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Matthew Pine

Matthew Pine

President & Chief Executive Officer at XylemXylem
CEO
Executive
Board

About Matthew Pine

Matthew F. Pine, age 53, is President & Chief Executive Officer of Xylem Inc. (since January 1, 2024) and has served on Xylem’s Board since 2024; he is not independent as the sitting CEO . Under his leadership in 2024, Xylem set records: revenue grew 16% (6% organic), net income margin expanded 210 bps, EBITDA margin expanded 170 bps, and EPS increased 31% (13% adjusted) . Xylem’s cumulative TSR since 12/31/2019 equated to a $156 value for a $100 investment (vs $176 for S&P 500 Industrials), while 2024 revenue was $8,562M and net income $890M . Pine’s pay mix is heavily performance-based (88% of CEO total direct compensation at target) and the company’s say‑on‑pay support was 82.7% in 2024 .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Xylem Inc.President & CEO2024–presentLed transition to high-impact culture; delivered record 2024 performance and accelerated Evoqua integration synergies .
Xylem Inc.Chief Operating Officer2023Drove simplification to segment-led structure; 80/20 execution and modernization initiatives .
Xylem Inc.Segment leader (Applied Water; MCS; Americas Commercial)2020–2023Advanced customer centricity and profitable growth in core franchises .
United Technologies (Carrier Residential)President2018–2020Led residential HVAC portfolio with commercial and operating discipline .
Vestas Wind Systems; Lennox International; Trane Residential & Light Commercial SystemsSales/Marketing leadershipPrior to 2018Built global product and go-to-market expertise across energy and climate tech .

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Trane Technologies plcDirector2025–present (effective Apr 1, 2025)Adds adjacent industrial tech insight; potential information flow across climate tech ecosystems .
Business RoundtableMemberOngoingPolicy engagement and CEO‑level strategy dialogue .
WEF Alliance of CEO Climate LeadersMemberOngoingSustainability leadership and climate transition collaboration .

Fixed Compensation

Component2024Notes
Base Salary ($)1,100,000 Increased 69% upon promotion to CEO effective Jan 1, 2024 .
Target AIP (% of salary)135% Raised from 80% to 135% with CEO role .
Actual AIP Payout ($)2,085,311 Based on total performance score of 140% .

Performance Compensation

Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) – 2024 Team Metrics and Results

MetricWeightTargetActualActual vs TargetPayout %
Organic Revenue ($M)25% 8,520 8,626 101% 131%
Adjusted EBITDA ($M)25% 1,670 1,762 106% 183%
Free Cash Flow Conversion (%)25% 115% 113% −2% delta 96%
Team Performance Score (%)137%

AIP Design notes: Team metrics 75% and Individual Objectives 25% in 2024; total performance score for Pine was 140% (IO score 110%) . For 2025, AIP will be 100% team-based (EBITDA margin adjusted, organic revenue, FCF margin adjusted); segment executives will have blended global/segment weightings .

Long-Term Incentive Plan (LTIP) – 2024 Grants (Grant Date: Mar 1, 2024)

InstrumentWeightGrant Shares/UnitsKey TermsGrant Date Fair Value ($)
PSUs – rTSR50% of PSU12,701 target 3-year cliff; 0–200% payout scale; capped at 100% if absolute TSR negative; comparator S&P 500 ex Financials 2,309,042
PSUs – Adjusted EBITDA25% of PSU6,351 target 3-year cliff; 80%/100%/113.3% of target → 50%/100%/200% payout 812,547
PSUs – Revenue25% of PSU6,351 target 3-year cliff; 90%/100%/110% of target → 50%/100%/200% payout 812,547
RSUs25%12,701 Vests 1/3 annually over 3 years 1,624,966
Stock Options25%42,967 10-year term; strike $127.94; vests 1/3 annually over 3 years 1,625,012
Total 2024 LTIP Value7,184,114

PSU rTSR payout scale: 25th percentile = 25%; 50th = 100%; 83rd+ = 200% . For 2025, PSU metrics will be rTSR versus S&P 500 Industrials and Adjusted Cumulative EPS (replacing EBITDA and Revenue) .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

ItemDetail
Total beneficial ownership247,250 shares (<1% of class) as of Mar 7, 2025 .
Unvested RSUs (count; market value)17,152; $1,989,975 (at $116.02 on 12/31/2024) .
Unearned PSUs (count; market value)79,384; $9,210,132 (valuation per proxy methodology) .
Options – exercisable14,635 @ $63.55 (exp 2/27/2030); 145,856 @ $63.55 (exp 5/7/2030); 11,853 @ $102.23 (exp 3/1/2031); 10,070 @ $86.76 (exp 3/1/2032); 5,735 @ $101.09 (exp 3/1/2033) .
Options – unexercisable5,036 @ $86.76 (exp 3/1/2032); 11,471 @ $101.09 (exp 3/1/2033); 42,967 @ $127.94 (exp 3/1/2034) .
Stock ownership guidelinesCEO must hold 6× base salary; executives must retain at least 50% of net shares from vesting until compliant; all directors/executives met or are on track as of Mar 7, 2025 .
Hedging/pledgingProhibited (hedging, pledging, shorting); robust insider trading policy with quarterly blackout periods and 10b5‑1 plan controls .
Director compensation for CEO directorNone (employee director receives no director pay) .

Scheduled Vesting (as of 12/31/2024)

Grant202520262027
Options (3/1/24) – 42,967 unexercisable14,322 14,322 14,323
Options (3/1/23) – 11,471 unexercisable5,735 5,736
Options (3/1/22) – 5,036 unexercisable5,036
RSUs (3/1/24) – 12,7014,233 4,234 4,234
RSUs (3/1/23) – 3,298 (two tranches)1,649 1,649
RSUs (3/1/22) – 1,1531,153
PSUs (3/1/24) – combined cycles50,806
PSUs (3/1/23) – combined cycles17,312
PSUs (3/1/22) – combined cycles8,576

Note: 2022 PSUs paid at 124% of target upon vesting on 3/1/2025; 2023/2024 PSU estimates at 175% and 200% were used in proxy fair value estimates (subject to actual performance) .

Employment Terms

ProvisionKey Economics
Senior Executive Severance Pay Plan (non‑CoC)12 months base salary up to 24 months based on service, plus continued health/life benefits during severance period; forfeiture if Code of Conduct or non‑compete violated .
Special Senior Executive Severance Pay Plan (CoC)2× base salary + most recent annual bonus; 2 years health/life insurance at same cost; retirement contributions multiple; 1 year outplacement; best‑net approach for 280G .
Estimated payouts (as of 12/31/2024)Death/Disability: $5.4M; Termination not for cause: $1.2M; CoC termination not for cause/with good reason: $14.7M .
ClawbackSEC Rule 10D‑1 compliant recoupment for incentive‑based compensation; LTIP agreements include additional clawback provisions .
Contracts & gross‑upsNo fixed‑term employment contracts; no 280G excise tax gross‑ups; no executive perquisites .

Board Governance

  • Board service: Director since 2024; not independent due to CEO role .
  • Leadership structure: Independent Board Chair (Robert F. Friel) sets agendas, presides over executive sessions; Lead Independent Director would be appointed if Chair were non‑independent .
  • Committees: Audit (Ellis, Harker, Morelli, Yadav), Leadership Development & Compensation (Morelli Chair, Beliveau‑Dunn, Friel, Glatch), Nominating & Governance (Peribere Chair, Harker, Tretikov, Yadav); CEO not a committee member .
  • Board effectiveness: >97% meeting attendance; six Board meetings and 15 committee meetings in 2024; independent director executive sessions at all meetings .
  • Independence: 8 of 9 nominees independent; CEO sole non‑independent; executive sessions regular .

Dual-role implications: Pine is CEO and a director, but Board independence (90%), an independent Chair, majority voting, and regular executive sessions mitigate concentration risk and preserve independent oversight of CEO performance and compensation .

Director Compensation

  • Non‑employee director program: $105,000 cash retainer; $165,000 annual RSU grant; additional retainers for Committee Chairs and Independent Chair; deferral elections available; annual cap $750,000 .
  • Employee director: Pine receives no compensation for board service .

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Mix and leverage: CEO target pay heavily at-risk; 2024 CEO total compensation in SCT was $10.58M with $7.18M LTIP grant value; strong pay‑for‑performance alignment through PSU rTSR, EBITDA, and Revenue .
  • 2025 design tightening: AIP moves to 100% team metrics (adds adjusted FCF margin; segment accountability); LTIP simplifies PSUs to rTSR plus Adjusted Cumulative EPS; rTSR comparator refined to S&P 500 Industrials; reflects shareholder feedback and strategic priorities .
  • Governance guardrails: Double‑trigger CoC; clawbacks; prohibition on hedging/pledging; no option repricing; use of independent compensation consultant; regular risk assessment found no material compensation‑related risks .

Related Party Transactions

No related party transactions requiring disclosure since Jan 1, 2024; pre‑approval policy in place; independent review by Nominating & Governance Committee .

Say‑On‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback

  • Say‑on‑pay support: 83.1% (2023), 82.7% (2024) .
  • Engagement: Targeted outreach to 13 shareholders (>26% of shares) in fall 2024; nine engaged (>21% of shares); feedback incorporated into 2025 AIP/LTIP design changes .

Compensation Peer Group

  • 2024 peer group includes Agilent, Ametek, Dover, Flowserve, Fortive, IDEX, ITW, Ingersoll Rand, Lincoln Electric, Parker-Hannifin, Pentair, Rockwell Automation, Roper, Snap‑On, TE Connectivity, Trane Technologies, Veralto .
  • 2025 addition: Emerson Electric Co. .
  • Targets benchmarked around market median; balanced against role scope and performance .

Expertise & Qualifications

  • Global leadership across sales, operations, supply chain, product management, technology, and digital transformation; deep water industry knowledge; execution of complex strategic transactions (acquisitions/JVs) .
  • External leadership roles (Business Roundtable; WEF Alliance of CEO Climate Leaders); passion for developing talent and inclusive culture .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: Strong linkage of CEO pay to multi-year value drivers (rTSR, EPS/EBITDA/Revenue), reinforced by ownership guidelines and anti‑hedging/pledging policy—supports long-term shareholder alignment .
  • Retention risk: CoC economics (~$14.7M estimate) and sizable unvested equity (e.g., ~79k PSUs and ~17k RSUs) reduce near-term departure risk; 2027 PSU vesting (~50,806 shares) may create transactional liquidity needs, but blackout/10b5‑1 policy governance mitigates disorderly selling .
  • Trading signals: Upcoming multi-year vesting schedules and option maturities (2025–2027) could introduce episodic selling pressure; monitor Form 4 activity and any disclosed 10b5‑1 plans around vest dates (March cadence) .
  • Governance quality: Independent Chair and strong committee oversight offset CEO-director dual role; sustained say‑on‑pay support and shareholder-engaged compensation redesigns are constructive for sentiment and execution accountability .