Joseph Massaro
AptivAbout Joseph Massaro
Joseph R. Massaro is Vice Chairman, Engineered Components Group (ECG) at Aptiv, responsible for growth across Connection Systems, HellermannTyton, Winchester Interconnect, and Intercable Automotive Solutions (appointed Nov 8, 2024). He previously served as CFO from March 2016 to Nov 7, 2024, and held roles including SVP Business Operations, VP Corporate Controller (2014–2016), and VP Internal Audit (2013–2014). He joined Aptiv in 2013 after senior finance/operating roles at Liberty Lane Partners, Thermo Fisher Scientific, Fisher Scientific, and PwC Transaction Services; he holds a BA in Finance & Economics (Bentley) and MBA and MS in Accounting (Northeastern) .
During his CFO tenure, Aptiv’s revenue rose from $12.27B in 2016 to $19.71B in 2024, and EBITDA increased from $2.18B to $3.07B, while the 2022–2024 PSU cycle paid at 63% of target due largely to a 0% payout on relative TSR despite solid financial goal achievement . Revenues FY2016: $12,274M → FY2024: $19,713M [GetFinancials]; EBITDA FY2016: $2,177M → FY2024: $3,067M [GetFinancials].
Values retrieved from S&P Global.
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Aptiv | Vice Chairman, Engineered Components Group | 2024–present | Leads ECG portfolio growth across interconnect and cable management businesses |
| Aptiv | Vice Chairman, Business Operations & CFO | 2024 | Oversaw supply chain, IS, and GBS while serving as CFO |
| Aptiv | SVP, Business Operations | 2020–2024 | Operating execution and transformation support |
| Aptiv | SVP & CFO | 2016–2024 | Finance leadership; later expanded scope to SCM, IS, GBS |
| Aptiv | VP, Corporate Controller | 2014–2016 | Corporate controllership |
| Aptiv | VP, Internal Audit | 2013–2014 | Internal controls and assurance |
| Liberty Lane Partners; Thermo Fisher Scientific; Fisher Scientific; PwC | Senior finance/operating and transaction services roles | — | Finance, operations, M&A execution |
External Roles
- No public company directorships disclosed for Mr. Massaro in the cited Aptiv filings .
Fixed Compensation
| Component | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base salary ($) | 1,150,000 | 1,256,250 | 1,275,000 |
| Target bonus (% of base) | — | 125% | 135% |
| Annual incentive payout ($) | 1,500,000 | 1,593,750 | 1,945,013 |
| All other comp ($) | 103,463 | 172,336 | 182,112 |
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) – 2024 Design and Results (Massaro: corporate weighting)
| Metric (Total Aptiv) | Weight | Threshold | Target | Max | Actual | Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted Operating Income ($M) | 30% | 1,319 | 1,978 | 2,528 | 2,128 | 114% |
| Cash Flow Before Financing ($M) | 30% | 765 | 1,148 | 1,466 | 1,647 | 200% |
| Growth Over Market (pp) | 15% | 3.6 | 5.4 | 7.8 | 0.6 | 0% |
| Strategic Results Metric | 25% | — | — | — | — | 75% of target |
| Financial payout (weighted) | — | — | — | — | — | 126% (Total Aptiv) |
| Total payout factor (Massaro) | — | — | — | — | — | 113% |
Massaro 2024 AIP: Target $1,721,250; Payout $1,945,013 at 113% of target .
Long-Term Incentive (LTI) Structure and Grants
| LTI component | Metric(s) | Weight | Vesting | 2024 Target Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Performance-based RSUs | Avg RONA; Cumulative NI; Relative TSR | 33.3% each | Earned over 2024–2026; settle early 2027 | 3,750,000 |
| Time-based RSUs | Time-based | — | Generally ratable over 3 years | 2,500,000 |
| Total 2024 LTI target | — | — | — | 6,250,000 |
2022–2024 PSU outcome (settled Feb 2025): Avg RONA 82% of target; Cumulative NI 106%; Relative TSR 0%; weighted payout 63% of target. Massaro earned 13,640 units vs 21,650 target (8,010 forfeited) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership | 142,351 shares (as of Feb 28, 2025) |
| Ownership as % of SO | ~0.062% (142,351 / 229,446,368 SO as of record date) |
| Unvested time-based RSUs (12/31/2024) | 4,811 (2/28/2022 grant; $290,969), 13,024 (2/28/2023; $787,692), 31,912 (2/28/2024; $1,930,038) |
| Outstanding performance-based RSUs (max presentation) | 58,604 (2023–2025; $3,544,370), 95,738 (2024–2026; $5,790,234); settle early 2026 and early 2027, respectively |
| Options | None disclosed in outstanding awards—equity shown as RSUs/PSUs |
| Ownership guidelines | Section 16 officers: 3x base salary; NEOs at/above or on track as of Feb 14, 2025 |
| Hedging/pledging | Prohibited by policy |
Vesting schedule considerations: time-based RSUs generally vest ratably over three years on grant anniversaries; performance-based RSUs settle after performance period ends (2023–2025 and 2024–2026) .
Employment Terms
| Provision | Terms (Massaro unless noted) |
|---|---|
| Non-compete / Non-solicit | 12-month non-compete; 24-month non-solicit of employees and customers; applies under non-interference/confidentiality agreements |
| Clawback | NYSE/SEC-compliant clawback adopted in 2023; supplemental clawback for misconduct/fraud |
| Severance (no CIC) | Involuntary not-for-cause or good reason: 18 months base + 1.5x target bonus (cash); illustrated value $4,494,375; benefits continuation per plan |
| Change-in-control (double-trigger) | 2x base + 2x target bonus (cash); illustrated value $5,992,500; pro-rata AIP (greater of actual vs target) and equity vesting per plan; no excise tax gross-ups |
| AIP in CIC/death/disability | Pro-rated; paid per plan terms |
| Equity treatment | Time-based RSUs vest; PSUs vest at greater of earned-to-date or 100% at CIC if no replacement award and qualifying termination; otherwise per plan; settlement timing per plan |
| Deferred comp | Participates in DCP; 2024 exec contributions $75,713; registrant contributions $138,806; YE balance $748,859 |
| Perquisites | 2024 “other” included tax preparation expenses; total “All Other Comp” $182,112 |
Compensation Governance, Peer Group, and Say-on-Pay
- 2024 say-on-pay support ~90%; company maintained pay-for-performance design .
- 2024 compensation peer group includes Adobe, Amphenol, Corning, Cummins, Eaton, Emerson, Fortive, Honeywell, ITW, Johnson Controls, Lear, PayPal, Rockwell, Salesforce, TE Connectivity, Textron, Trane, Uber, among others (additions noted with asterisk in filing) .
- No hedging/pledging; robust stock ownership guidelines; clawback policy; no excise tax gross-ups .
Company Performance During Massaro’s CFO Tenure (Context)
| Metric | FY 2016 | FY 2017 | FY 2018 | FY 2019 | FY 2020 | FY 2021 | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenues ($M) | 12,274 [GetFinancials]* | 12,884 [GetFinancials]* | 14,435 [GetFinancials]* | 14,357 [GetFinancials]* | 13,066 [GetFinancials]* | 15,618 [GetFinancials]* | 17,489 [GetFinancials]* | 20,051 [GetFinancials]* | 19,713 [GetFinancials]* |
| EBITDA ($M) | 2,177 [GetFinancials]* | 2,059 [GetFinancials]* | 2,240 [GetFinancials]* | 2,114 [GetFinancials]* | 1,564 [GetFinancials]* | 1,980 [GetFinancials]* | 2,124 [GetFinancials]* | 2,744 [GetFinancials]* | 3,067 [GetFinancials]* |
Values retrieved from S&P Global.
Notable compensation-performance linkage: The 2022–2024 PSU payout of 63% (RONA 82%, NI 106%, Relative TSR 0%) reduced realized equity despite operational delivery, aligning outcomes with shareholder returns .
Investment Implications
- Alignment and retention: Significant unvested equity (TBRSUs and PSUs through early 2027), strict no-hedge/no-pledge policy, and 3x salary ownership guideline promote shareholder alignment and create retention hooks; 12-month non-compete and 24-month non-solicit further mitigate near-term transition risk .
- Vesting/supply watchpoints: Potential stock settlement events in early 2026 (2023–2025 PSUs) and early 2027 (2024–2026 PSUs), plus annual TBRSU vesting, could create episodic insider selling windows subject to trading policies .
- Pay-for-performance: 2024 AIP paid at 113% driven by OI/CFBF strength despite GOM shortfall, while 2022–2024 PSUs paid 63% due to TSR underperformance—indicative of discipline and external alignment in the LTI plan design .
- Governance quality: No excise tax gross-ups, comprehensive clawback, strong say-on-pay support (~90%), and an expanded peer set to reflect tech-talent competition suggest balanced compensation governance with market realism .
- Red flags: None material in filings; no 2024 related party transactions; however, TSR underperformance vs the Auto Parts index in the 2022–2024 cycle (0% TSR component payout) underscores market risk and execution scrutiny going forward .
Citations:
GetFinancials: Values retrieved from S&P Global.