Alejandro Alcala
About Alejandro Alcala
Alejandro A. Alcala is Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of Crane Company, promoted to COO on December 9, 2024; he is age 50 and has been an executive officer since 2020 . He joined Crane in 2013 and progressed through President roles (Pumps & Systems; ChemPharma & Energy), then Senior Vice President leading the Process Flow Technologies segment and regional operations, and in February 2023 became Executive Vice President overseeing all businesses prior to his promotion to COO . Company performance backdrop during his tenure includes strong segment execution: Aerospace & Electronics 2024 sales up 18% with margins up 230 bps to 22.4%, and Process Flow Technologies 2024 sales up 12% with record segment margins of 20.1% (adjusted 20.9%) . Executive incentives are tied to adjusted EPS and free cash flow, with PRSUs aligned to relative TSR vs the S&P MidCap 400 Capital Goods Group, reinforcing pay-for-performance .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Crane Company | Executive Vice President & COO | Dec 2024–present | COO overseeing all segments and Crane Business System |
| Crane Company | Executive Vice President (A&E, EM, PFT, Regional Presidents) | Feb 2023–Dec 2024 | Led all post-separation segments and regional teams |
| Crane Company | Senior Vice President, Process Flow Technologies & Regional Ops (China, India, MEA) | Mar 2020–Jan 2023 | Drove record profitability and portfolio repositioning into higher-growth end markets |
| Crane Company | President, ChemPharma & Energy | 2014–Mar 2020 | Led specialty flow solutions businesses |
| Crane Company | President, Pumps & Systems | 2013–2014 | Led pump platform operations |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Eaton Corporation | Operations and strategic marketing roles of increasing responsibility | — | Built operational and commercial experience prior to Crane |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $498,874 | $586,823 | $642,596 |
| Base Salary (current) | — | — | $700,000 as of Dec 9, 2024 (post-promotion) |
| Target Bonus (% of Salary) | — | — | 75% |
| Target Bonus ($) | — | — | $525,000 |
| Actual Annual Bonus Paid ($) | $542,611 | $815,850 | $618,450 |
Notes:
- Base salary increased by $55,000 to $700,000 in connection with promotion to COO effective December 9, 2024 .
- 2024 annual bonus for other NEOs (including Alcala) paid at 117.8% of target .
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) – 2024
| Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout Component (%) | Vesting/Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EPS | 75% | $5.03 | $5.32 | 96.7% | Paid cash in Feb 2025 |
| Adjusted Free Cash Flow | 25% | $262.2M | $249.8M | 21.1% | Paid cash in Feb 2025 |
| Weighted Payout | — | — | — | 117.8% (Other NEOs) | — |
Design: Annual incentive metrics set at start of year; payouts range 0–200% with thresholds/caps; CEO also has strategic objectives (not applied to other NEOs) .
Long-Term Incentives (2024 Grants)
| Award Type | Grant Date | Target Value ($) | Shares/Options Granted | Exercise Price | Valuation Method |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PRSUs (relative TSR vs S&P MidCap 400 Capital Goods Group; 3-year performance; 25th/50th/75th percentile = 25%/100%/200%) | Feb 12, 2024 | $500,000 | 4,006 target shares | — | Monte Carlo ($151.79/share) |
| TRSUs (time-based; vest 25% per year over 4 years) | Feb 12, 2024 | $250,000 | 2,003 units | — | Closing price ($124.80/share) |
| Stock Options (vest 25% per year over 4 years; 10-year term) | Feb 12, 2024 | $250,000 | 4,762 options | $124.80 | Black-Scholes ($52.50/option) |
PRSU rules: Straight-line interpolation; negative TSR caps vesting at 100%; maximum value capped at 4x original grant value; no dividends during performance period .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Ownership Component | Amount |
|---|---|
| Shares owned directly/beneficially | 32,726 |
| Stock options, DSUs, RSUs that have vested or will vest within 60 days | 63,269 |
| Shares in Company Savings Plan (401(k)) | 289 |
| Total shares beneficially owned | 96,284 |
| Share units vesting after 60 days (incentive plans) | 2,716 |
Ownership guidelines:
- Executive officers (CEO direct reports): minimum 4x base salary; other executive officers: 3x .
- Shares counting include owned shares, 401(k), and 65% of after-tax TRSUs; PRSUs and unexercised options do not count .
- Retention policy requires executives to retain at least 50% of net shares from option exercises or RSU vesting until guidelines met; as of March 3, 2025, all NEOs either met guidelines or were complying with retention ratio .
Hedging/pledging:
- Prohibited for directors and executive officers; no hedging or pledging transactions occurred in 2024 .
Options outstanding and RSU vesting schedule highlights (Crane Company):
- Unexercised options and unvested equity at 12/31/2024 show significant alignment; examples include options and RSUs scheduled vestings over 2025–2028 with regular cadence supporting retention .
Upcoming RSU vesting schedule (Crane Company, counts for Alcala):
| Vesting Date | Units |
|---|---|
| Jan 25, 2025 | 478 |
| Feb 6, 2025 | 392 |
| Feb 7, 2025 | 430 |
| Feb 12, 2025 | 500 |
| Feb 6, 2026 | 391 |
| Feb 7, 2026 | 430 |
| Feb 12, 2026 | 501 |
| Feb 6, 2027 | 392 |
| Feb 12, 2027 | 501 |
| Feb 12, 2028 | 501 |
Employment Terms
Change-in-control (CIC):
- Each executive has an agreement providing continued employment for 3 years or until normal retirement following a CIC; if terminated without cause or resigns for Good Reason during that period, entitled to a multiple of base salary and average annual bonus and certain benefits; equity awards accelerate upon termination following CIC; no excise tax gross-ups—payments are capped to maximize after-tax outcome if 4999 excise tax would apply .
Potential payments (as if terminated on Dec 31, 2024):
| Scenario | Estimated Aggregate Amount ($) |
|---|---|
| Involuntary Termination | $720,386 |
| Retirement | $6,086,731 |
| Death or Disability | $6,086,731 |
| Termination after Change in Control | $9,707,520 |
Equity treatment on termination:
- RSUs/PRSUs: For retirement, continue to vest per schedule subject to non-compete; death/disability leads to immediate vesting; termination after CIC triggers accelerated vesting; PRSU vesting amounts determined based on performance through event date (target if CIC occurs in first half of performance period) .
Clawback:
- “No-fault” clawback enables recovery of incentive awards in event of financial restatement regardless of executive fault .
Performance Compensation Details
| Metric | Weighting | 2024 Target | 2024 Actual | Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EPS | 75% | $5.03 | $5.32 | 96.7% |
| Adjusted Free Cash Flow | 25% | $262.2M | $249.8M | 21.1% |
| Total AIP Payout (Other NEOs) | — | — | — | 117.8% |
PRSUs (relative TSR):
- Threshold: 25th percentile = 25% payout; Target: 50th percentile = 100%; Max: ≥75th percentile = 200%; straight-line interpolation; negative TSR cap at 100% .
Multi-Year Compensation Summary
| Component ($) | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary | $498,874 | $586,823 | $642,596 |
| Stock Awards (TRSUs/PRSUs grant-date fair value) | $590,218 | $630,942 | $858,045 |
| Option Awards (grant-date fair value) | $175,001 | $187,505 | $250,005 |
| Non-Equity Incentive Plan Compensation | $542,611 | $815,850 | $618,450 |
| Change in Pension Value and Deferred Compensation Earnings | — | — | — |
| All Other Compensation | $66,327 | $63,545 | $75,191 |
| Total | $1,873,032 | $2,284,665 | $2,444,287 |
Performance & Track Record
- Led Process Flow Technologies to record profitability and growth by repositioning the portfolio to higher-growth, higher-margin end markets as SVP PFT .
- As EVP, oversaw all segments post-separation, supporting strong execution; in 2024, A&E segment sales increased 18% with margins up 230 bps; PFT sales increased 12% with record margins .
- As COO, continues to drive differentiated strategic execution and M&A integration, including pending PSI acquisition (Druk, Panametrics, Reuter Stokes) expected to meet 10% ROIC by year five and align with Crane’s strategy .
Governance, Peer Group, and Say-on-Pay Context
- Compensation peer group reviewed by FW Cook; 2025 adjustments added RBC Bearings and Watts Water Technologies .
- 2024 Say-on-Pay approval exceeded 97%, indicating strong shareholder support for the compensation program .
- Compensation program best practices include prohibitions on hedging/pledging, clawback policy, majority of variable pay as long-term equity, and significant executive stock ownership requirements .
Investment Implications
- High equity mix and PRSUs tied to relative TSR support pay-for-performance and alignment; 2024 LTI allocations for Alcala: 50% PRSUs, 25% options, 25% TRSUs ($1,000,000 total) .
- Ownership guidelines and retention policy materially reduce near-term selling pressure; executives must retain at least 50% of net shares until guidelines met; Alcala’s beneficial ownership totals 96,284 shares with ongoing scheduled RSU vesting over 2025–2028 .
- Change-in-control agreements are double-trigger with capped payments (no gross-ups), mitigating excessive termination windfalls; estimated termination after CIC value for Alcala at year-end 2024: $9.7M, largely reflecting equity acceleration mechanics .
- Track record of portfolio transformation and segment margin expansion under Alcala’s leadership suggests continued execution strength; pending PSI acquisition underscores strategic focus on proprietary sensing technologies and expected attractive returns .