Brian D. Savoy
Duke EnergyAbout Brian D. Savoy
Brian D. Savoy is Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Duke Energy; he was appointed CFO effective September 1, 2022, after joining the company in 2001 and holding leadership roles including Chief Strategy & Commercial Officer and Chief Transformation & Administrative Officer . In 2024, Duke delivered adjusted EPS within its $5.85–$6.10 guidance range (company-selected adjusted EPS: 2024 $5.90; 2023 $5.56; 2022 $5.41), and 2024 TSR was 15.5% versus 20.9% for the UTY utility peer index, framing the performance environment during his tenure as CFO . The 2022–2024 performance share cycle paid at 124.25% of target (Savoy earned 15,485 shares), reflecting above-target long-term outcomes on cumulative EPS, relative TSR, and safety .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Duke Energy | EVP & CFO | 2022–present (CFO effective 9/1/22) | Led finance during recovery to adj. EPS 5.90 in 2024 within guidance; comp plans tied to cost control and modernization metrics . |
| Duke Energy | EVP, Chief Strategy & Commercial Officer | 2021–2022 | Enterprise strategy and commercial leadership preceding CFO role . |
| Duke Energy | SVP & Chief Transformation & Administrative Officer | 2019–2021 | Led transformation and admin functions . |
| Duke Energy | SVP, Business Transformation & Technology | 2016–2019 | Drove business and technology transformation initiatives . |
| Duke Energy | Chief Accounting Officer & Controller; other leadership roles | 2001–2016 | Broad finance and accounting leadership since joining Duke in 2001 . |
External Roles
- No external directorships or outside roles disclosed for Mr. Savoy in the proxy or 8-K filings .
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base salary ($) | 587,931 | 646,867 | 689,017 |
| Target STI (% of salary) | 100% (unchanged into 2024) | 100% | 100% |
| Actual STI payout ($) | 531,773 | 428,549 | 551,214 (80% of target for 2024 plan) |
| All other compensation ($) | 167,760 | 172,556 | 166,151 |
| Change in pension value ($) | 0 | 77,207 | 52,708 |
| Total compensation ($) | 3,340,682 | 3,477,490 | 3,950,570 |
Notes:
- 2024 STI paid at 80% of target across NEOs after committee applied a 1.1056x performance modifier for extraordinary storm response; adjusted EPS (circuit breaker) capped other metric payouts; Savoy’s payout: $551,214 .
- 2024 base salary was increased 7% effective March 1, 2024 to remain competitive vs market median .
Performance Compensation
2024 Short-Term Incentive (corporate scorecard; 85% corporate/15% individual)
| Metric | Weight | Threshold | Target | Maximum | 2024 Result | Payout factor |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EPS ($) | 50% | 5.78 | 5.98 | 6.13 | 5.90 | 70% (capped via circuit breaker) |
| O&M Expense ($M) | 5% | 4,755 | 4,605 | 4,455 | 4,561 | 122% (then capped by EPS circuit breaker) |
| Operational Excellence – Safety (TICR) | 2.5% | 0.48 | 0.36 | 0.30 | 0.32 | 150% (then capped) |
| Operational Excellence – Environmental Events | 2.5% | 8 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 175% (then capped) |
| Reliability Index (composite) | 5% | 25 | 100 | 175 | 162.95 | 162.95% (then capped) |
| Customer Satisfaction (index) | 10% | 42 | 46 | 50 | 46.1 | 101.88% (then capped) |
| Energy Modernization (non-emitting MW) | 10% | 800 | 1,200 | 1,600 | 867 | 37.56% (then capped) |
| Individual objectives | 15% | — | — | — | — | Reduced to 84% by EPS floor |
- Corporate objectives other than EPS aggregated to 103.76%, but all non-EPS measures were capped at 84% due to EPS circuit breaker (EPS < $5.90 target) .
- Final aggregate payout was 72.36% before modifier; committee applied +10.56% modifier recognizing historic storm response, yielding 80% of target; Savoy received $551,214 (80% of target $689,017) .
Long-Term Incentive design and realized outcomes
- LTI mix: 70% performance shares (PSUs), 30% RSUs; Savoy 2024 target LTI = 350% of base salary .
- 2024–2026 PSUs metrics/weights: 40% cumulative adjusted EPS (threshold 17.18; target 18.78; max 19.78), 40% relative TSR vs UTY (25th%=50%; 55th%=100%; 90th%=200%; capped at target if absolute TSR negative), 20% safety (TICR percentile vs EEI Group 1; 75th%=50%; 90th%=100%; Top company=200%) .
- 2022–2024 PSU payout: 124.25% of target; Savoy earned 15,485 shares for that cycle (target 12,463) plus dividend equivalents .
| Grant / Cycle | Instrument | Grant date | Target (#) | Max (#) | Vest schedule / performance period | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 LTI | PSUs | 2/22/2024 | 18,525 | 37,050 | 2024–2026 performance; cliff at end | Weights: EPS 40%, TSR 40%, Safety 20% -. |
| 2024 LTI | RSUs | 2/22/2024 | 7,939 | — | Vest 1/3 on 2/22/2025, 2/22/2026, 2/22/2027 | Service-based vesting . |
| 2022–2024 PSU cycle (realized) | PSUs | — | 12,463 | — | 2022–2024 completed | Payout 124.25% → 15,485 shares earned . |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership | 41,701 DUK shares as of March 3, 2025; less than 1% of shares outstanding . |
| Deferred/phantom units | 44,136 units economically equal to DUK shares in Executive Savings Plan . |
| Unvested RSUs (12/31/2024) | 14,062 units; $1,515,040 based on $107.74 close . |
| Unearned PSUs (12/31/2024) | 2023–2025 grant shown at max: 30,392 ($3,274,434); 2024–2026 at target: 18,525 ($1,995,884) . |
| Ownership guidelines | 3x base salary for NEOs; all NEOs in compliance in 2024 . |
| Hedging/pledging | Strict prohibition on hedging, shorting, derivatives, margin, and pledging for directors/officers/employees . |
Employment Terms
| Topic | Key terms |
|---|---|
| Severance (non‑CIC) | Executive Severance Plan (Tier I): lump sum equal to 2x (base salary + target bonus), pro‑rata current year bonus (based on actual results), 2 years medical/dental and life insurance equivalent, one year outplacement, and 2 additional years of equity vesting; subject to non‑compete, non‑solicit, and release -. |
| Change‑in‑control (CIC) | Double‑trigger: if terminated without cause/for good reason within 2 years post‑CIC: pro‑rata target bonus, 2x (base + target bonus), 2 years benefits/cash value, pension/401k make‑whole, and 2 years of additional equity vesting; CIC definitions standard; no excise tax gross‑ups (cutback applies) -. |
| Clawback | Dodd‑Frank compliant mandatory recovery for accounting restatements (3‑year lookback), plus broader “detrimental activity” recoupment for STI/LTI -. |
| Post‑termination restraints | CIC agreements include 1‑year non‑competition and non‑solicitation; severance plan includes restrictive covenants (confidentiality, non‑competition, non‑solicitation) -. |
Illustrative payout table for Savoy (as if terminated 12/31/2024):
| Scenario | Cash severance ($) | Incremental retirement ($) | Welfare & other benefits ($) | Equity ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Exec Severance Plan (non‑CIC) | 2,786,451 | 0 | 41,900 | 5,549,896 |
| CIC double‑trigger | 2,786,451 | 459,409 | 48,212 | 5,408,152 |
| Death/Disability | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3,476,790 |
Pension, Deferred Comp, and Perquisites (2024)
- Pension present values at 12/31/2024: RCBP $541,722; ECBP $236,400 .
- Executive Savings Plan: contributions $52,366 (executive) and $131,061 (company); aggregate balance $1,486,558; earnings $133,710 .
- All other compensation detail includes: $20,700 401(k) match, $131,061 make‑whole contributions, $7,500 charitable match, $3,918 financial planning, and other minor items; no corporate aircraft personal use reported for Savoy in 2024 .
Performance & Track Record
| Measure | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Company TSR (base $100 at 12/31/2019) | 105 | 125 | 127 | 125 | 145 |
| Peer TSR (UTY) | 103 | 121 | 122 | 111 | 134 |
| Net income ($M) | 1,270 | 3,802 | 2,444 | 2,735 | 4,402 |
| Adjusted EPS (Company‑selected) | 5.12 | 5.24 | 5.41 | 5.56 | 5.90 |
Context and execution risk/achievements:
- 2024 delivered within adjusted EPS guidance but missed STI EPS target ($5.98), triggering circuit‑breaker cap; strong storm response and regulatory outcomes highlighted (e.g., Carolinas Resource Plan approvals; Florida solar buildout) -.
- Long‑term PSUs rewarded above target (124.25%) on cumulative EPS, relative TSR, and safety through 2024 .
Compensation Committee & Peer Benchmarking
- Independent Compensation & People Development Committee oversees design; uses FW Cook as independent advisor; no tax gross‑ups; no single‑trigger equity vesting .
- Compensation peer group includes large utilities and capital‑intensive industrials (e.g., Southern, NextEra, AEP, Exelon, Deere, Honeywell, Lockheed, UPS, Texas Instruments) .
Equity Vesting Schedules and Insider Selling Pressure
- Upcoming time‑based RSU vest tranches for Savoy: 2/22/2025, 2/22/2026, 2/22/2027 (2024 grant) .
- Performance‑based cycles maturing: 2023–2025 and 2024–2026 PSUs; 2022–2024 PSUs paid at 124.25% (15,485 shares) on 2/7/2025 approval, a potential source of near‑term supply if disposed .
- Hedging/pledging prohibited, which mitigates financing‑driven selling risk .
Equity Ownership & Alignment — Snapshot Table
| Category | Shares/Units | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Beneficially owned shares | 41,701 | As of March 3, 2025 . |
| Deferred/phantom units | 44,136 | Executive Savings Plan . |
| Unvested RSUs | 14,062 | $1.515M at $107.74 . |
| PSUs unearned (2023–2025) | 30,392 (max presentation) | $3.274M; shown at max per SEC rules . |
| PSUs unearned (2024–2026) | 18,525 (target) | $1.996M . |
| Ownership policy status | In compliance | 3x salary guideline for NEOs . |
| Hedging/pledging | Prohibited | Company‑wide policy . |
Employment Terms — Key Legal and Economic Protections
- Double‑trigger CIC; severance multiple 2x base+target bonus; outplacement and benefits continuation; equity continues/accelerates per plan; cutback to avoid excise tax; 1‑year post‑CIC non‑compete/nonsolicit - -.
- Non‑CIC severance mirrors economic multiple (2x) with two additional equity vesting years and restrictive covenants -.
- Robust clawback and “detrimental activity” recoupment provisions enhance alignment -.
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment is strong: 2024 STI paid at 80% amid EPS shortfall versus STI target, while multi‑year PSUs paid above target (124.25%), balancing near‑term discipline with long‑term value creation; this supports incentive integrity under Savoy’s finance leadership .
- Retention risk appears well‑mitigated: 2x severance economics, double‑trigger CIC protection, significant unvested RSUs/PSUs, and ownership requirements reduce flight risk during a CEO transition period - .
- Selling pressure watchpoints: 2022–2024 PSU vest (15,485 shares) in early 2025 and annual RSU tranches could add episodic supply, though hedging/pledging prohibitions limit leveraged selling dynamics .
- Governance/ESG safeguards (no pledging; clawbacks; no tax gross‑ups; no single‑trigger vesting) reduce red‑flag risk and are generally shareholder‑friendly -.