Peter J. Straub
AMPHENOL CORP /DE/About Peter J. Straub
Peter J. Straub, age 57, is President of Amphenol’s Interconnect and Sensor Systems Division (since January 1, 2024). He previously led the Sensor Technology Group (2019–2023) and Advanced Sensors (2013–2018), joining Amphenol via the acquisition of GE Advanced Sensors; earlier roles include senior positions at Spirent‑Keystone Thermometrics and engineering roles at Delphi and General Motors. He has approximately 24 years of service with Amphenol or acquired businesses and does not serve on any public company boards . In 2024, Straub’s division delivered 10% constant‑currency net sales growth and 10% adjusted operating income growth, resulting in a 110% incentive plan multiplier and a $474,375 incentive payout for the year .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Amphenol | President, Interconnect and Sensor Systems Division | 2024–present | Leads divisional growth and operating performance |
| Amphenol | VP & Group GM, Sensor Technology Group | 2019–2023 | Drove revenue and operating income growth in sensor segment |
| Amphenol | GM, Advanced Sensors | 2013–2018 | Managed advanced sensor portfolio integration and growth |
| GE Advanced Sensors | Product General Manager | Pre‑2013 (joined GE in 2001) | Product leadership prior to Amphenol acquisition |
| Spirent‑Keystone Thermometrics | Senior roles | Pre‑2001 | Senior management in sensing components |
| Delphi; General Motors | Engineering roles | Pre‑2001 | Engineering foundation in automotive systems |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Public company boards | None | n/a | No external public board roles disclosed |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2024 | 2025 | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base salary ($) | $575,000 | $600,000 (↑4.4%) | 2025 increase aligned with broad salaried adjustments |
| Incentive plan target (%) | 75% | 80% | Emphasis on performance‑based pay |
| Group term life imputed ($) | $5,676 | n/a | Company contributes in 2025; amount not specified |
| 401(k) company contribution ($) | $29,099 | n/a | 2024 includes $19,199 regular contribution + $9,900 due to pension discontinuation |
| DC SERP contribution ($) | $16,100 | n/a | Notational contributions |
| Total “All Other Compensation” ($) | $50,875 | n/a | Sum of imputed insurance + 401(k) + DC SERP |
Performance Compensation
Annual Cash Incentive (2024 Management Incentive Plan)
| Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual (2024) | Incentive Plan Multiplier | Payout ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Division constant‑currency net sales growth | 50% | 7% | 10% | 110% | $474,375 (paid Jan 2025) |
| Division adjusted operating income growth | 50% | 11% | 10% | 110% | $474,375 (paid Jan 2025) |
Notes:
- Incentive payout formula: Base salary × target % × multiplier; for 2024: $575,000 × 75% × 110% = $474,375 .
- Maximum multiplier = 200%; no payout if threshold profitability not met; equal weighting between sales and operating income growth for division presidents .
Stock Option Awards (Equity)
| Grant date | Options (#) | Exercise price ($/sh) | Term | Vesting schedule | Grant‑date fair value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| May 17, 2024 | 147,058 | $65.96 | 10 years | 20% per year over 5 years | $2,855,866 |
Notes:
- Amphenol grants only non‑qualified stock options; no RSUs/PSUs under the Option Plans .
- Annual grants generally in Q2; exercise price not less than closing price on grant date; Committee avoids granting close in time to release of material nonpublic information .
Exercises and Realized Value (Liquidity indicator)
| Year | Options exercised (#) | Value realized on exercise ($) |
|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 172,000 | $8,128,600 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership (Mar 17, 2025) | 403,580 shares; percent of class indicated as “*” (less than 1%) |
| Ownership guidelines | Company guidelines require CEO 6× salary and CFO 3×; “certain executives” covered, but division presidents not explicitly specified; 5‑year compliance window; 60% of value of vested, unexercised options counts |
| Hedging/derivatives/pledging | Prohibited for officers/directors (no short sales, derivatives, hedging, margin purchases, or pledges) |
| Equity award structure | Options only; vest 20% annually over 5 years; ten‑year term |
| Recent exercises (pressure indicator) | 172,000 options exercised in 2024 with $8.13m realized value |
Employment Terms
| Scenario | Severance ($) | Non‑compete pay ($) | Incentive plan ($) | Accelerated vesting of unvested options (net value) ($) | Disability ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Voluntary termination | 0 | 575,000 | 474,375 (Committee approval) | 0 | 0 |
| Early retirement | 0 | 575,000 | 474,375 | 12,513,892 | 0 |
| Normal retirement | 0 | 575,000 | 474,375 | 12,513,892 | 0 |
| Involuntary not for cause / for good reason | 0 | 575,000 | 474,375 | 12,513,892 | 0 |
| For cause | 0 | 575,000 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Change in control | 0 | 575,000 | 474,375 | 12,513,892 | 0 |
| Disability | 0 | 287,500 | 474,375 | 12,513,892 | 287,500 |
| Death | 0 | 0 | 474,375 | 12,513,892 | 0 |
Notes:
- Non‑compete pay: Company may pay 50% of base salary (up to 2 years) post‑termination in exchange for a firm non‑compete; Straub base salary at 12/31/2024 was $575,000; payments made as salary continuation .
- Change‑in‑control: Under 2017 Plan, the plan administrator has discretion to accelerate options; 2009 Plan provides immediate vesting prior to change in control at Board discretion; tables assume full acceleration .
- Clawback policy: Company may recover incentive‑based compensation upon an accounting restatement, per SEC Rule 10D‑1 and NYSE standards .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Mix emphasizes at‑risk pay: Options and annual incentive tied to growth metrics; fixed elements are a minority for NEOs; at‑risk items are designed to reward revenue and operating income growth for division presidents .
- Targets and rigor: Division presidents must achieve 7% sales and 11% operating income growth for 100% multiplier; 17.5% and 27.5% respectively for 200% multiplier; equal weighting; threshold is 0% .
- 2024 outcomes: Straub’s division achieved 10% sales and 10% operating income growth; multiplier 110%; payout $474,375; 2025 target bonus increased to 80% of salary, signaling continued focus on performance‑based pay .
- Equity design: Options vest over five years and require share price appreciation to create value; no RSUs/PSUs are granted under current plans, simplifying alignment and reducing “guaranteed” equity .
Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback
- 2024 say‑on‑pay approval exceeded 91%, with programs/policies unchanged heading into 2025 .
- Governance documents (including stock ownership guidelines, insider trading, and clawback) are published and refreshed; proxy emphasizes continued investor outreach and adoption of clawback policy in 2023 .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Incentives are directly tied to divisional sales and operating income growth with equal weighting and a rigorous 200% cap; options‑only equity requires share price appreciation, supporting pay‑for‑performance alignment .
- Retention and liquidity: Five‑year option vesting promotes retention; however, Straub exercised 172,000 options in 2024 with $8.13m realized value, indicating meaningful liquidity events that could create near‑term selling pressure if paired with disposals in cashless exercises .
- Risk controls: Anti‑hedging and anti‑pledging policies reduce misalignment risk; clawback policy provides downside protection against erroneous incentive payouts, improving governance quality .
- Change‑in‑control economics: Discretionary acceleration of options under the 2017 Plan results in substantial potential vesting value ($12.51m), highlighting sensitivity of equity value to corporate control events .
- Performance execution: 2024 division results (10% sales and 10% operating income growth) yielded only a 110% multiplier versus a 200% maximum, signaling room to drive higher divisional growth/operating leverage to maximize at‑risk compensation outcomes .