David Elkins
Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer at BMY
Executive
About David Elkins
David V. Elkins is Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Bristol Myers Squibb, overseeing Global Business Operations including Finance, Business Development, Global Financial Services & Operational Excellence, Procurement, and Investor Relations . He holds a BS (University of Delaware), MS (University of Pennsylvania), and MBA (Drexel University) ; age 56 and CFO since 2019 per third-party executive registry . During 2024, BMS delivered 7% revenue growth to $48.3B, applied a 140.29% Company Performance Factor to executive AIP awards, and reported a value of $105 for an initial fixed $100 TSR investment, while GAAP net income was a loss of $8,948M reflecting significant Acquired IPRD charges .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bristol Myers Squibb | EVP & CFO; Head of Global Business Operations | 2019–present | Leads capital allocation, debt reduction, BD financing and integration; supported $6B debt repayment and progress toward ~$10B by 2026 . |
| Celgene | EVP & CFO | 2018–2019 | Joined BMS through Celgene acquisition; led Celgene finance prior to integration . |
| Johnson & Johnson | CFO for Consumer, Medical Devices, and Corporate Functions | Prior to 2018 (years not disclosed) | Oversaw multi-segment finance at scale . |
| Becton, Dickinson & Company | EVP & CFO | 2008–2012 | Public company CFO; led financial discipline and operations . |
| AstraZeneca | Finance roles of increasing responsibility | 1995–2008 | Built global finance, strategy, and operations expertise . |
| Boeing | Early finance career | Early career | Foundational FP&A and financial controls experience . |
External Roles
| Organization | Position | Committee/Role | Start Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tapestry, Inc. | Outside Director | Audit Committee member | Feb 2024 . |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 1,073,859 | 1,106,176 | 1,115,000 |
| Bonus ($) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | 252,954 | 311,663 | 250,093 |
| Company Contributions to Savings Plans ($) | — | — | 237,758 (component of All Other Compensation) |
| Financial Counseling ($) | — | — | 12,335 |
| Executive Physical ($) | — | — | 0 |
| Non-qualified Deferred Comp – Executive Contributions ($) | — | — | 114,542 |
| Non-qualified Deferred Comp – Registrant Contributions ($) | — | — | 217,058 |
| Non-qualified Deferred Comp – Aggregate Earnings ($) | — | — | 385,551 |
| Non-qualified Deferred Comp – Year-end Balance ($) | — | — | 2,142,075 |
| Pension Plan Participation | Not a participant in BEP-Retirement Plan | Not a participant | Not a participant |
Summary Compensation (Total, includes equity and AIP):
| Metric | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stock Awards ($) | 4,922,614 | 4,882,143 | 5,778,244 |
| Non-Equity Incentive Plan Compensation (AIP) ($) | 1,397,863 | 866,318 | 1,564,234 |
| Total Compensation ($) | 7,647,290 | 7,166,300 | 8,707,571 |
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) design and payouts:
- 2024 AIP metrics weighting: 35% Growth Portfolio Revenue, 30% non-GAAP Operating Income, 25% Pipeline Performance, 10% Sustainability Scorecard .
- Company Performance Factor earned: 140.29%; Elkins target AIP $1,115,000; actual payout $1,564,234 .
| Executive | Target Incentive Award ($) | Company Performance Factor (%) | Actual AIP Payout ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| David V. Elkins | 1,115,000 | 140.29% | 1,564,234 |
Long-Term Incentives (PSUs and MSUs) – 2024 grants and structure:
- PSUs cliff-vest on the third anniversary; performance metrics: 40% 3-year cumulative Growth Portfolio Revenue (FX-neutral), 25% 3-year cumulative non-GAAP Operating Margin, 35% 3-year relative TSR CAGR vs. peer group; threshold 50% of target, max 200%; no dividend equivalents .
- MSUs are performance-based market share units; long-term equity incentives are delivered with three-year vesting .
Grants of Plan-Based Awards (2024):
| Award Type | Grant Date | Target Shares (#) | Threshold (#) | Maximum (#) | Grant Date Fair Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PSU | 03/10/2024 | 62,693 | 7,837 | 125,386 | 3,327,744 |
| MSU | 03/10/2024 | 41,796 | 20,898 | 94,041 | 2,450,499 |
Unearned/Unvested Equity Outstanding (as of 12/31/2024):
| Grant/Performance Period | Instrument | Unearned Shares (#) | Market/Payout Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 01/01/2022–02/28/2025 | PSU | 45,916 | 2,597,009 |
| 01/01/2023–02/28/2026 | PSU | 47,424 | 2,682,301 |
| 01/01/2024–02/28/2027 | PSU | 62,693 | 3,545,916 |
| 03/10/2021 | MSU | 8,045 | 455,025 |
| 03/10/2022 | MSU | 12,245 | 692,566 |
| 03/10/2023 | MSU | 18,970 | 1,072,921 |
| 03/10/2024 | MSU | 20,898 | 1,181,991 |
2024 Vested/Realized Values:
| Instrument | Shares Vested (#) | Value Realized ($) |
|---|---|---|
| RSU | 0 | 0 |
| MSU | 13,419 | 721,808 |
| PSU (2021–2023 cycle payout at $53.79 close on 03/08/2024) | 31,459 | 1,692,180 |
PSU outcome (2011–2024 cycle evaluated in Mar 2024):
| Metric | Target | Actual | % of Target | Payout % |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3-Year Cumulative Total Revenues (FX-neutral, $MM) | 141,330 | 141,313 | 100.00% | 99.98% |
| 3-Year Cumulative non-GAAP Operating Margin | 42.70% | 41.70% | 97.60% | 97.57% |
| 3-Year Relative TSR Percentile Rank | 50th | 17.1th | — | 0% |
| Total | — | — | — | 65.19% |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Total common shares owned | 223,605 |
| Ownership % of outstanding | None of executives >1% disclosed; exact % not provided |
| Options exercisable within 60 days | 0 |
| Stock ownership guideline | 3x base salary (CFO) |
| Retention policy | Prior to guideline: hold 100% of vested shares; after achieving guideline: hold 75% of newly acquired shares for 1 year |
| Compliance status (2024) | Yes (meets ownership and retention) |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited for all employees; no pledging or margin accounts by directors/officers disclosed |
Share Sales Pressure Indicators:
- 2024 vestings (MSUs/PSUs) realized value $2.41M; retention policy requires holding 75% of newly acquired shares for 1 year after vesting when guideline met, mitigating near-term sell pressure .
Employment Terms
Plan mechanics and severance/CIC economics:
- Senior Executive Severance Plan: two-times base salary for senior-most executives (includes NEOs), plus health and life insurance continuation up to 56 weeks and outplacement, for involuntary not-for-cause or voluntary for “Good Reason” (material reduction in salary, grade/responsibilities, or relocation >50 miles) .
- Change in Control agreements: double-trigger; benefits only if CIC plus qualifying termination within 24 months (36 months for certain executives) . No excise tax gross-ups; shareholder-approved policy prohibits cash severance >2.99x salary+bonus without shareholder approval .
Termination scenario values (as of 12/31/2024):
| Scenario | Cash Severance ($) | RSUs ($) | MSUs ($) | PSUs ($) | Savings Plans ($) | Health ($) | Retiree Medical ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Voluntary Termination for Good Reason | 2,230,000 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 35,867 | 0 | 2,265,867 |
| Involuntary Termination Not for Cause (No CIC) | 2,230,000 | 0 | 945,514 | 4,062,196 | 0 | 35,867 | 0 | 7,273,576 |
| Qualifying Termination post-CIC (double-trigger) | 4,460,000 | 0 | 4,968,853 | 8,825,226 | 535,200 | 72,449 | 51,847 | 18,913,575 |
Change in Control definition includes any of: 30%+ beneficial ownership, merger where prior voting securities <51% of combined voting power, stockholder-approved plan of complete liquidation or sale of substantially all assets, or board composition change such that majority not approved within a two-year period .
Performance & Track Record
- CFO contributions in 2024: advanced $1.5B cost-savings program (majority realized in 2024), led consistent capital allocation including $6B debt repayment and commitment to dividend/share repurchases, supported integration of Mirati, Karuna, and RayzeBio with financing/oversight, and strengthened finance organization .
- Company financials (2024): Total revenues $48.3B; GAAP diluted loss per share $(4.41) with Acquired IPRD impact; non-GAAP diluted EPS $1.15; dividend increased 5.3% for 2025 .
- Pay-Versus-Performance TSR (value of $100 initial investment): $105 (2024); $91 (2023); $123 (2022), alongside GAAP net income of $(8,948)M and revenues $48,300M for 2024 .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- High at-risk mix: Average NEO target pay 84% performance-based; 68% long-term equity with three-year vesting; CFO generally benchmarked around 75th percentile vs primary peer/PHRA survey .
- Metric refinements (2024): shifted revenue focus to Growth Portfolio Revenue and profitability metric to non-GAAP Operating Income; removed individual factor for senior executives to reinforce team execution alignment .
- Option risk: no executive stock option exercises in 2024; longstanding policy prohibits option repricing without shareholder consent .
- Clawback/recoupment and anti-hedging: disclosed policies targeting sustainable long-term value; hedging/pledging prohibited; none pledged/margined .
Equity Ownership & Alignment Details (Beneficial Ownership Table Snapshot)
| Name | Total Common Shares Owned (#) | Shares Underlying Options/Stock Units (#) | Deferred Share Units (#) |
|---|---|---|---|
| David V. Elkins | 223,605 | 0 | 0 |
| Note | None of directors/executive officers individually owns ≥1% of outstanding shares |
Employment Terms (Additional Provisions)
- Agreement auto-renewal: CIC agreements automatically extend annually unless notice given by Dec 1 or a CIC has occurred .
- Benefits on CIC termination: pro-rata AIP at target; vesting of all unvested PSUs at target; vesting of RSUs and stock options (if any); vesting of MSUs subject to performance; continuation of life/health insurance for two years; vesting of savings plan match; legal fee coverage to enforce agreement; no excise tax gross-up .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: 2024 AIP heavily weighted to growth and profitability, with actual payouts scaled by a 140.29% company factor; LTIs (PSUs/MSUs) are 100% performance-based with three-year horizons, and PSU payout for the 2021–2024 cycle was curtailed to 65.19% due to weak relative TSR despite near-target revenue and margin outcomes—reducing realized compensation and aligning incentives with shareholder returns .
- Retention risk moderated: robust double-trigger CIC protection, substantial unvested PSU/MSU holdings, and strict share retention policy (100% until guideline; 75% thereafter for 1 year) lower near-term selling pressure and encourage continued tenure .
- Capital discipline signal: CFO-led $6B debt repayment and BD integration support underpin balance-sheet strength amid portfolio renewal, suggesting continued prioritization of cash deployment to innovation and shareholder returns .
- Governance safeguards: anti-hedging/pledging policies, option repricing prohibition, and shareholder approval thresholds for large cash severance reduce governance red flags and align executive incentives with long-term value creation .