Louis Renjel
About Louis Renjel
Louis E. Renjel is Executive Vice President and Chief Executive Officer of Duke Energy Florida and Midwest, and Chief Corporate Affairs Officer at Duke Energy. He leads Florida, Indiana, Ohio and Kentucky utility operations and oversees corporate communications, federal affairs, strategic policy, sustainability, stakeholder engagement, and the Duke Energy Foundation . He joined Duke Energy in March 2017 after senior roles at CSX; prior public- and private-sector experience spans Cummins, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the U.S. Senate EPW Committee . Education: MBA (Duke University), MS Environmental Sciences (Johns Hopkins), BA Environmental Studies (Randolph-Macon College) . Age: 51 (as reported by Morningstar, July 2025) . 2024 company performance context: Adjusted EPS delivered within original $5.85–$6.10 guidance; 2024 TSR was 15.5% vs. 20.9% for UTY; STI EPS fell short of target, triggering the EPS “circuit breaker” cap .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Duke Energy | EVP & CEO, Duke Energy Florida and Midwest; Chief Corporate Affairs Officer | 2025–present | Leads FL/Midwest operations; oversees comms, federal affairs, policy, sustainability, stakeholder engagement, Foundation . |
| Duke Energy | SVP External Affairs & Communications (previously SVP Federal Government & Corporate Affairs; VP Federal Government Affairs & Strategic Policy) | 2017–2025 | Directed enterprise policy/communications; federal advocacy and strategy; elevated corporate positioning . |
| CSX Corporation | VP Strategic Infrastructure; Director Environmental & Government Affairs | 2006–2017 | Aligned strategy to government advocacy; P3s; approvals for large infrastructure; led environmental/energy policy . |
| Cummins Inc.; U.S. Chamber of Commerce; U.S. Senate EPW; U.S. House Energy & Commerce | Government relations/policy roles | Pre‑2006 | Energy, environmental, transportation policy; legislative/staff leadership . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Nuclear Energy Institute | Board member | Current | Industry policy and nuclear advocacy . |
| Randolph‑Macon College | Board member | Current | Higher education governance . |
Fixed Compensation
- Individual base salary and 2024/2025 target bonus for Mr. Renjel are not disclosed in the 2025 proxy (he is not listed as a named executive officer). Duke’s executive program elements comprise base salary, Short‑Term Incentive (STI), and Long‑Term Incentive (LTI) in performance shares and RSUs .
- In 2025 leadership updates, Duke disclosed pay adjustments for the CEO and some NEOs; no specific compensation terms were disclosed for Mr. Renjel in those filings .
Performance Compensation
- Structure: STI measured over one year; LTI allocated 70% performance shares (3‑year) and 30% RSUs (ratable over 3 years). Performance shares are tied to cumulative adjusted EPS, relative TSR, and safety; RSUs vest in three equal annual installments .
STI corporate metrics and 2024 results (companywide plan mechanics)
| Metric | Weight | Target | Actual/Result | Payout Percent |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EPS | 50% | $5.98 | $5.90 (used for payout) | 70% (pre-cap table shows 70%) |
| O&M Expense | 5% | $4,605M | $4,561M | 122% |
| Safety – TICR Employees | 2.5% | 0.36 | 0.32 | 150% |
| Environmental Events | 2.5% | 4 | 0 | 175% |
| Reliability Index | 5% | 100 | 162.95 | 162.95% |
| Customer Satisfaction | 10% | 46 | 46.1 | 101.88% |
| Energy Modernization (Non‑emitting MW added) | 10% | 1,200 | 867 | 37.56% |
- Funding guardrail: If adjusted EPS < $5.90, all other measure payouts are capped (“circuit breaker”). 2024 aggregate for non‑EPS measures was 103.76% before cap; cap applied because EPS < $5.90, limiting other measures’ payouts to 84% .
LTI design (granted in 2025 cycle, structure applies companywide)
- 70% performance shares (3‑year), measured on Cumulative Adjusted EPS, relative TSR, and safety; 30% RSUs vest ratably over three years, subject to service .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Hedging/pledging: Duke policy prohibits all hedging/monetization transactions and pledging/margin use by directors, officers, employees and their related persons .
- Clawbacks: Equity and cash incentives are subject to a clawback policy; no dividend equivalents on unearned performance shares .
- Stock ownership guidelines: Directors must hold 5x cash retainer; CEO 6x salary; other NEOs 3x salary; stock retention policy in place. (Guidelines cited for directors and NEOs; the proxy does not specify Mr. Renjel’s required multiple) .
- Individual beneficial ownership for Mr. Renjel is not itemized in the 2025 proxy’s management ownership table; no pledging allowed by policy .
Employment Terms
- Executive Severance Plan (companywide framework): For Tier I participants (includes NEOs named in proxy), if involuntarily terminated without cause or resign for good reason, severance generally equals 2x (base salary + target bonus), pro‑rata current‑year bonus based on actual results, two years’ medical/dental premiums (cash equivalent), two additional years of equity vesting, one year of outplacement; restrictive covenants include non‑competition, non‑solicitation, and confidentiality; no excise tax gross‑ups (280G cutback applies if beneficial) .
- Change‑in‑Control (CIC) Agreements (for NEOs other than CEO): Double‑trigger; if terminated without cause or for good reason within two years post‑CIC, severance generally equals 2x (salary + target bonus), continued benefits, additional retirement plan contributions, and two years of equity vesting; one‑year non‑compete/non‑solicit; no excise tax gross‑ups (cutback applies) .
- 2025 update (context): CEO Sideris’ CIC multiple increased to 2.99x effective April 1, 2025 (reflects market norms for CEO); not indicative of other executives’ multipliers .
- Definitions of “cause” and “good reason” and non‑compete scope summarized in Duke’s prior proxy disclosures .
- The proxy does not explicitly disclose whether Mr. Renjel is a party to the Executive Severance Plan or a CIC agreement; however, program terms above indicate how Duke structures severance/CIC for senior executives .
Investment Implications
- Pay‑for‑performance alignment: Renjel’s incentives are governed by enterprise STI/LTI metrics that tie to adjusted EPS, reliability/safety, customer satisfaction, and energy modernization, with PSUs linked to 3‑year EPS and relative TSR—factors central to regulated utility value creation and regulatory support .
- Vesting and potential selling pressure: RSUs vest ratably over three years and PSUs settle after a 3‑year cycle; combined with a strict anti‑hedging/pledging policy and ownership/retention requirements, structural selling pressure risk is moderated, though normal tax‑related sales around vest dates are possible .
- Retention risk: Duke’s standard severance/CIC frameworks (double‑trigger, 2x cash multiple; CEO at 2.99x) and non‑compete/non‑solicit provisions are designed to retain senior talent during strategic transitions; lack of tax gross‑ups and clawbacks supports governance quality .
- Execution leverage: Renjel’s portfolio (policy, sustainability, communications, stakeholder engagement) is materially tied to regulatory outcomes and capital plan execution; 2024 results show EPS within guidance but below STI target; TSR lagged UTY, underscoring a heightened need for policy/regulatory execution as growth capex accelerates .
- Network/industry influence: Current board roles at NEI and Randolph‑Macon provide sector connectivity that can aid nuclear and clean‑energy strategy positioning .
Sources
- Duke Energy 2025 Proxy Statement (DEF 14A), March 14, 2025: sections on compensation design, STI results, severance/CIC, governance policies, beneficial ownership .
- Duke Energy press release: leadership appointments, May 2, 2025 .
- Duke Energy leadership biography for Louis Renjel (roles, education, responsibilities) .
- Morningstar executive page (age) .
- Prior proxy disclosures for CIC/severance terms and definitions .