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsNotes
Allbirds, Inc.DirectorCurrentPublic company director
Sweetgreen, Inc.DirectorCurrentPublic company director
Warby Parker Impact FoundationDirectorCurrentNonprofit; three WRBY directors serve; Company donated shares in 2024
Partnership Fund for New York CityDirectorCurrentNonprofit board service
Robin HoodDirectorCurrentNonprofit board service
Tech:NYCDirectorCurrentNonprofit board service
Good Friends, LLCGeneral PartnerSince Sep 2019Venture capital GP role

Fixed Compensation

MetricFY 2022FY 2023FY 2024
Base Salary ($)500,000 525,000 555,000 (5.7% increase YoY)
Target Bonus (% of Salary)90%
Non-Equity Incentive/Bonus Paid ($)187,500 368,944 561,938 (paid as fully vested RSUs in Mar-2025)

Notes:

  • Annual bonuses for 2024 were delivered in fully vested RSUs to align with shareholder interests; the number of RSUs is based on grant-date price .

Performance Compensation

Annual Bonus Structure (FY 2024)

MetricWeightingThresholdTargetMaximumActual ResultPayout as % of Target
Net Revenue ($)70%736,700,000 758,000,000 803,800,000 771,315,000 112.5%
Adjusted EBITDA ($)30%67,000,000 70,000,000 80,000,000 73,111,000 112.5%
Aggregate Payout112.5% (no stakeholder modifier adjustment)

Bonus Settlement (FY 2024, granted Mar-2025)

Named ExecutiveTarget Bonus %Target Bonus ($)Earned Bonus %Earned Bonus ($)RSUs Granted (Number)
Neil Blumenthal90% 499,500 112.5% 561,938 23,250

Long-term Equity and Founders’ PSUs (Multi-year)

  • Founders’ Grants (granted 6/15/2021): 2,198,844 PSUs and 942,362 time-based RSUs, with PSUs split into eight tranches requiring 90-day VWAP stock price hurdles from $47.75 to $103.46 over a 10-year term; RSUs vest monthly over 60 months with settlement two years post-vesting except shares withheld/sold for taxes .
  • PSU Tranches and Hurdles: | Tranche | PSUs | Stock Price Hurdle | |---:|---:|---:| | 1 | 274,856 | $47.75 | | 2 | 274,855 | $55.71 | | 3 | 274,856 | $63.67 | | 4 | 274,855 | $71.63 | | 5 | 274,856 | $79.59 | | 6 | 274,855 | $87.55 | | 7 | 274,856 | $95.50 | | 8 | 274,855 | $103.46 |

Other performance-aligned structures:

  • Bonus stakeholder modifier tied to customer NPS, employee engagement, and “do-good” glasses distributed can adjust payouts by up to ±20%; no adjustment applied in 2024 .
  • Clawback policy (2023) applies to current/former executive officers for restatements per NYSE Rule 10D-1 .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

Beneficial Ownership (as of Apr 14, 2025)

ClassShares Beneficially OwnedPercent of ClassPercent of Total Voting Power
Class A433,777
Class B6,826,88238.7% 24.4% of total voting power

Breakdown and alignment factors:

  • Includes direct holdings, family trusts, RSUs vesting within 60 days (44,640 Class B; 9,816 Class A), and options exercisable within 60 days (710,759 Class B) .
  • Shares pledged: 3,039,763 Class B pledged under a line of credit with JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Audit Committee pre-approval policy permits pledging for Section 16 insiders) .
  • Hedging prohibited; pledging requires Audit Committee pre-approval .

Outstanding Equity Awards (as of Dec 31, 2024)

Award TypeCountNotes
Options (Class B)710,759 exercisable; additional unexercisable per scheduleExercise price $3.83; expiring 2/21/2027
RSUs (Class B)298,416 unvestedVests monthly; settlement two years post-vesting
PSUs (Class B)2,198,844 unearnedVest upon stock price hurdles (see table above)

2024 Stock Vesting and Deferred Settlement

ItemSharesValue Realized ($)
Shares acquired on vesting (2024)236,1153,582,093
Deferred RSUs (2024 portion of founders’ awards; two-year settlement deferral)178,560See non-qualified deferred compensation table

Non-Qualified Deferred Compensation (2024)

MetricAmount ($)
Registrant Contributions in Last FY2,799,633
Aggregate Earnings in Last FY3,731,536
Aggregate Withdrawals/Distributions(2,927,152)
Aggregate Balance at FYE8,680,834

Employment Terms

ProvisionTerms
Employment AgreementNone (no offer letter or contract for Blumenthal)
Severance (non-CoC)Founders’ RSUs accelerate in full upon termination without cause/for good reason/death/disability; PSUs remain eligible to vest for up to 18 months post-termination
Change-in-Control (single-trigger)Upon CoC, measure PSUs at transaction price; tranches met and 25% of remaining PSUs vest and settle
Change-in-Control (double-trigger)If terminated without cause or resigns for good reason within 18 months post-CoC, all unvested RSUs accelerate
Estimated Value of Accelerations (12/31/2024 prices)Termination w/o cause/good reason or death/disability: $7,224,651; CoC (no termination): $13,308,503; CoC + qualifying termination: $20,533,155

Other governance and compensation policy features:

  • No pensions, SERP, or tax gross-ups; limited perquisites; independent compensation advisor (Semler Brossy) .
  • Say-on-pay support: Over 99% approval at 2024 annual meeting .

Board Service and Governance

  • Role: Co-Chair of the Board and Co-CEO; not independent under NYSE standards (independent directors listed exclude Co-CEOs) .
  • Board structure: Combined Co-CEO + Co-Chair roles with Lead Independent Director (Ronald Williams) appointed in August 2024 to strengthen independent oversight, including presiding over executive sessions and agenda approval .
  • Committee memberships: Blumenthal is not a member of the Audit, Compensation, or Nominating & Corporate Governance Committees; committee chairs and independent composition in place .
  • Attendance: Board met four times in 2024; each incumbent director attended at least 75% of meetings; 7 of 9 directors attended the 2024 Annual Meeting .
  • Director compensation: Co-CEOs do not receive additional board compensation .

Compensation Peer Group and Shareholder Feedback

  • 2024 peer group included Allbirds, FIGS, GoodRx, National Vision, Progyny, Revolve, YETI, among others; 2025 changes added Arhaus, Olaplex, Teladoc and removed several lower-valuation names .
  • Independent consultant: Semler Brossy; advisor independence confirmed .
  • Say-on-Pay cadence: Annual; next vote in 2026 per company schedule .

Related Party Transactions and Red Flags

  • Pledging: 3,039,763 Class B shares pledged as collateral; while permitted with Audit Committee pre-approval, pledging introduces potential forced-sale risk during market stress (alignment concern) .
  • Investors’ Rights Agreement: Registration rights among founders, directors, and major holders (information flow considerations) .
  • Philanthropy: Company authorized share donations to Warby Parker Impact Foundation; Board includes Blumenthal, Gilboa, Cutler as directors of the Foundation .
  • Clawback: Broad recovery policy for erroneously awarded compensation following restatements .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: Significant founder equity and long-dated PSU hurdles tightly couple realized pay with sustained stock performance; annual bonuses paid in RSUs further enhance alignment .
  • Selling pressure: Ongoing monthly RSU vesting and two-year settlement deferrals create predictable future supply; pledged shares add downside risk via potential margin-driven disposals during volatility .
  • Retention and CoC economics: Strong retention due to founders’ multi-year awards; CoC mechanics include single-trigger PSU vesting and RSU acceleration on double-trigger, which could affect deal-related dilution and executive incentives .
  • Governance: Combined Co-CEO/Co-Chair structure is partially mitigated by Lead Independent Director and fully independent key committees; say-on-pay support (>99%) indicates current shareholder acceptance of pay design .