Richard Maue
CraneAbout Richard Maue
Richard A. Maue is Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Principal Accounting Officer of Crane Company. He joined Crane in August 2007 as VP, Controller & Chief Accounting Officer; became Co‑CFO in May 2010; was promoted to VP, Finance & Chief Financial Officer in January 2013; and to Senior Vice President in January 2019, also assuming segment leadership for the Aerospace & Electronics segment in March 2019. Age 52 as of January 23, 2023 per company disclosure. Incentive pay is tied primarily to Adjusted EPS and Adjusted Free Cash Flow for annual bonuses and to 3‑year relative TSR versus the S&P 400 MidCap Capital Goods group for PRSUs; 2024 AIP paid at 117.8% of target for non‑CEO NEOs and 2023 AIP paid at 181.3% of target, demonstrating pay‑for‑performance linkage .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Crane Company | EVP, CFO & Principal Accounting Officer | 2013–present (EVP from 2019) | Led finance; post‑separation corporate finance leadership; segment leadership added in 2019 (A&E) . |
| Crane Company | Co‑Chief Financial Officer | 2010–2013 | Transition to full CFO responsibilities . |
| Crane Company | VP, Controller & Chief Accounting Officer | 2007–2010 | Built controllership and accounting infrastructure . |
| Paxar Corporation | VP, Controller & Chief Accounting Officer | Pre‑2007 | Public company controllership . |
| Protiviti, Inc. | Director, Internal Audit Practice | Pre‑2007 | Internal audit leadership . |
| Arthur Andersen | Audit & Business Advisory | Early career | Public audit/advisory foundation . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Crane Fund for Widows and Children | Trustee | As of Jan 31, 2025 | Oversight of corporate‑affiliated charitable trust; no beneficial ownership of shares held by trust . |
| The Crane Fund | Trustee (historical disclosure) | As of Jan 31, 2024 | Oversight of charitable trust; no beneficial ownership of trust shares . |
Fixed Compensation
Multi‑year summary compensation (as reported):
| Year | Salary ($) | Stock Awards ($) | Option Awards ($) | Non‑Equity Incentive ($) | All Other ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 787,926 | 1,115,501 | 324,975 | 791,027 | 96,306 | 3,115,735 |
| 2023 | 759,714 | 1,093,630 | 324,980 | 1,175,877 | 89,477 | 3,443,677 |
| 2022 | 717,209 | 1,096,141 | 325,002 | 767,644 | 104,466 | 3,010,462 |
Notes:
- 2023 Summary Compensation (same values) also disclosed in 2024 Proxy .
- AIP target bonus percentage for 2023: 85% of salary; bonus paid 181.3% of target. 2024 AIP target disclosed in dollars ($671,500) with payout 117.8% of target for non‑CEO NEOs .
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) – Structure and Outcomes
- Metrics and weights:
- 2024: Other NEOs (incl. CFO): Adjusted EPS 75%; Adjusted Free Cash Flow 25%. CEO had an additional 20% Strategic Objectives (CFO did not) .
- 2023: CEO and other NEOs: Adjusted EPS 75%; Adjusted FCF 25% .
- Payout curves: 0%–200% with threshold/target/maximum set annually .
2024 AIP (Other NEOs incl. CFO):
| Metric | Weight | Target | Actual | Payout calc (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EPS | 75% | $5.03 | $5.32 | 96.7% |
| Adjusted Free Cash Flow | 25% | $262.2M | $249.8M | 21.1% |
| Weighted Payout | — | — | — | 117.8% |
2023 AIP (All NEOs incl. CFO):
| Metric | Weight | Target | Actual | Performance vs Target | Payout calc (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EPS | 75% | 3.44 | 4.16 | 200% | 150.0% |
| Adjusted Free Cash Flow | 25% | $161.4M | $173.0M | 125% | 31.3% |
| Weighted Payout | — | — | — | — | 181.3% |
NEO‑specific target and payout examples:
- 2023: CFO target bonus 85% of salary ($648,581), paid $1,175,877 at 181.3% of target .
- 2024: CFO AIP target $671,500; Committee approved 117.8% payout for other corporate NEOs (paid Feb 2025) .
Long‑Term Incentives (LTI)
Design:
- Mix for NEOs: PRSUs 50%, Stock Options 25%, TRSUs 25% (values at grant) .
- PRSUs: 3‑year performance based on relative TSR vs S&P 400 MidCap Capital Goods group; payout 0% at <25th percentile, 100% at 50th, 200% at ≥75th; linear interpolation; cap at 100% if absolute TSR negative; value cap at 4x grant value .
- Options: 10‑year term; vest 25% per year over 4 years; strike at fair market value on grant date .
CFO 2024 LTI grant details:
| Instrument | Grant date | Units (#) | Key terms | Accounting/Calc Basis |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PRSUs (target) | 2/12/2024 | 5,208 | 3‑yr relative TSR vs S&P 400 Capital Goods; 0–200% payout | Target units determined using $124.80 stock price; grant date fair value per share $151.79 |
| TRSUs | 2/12/2024 | 2,604 | Time‑vested; standard company RSU terms | Units based on $124.80 price |
| Stock Options | 2/12/2024 | 6,190 | 10‑yr term; 25%/yr vest; strike $124.80 | Grant date fair value $324,975 |
CFO 2023 LTI grant details (pre‑separation awards, later adjusted):
| Instrument | Grant date | Units/Options | Terms |
|---|---|---|---|
| PRSUs (target) | 2/6/2023 | 5,430 target; 1,358 threshold; 10,860 max | 3‑yr relative TSR vs S&P 400 Capital Goods; PRSUs split/adjusted between Crane Company and Crane NXT at separation . |
| TRSUs | 2/6/2023 | 2,715 | Time‑vested per plan . |
| Stock Options | 2/6/2023 | 7,652; strike $119.71; 10‑yr term; 25%/yr vest | Options adjusted at separation under “shareholder method” . |
Vesting Schedules and Outstanding Options (illustrative data point)
As of December 31, 2022 (pre‑separation), CFO option positions included tranches with the following terms (selected line items):
| Exercise Price ($) | Status (Exercisable/Unexercisable) | Expiration | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| 79.14 | 0 / 6,650 | 1/28/2029 | Vests per schedule; also vests/continues on death/disability/retirement/CIC per plan . |
| 83.58 | 13,141 / 13,142 | 1/27/2030 | As above . |
| 78.59 | 3,752 / 11,258 | 1/25/2031 | As above . |
| 101.72 | 0 / 9,997 | 2/7/2032 | As above . |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Beneficial ownership (CFO):
| As of | Shares Owned Directly/Beneficially | Options/DSUs/RSUs Vesting ≤60 days | 401(k) Shares | Total Beneficially Owned | Percent of Class | Units Vesting >60 days |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jan 31, 2025 | 82,182 | 29,075 | 1,783 | 113,040 | <1% | 4,110 |
| Jan 31, 2024 | 75,420 | 18,711 | 1,773 | 95,904 | <1% | 4,629 |
- Ownership guidelines and compliance:
- Requirement: CFO minimum 5x base salary; Actual CFO ownership level 13x (as of Dec 31, 2023) and 16x (as of Dec 31, 2024) .
- Counting rules: owned shares, 401(k) shares, and 65% of TRSUs count; PRSUs and unexercised options do not .
- Retention: must retain at least 50% of net shares from option exercises/RSU vesting until guidelines met; all NEOs in compliance as of Feb 26, 2024 and Mar 3, 2025, respectively .
- Hedging/Pledging: Prohibited for directors/officers; no hedging or pledging transactions by directors or executive officers in 2023 or 2024 .
Employment Terms
- Change‑in‑Control (CIC) agreements:
- Term: 3 years, automatically extended annually unless notice given .
- Double‑trigger: Benefits payable if terminated without Cause or resign with Good Reason within 3 years post‑CIC .
- Cash severance: 3x (salary + greater of last year’s bonus or 3‑year average bonus), plus proportionate current‑year bonus; continuation of benefits for 3 years; continued accrual of certain benefits .
- Estimated amounts (if CIC on 12/31/2023 and termination immediately thereafter): Cash $6,917,387; Benefits continuation $66,627; Aggregate “termination after CIC” value $16,158,162 for Maue .
- Earlier reference values at 12/31/2022: Cash $5,230,114; Benefits $74,654; CIC+termination aggregate $9,348,786 .
- Other separation scenarios (12/31/2023 sensitivity): Involuntary termination aggregate $785,246 for Maue .
- Clawback policy: Dodd‑Frank/NYSE‑compliant “no‑fault” recoupment of erroneously awarded incentive compensation upon material financial restatement; covers AIP and PRSUs; 3 completed fiscal years lookback; mandatory recoupment .
- No excise tax gross‑ups on CIC benefits per stated compensation practices .
Performance & Track Record (context)
- Company‑level strategic actions linked to value creation (2019–2025 period): separation from Crane Holdings completed April 3, 2023; multiple bolt‑on acquisitions (Baum, Vian, CryoWorks, Technifab) and divestiture of Engineered Materials effective Jan 1, 2025, reflecting portfolio focus and growth execution .
- Pay‑versus‑performance disclosures emphasize Adjusted EPS, Adjusted FCF, and relative TSR as the critical drivers of compensation actually paid for NEOs .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Cash vs equity mix: Majority of variable pay delivered in long‑term equity (PRSUs/options/TRSUs). 2024 LTI grant value for CFO: $1.3M split 50% PRSU / 25% options / 25% TRSU; AIP payout (cash) at 117.8% of target, down from 181.3% in 2023, aligning with moderated year performance .
- Shift in risk profile: Continued use of options (25% of LTI) maintains leverage to absolute share price; PRSUs tied 100% to relative TSR (50% of LTI) embed competitive performance hurdle; no option repricing or discounted grants .
- Governance protections: Strong ownership guidelines (CFO at 16x salary actual), no hedging/pledging, robust clawback, no excise tax gross‑ups; say‑on‑pay support >97% in 2024 .
Equity Ownership & Insider Selling Pressure (signals)
- Rising personal ownership: Total beneficial ownership increased from 95,904 (Jan 31, 2024) to 113,040 (Jan 31, 2025), indicating net accumulation year‑over‑year .
- Policy constraints: Mandatory 50% net share retention from vesting/exercises until guideline met; hedging/pledging banned; executives in compliance—factors that mitigate selling pressure risk .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Compensation heavily tied to Adjusted EPS/FCF and 3‑year relative TSR; 2024 (117.8%) and 2023 (181.3%) AIP outcomes show responsiveness to performance, supporting incentive credibility .
- Retention risk: CIC protections (3x salary+bonus, double‑trigger, benefits) are market‑typical and auto‑renew, reducing near‑term flight risk; absence of hedging/pledging, high ownership (16x salary) further align CFO with shareholders .
- Trading signals: Ownership increased YoY; policies require ongoing retention of vested shares; option overhang vests over four years and PRSU payouts depend on relative TSR, which tends to stagger realizations and limit concentrated selling catalysts absent extraordinary events .
- Governance quality: Strong say‑on‑pay approval (>97%), no tax gross‑ups, and robust clawback reduce governance red flags and potential discount to valuation attributable to compensation risks .