Patrick G. Mullaney
GREIFAbout Patrick G. Mullaney
Patrick G. Mullaney is Senior Vice President and Chief Business Unit Officer at Greif, Inc., appointed November 2024; he has been a Senior Vice President since November 2021 and previously served as Group President, Global Industrial Packaging, and in multiple EMEA leadership roles after joining Greif from Clondalkin Group, where he was CEO of Clondalkin Flexible Packaging . He is 55 years old as of the February 24, 2025 annual meeting date . Greif’s incentive plans tied to executive pay emphasize OPBSI, OWC, Adjusted EBITDA, and relative TSR, with clear governance around clawbacks and stock ownership guidelines . Company performance during 2022–2024 (span covering his SVP and CBU leadership tenure) is shown below.
| Metric | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Income ($USD Millions) | 394.0 | 379.1 | 295.5 |
| Adjusted EBITDA ($USD Millions) | 917.5 | 818.8 | 694.3 |
| TSR Value of $100 Investment (Company) | $166.82 | $162.02 | $161.41 |
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Greif, Inc. | SVP, Chief Business Unit Officer | Nov 2024–present | Portfolio oversight and execution across business units; continuation of Build to Last strategy |
| Greif, Inc. | SVP, Group President, Global Industrial Packaging | Feb 2022–Oct 2024 | Led global industrial packaging; margin focus and segmentation aligned with OPBSI/OWC-driven execution |
| Greif, Inc. | VP & Group President, Global Industrial Packaging | Nov 2021–Feb 2022 | Transition leadership to global role post EMEA general management |
| Greif, Inc. | VP, GM, Global Industrial Packaging – EMEA | Sep 2019–Oct 2021 | Regional leadership; operations and customer execution in EMEA |
| Greif, Inc. | Director/Manager, RIPS – EMEA | Jun 2017–Sep 2019 (Director West); Jun 2017–Jan 2018 (Manager Central) | Regional P&L and operations management |
| Clondalkin Group | CEO, Clondalkin Flexible Packaging | >5 years prior to Greif | Led international flexible packaging business; industry/operator credentials |
Fixed Compensation
No individual base salary, target bonus %, or actual bonus details for Patrick Mullaney are disclosed in the proxy’s NEO tables (he is not a named executive officer for FY2024) . Greif’s compensation design emphasizes competitive base salary with annual review and larger weight on at-risk incentives (STIP/LTIP) for executives .
Performance Compensation
Greif’s executives (including Mullaney) participate in STIP and LTIP structures with defined metrics, ranges, vesting, and clawbacks.
- Short-Term Incentive Plan (STIP) mechanics: payout 0–200% vs target; metrics and weights: OPBSI (80%) and OWC (20%); threshold payout at 50% of target . 2024 metrics were adjusted for M&A effects; aggregate NEO payout was 133.9% of target . 2025 targets set in Dec 2024 .
- Long-Term Incentive Plan (LTIP) mechanics: RSUs (time-based, ~3-year vest), PSUs (0–200% vs target) based on EBITDA with ±20% modifier from 3-year rTSR vs Russell 2000; unvested forfeiture upon termination except pro rata for death, disability, retirement; RSUs have dividend equivalents payable at vest . 2022–2024 PSU payout was 186% (company-level) .
| STIP Performance Goals | FY 2024 Threshold | FY 2024 Target | FY 2024 Maximum | FY 2024 Actual | FY 2025 Threshold | FY 2025 Target | FY 2025 Maximum |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| OPBSI (80%) | $318.6M | $379.3M | $596.0M | $439.6M (127.8% payout) | $429.4M | $466.8M | $504.1M |
| OWC (20%) | 11.9% | 11.3% | 10.7% | 10.9% (158.3% payout) | 13.4% | 12.7% | 12.0% |
| LTIP (Company-Level) | 2022–2024 Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual Performance | TSR Modifier | Actual PSU Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EBITDA-based PSU | $2,196M | $2,440M | $2,684M | $2,603M | +11.6% | 186% |
Mullaney-specific award vesting and grants (Form 4 filings):
- RSU conversion and tax withhold on Jan 16, 2025: 3,231 shares delivered (code M); 1,519 shares withheld (code F); RSUs represent one share deliverable at 3-year anniversary .
- PSU award on Jan 16, 2025: 9,071 performance shares (code A) subject to one-year transfer restriction; 4,264 shares withheld for taxes (code F) .
| Mullaney Award Activity (non-derivative) | 01/16/2025 | Shares | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Class A Common Stock (RSU conversion, M) | 01/16/2025 | 3,231 | RSUs convert at 3-year anniversary; no consideration paid |
| Class A Common Stock (tax F) | 01/16/2025 | 1,519 | Shares withheld for taxes |
| Class A Common Stock (PSU grant, A) | 01/16/2025 | 9,071 | LTIP performance shares; one-year transfer restriction |
| Class A Common Stock (tax F) | 01/16/2025 | 4,264 | Shares withheld for taxes |
| Mullaney RSUs (derivative) | As of 01/16/2025 | Balance |
|---|---|---|
| Restricted Stock Units (RSUs) | Post-transactions | 18,717 RSUs |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Beneficial ownership after reported transactions on January 16, 2025 showed changes consistent with RSU conversion and PSU grant; Form 4 reports direct ownership adjustments across transactions, culminating with derivative RSU beneficial ownership of 18,717 units and common share counts reflected line-by-line (codes M/A/F; see table above) .
- Stock ownership guidelines require 3x base salary for executive officers; retention of 100% of LTIP shares until guideline met; five-year compliance window when entering role or threshold change .
- Hedging and short sales prohibited; pledging requires pre-approval under governance practices .
- No open-market selling pressure evident in recent Form 4 filings; “F” codes indicate tax withholding, not discretionary sales .
Employment Terms
- No employment agreements for NEOs; all LTIP participants (including executives such as Mullaney) agree to post-employment covenants prohibiting involvement with competing enterprises; specific duration not disclosed .
- Company discloses no severance or change-in-control arrangements for NEOs; change-in-control terms in the 2001 Plan provide immediate vesting of options and lapse of restrictions on restricted/performance shares; options can be cash-out or terminated depending on fair value vs exercise price .
- Incentive compensation recovery (clawback) policy compliant with NYSE rules requires prompt recovery of erroneously awarded incentive-based compensation upon restatement .
- Insider Trading Policy and ownership/holding requirements apply company-wide and are part of governance documents .
Compensation Structure vs Performance Metrics
| Plan | Metric | Weighting | Targets/Mechanics |
|---|---|---|---|
| STIP (Annual Cash) | OPBSI | 80% | Threshold/Target/Max set annually; 0–200% payout scale; 2024 actual OPBSI $439.6M (127.8% payout) |
| STIP (Annual Cash) | OWC (% of revenue) | 20% | 2024 actual OWC 10.9% (158.3% payout); aggregate NEO payout 133.9% of target |
| LTIP (3-year Equity) | EBITDA | 100% base with rTSR ±20% | PSU target 0–200%; RSUs time-based ~3 years; 2022–2024 PSU payout 186% |
Vesting Schedules and Potential Selling Pressure
- RSUs: time-based vesting roughly three years from grant; vest dates in plan examples include Jan 16, 2025; Jan 14, 2026; Jan 14, 2027 for RSU tranches in NEO table; Mullaney’s RSU conversion occurred January 16, 2025 (indicates three-year cadence) .
- PSUs: earned based on 3-year EBITDA target with rTSR modifier; vesting date specified post performance period; example windows no sooner than mid-January and no later than March 15 following period end .
- Form 4 shows tax-withheld “F” transactions rather than discretionary sales; near-term vesting dates can create withholding events but not necessarily selling pressure .
Say-on-Pay & Shareholder Feedback
- 2023 say-on-pay approval exceeded 99% of shares voted; next say-on-pay scheduled for 2026 (three-year frequency) .
Compensation Peer Group
- Packaging/manufacturing comparables used for market context, including Berry Global, Crown Holdings, Sealed Air, Sonoco, Packaging Corp of America, and others; peer group adjusted in FY2024 (removed Patrick Industries; added Pactiv Evergreen) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment Table (Summary)
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Common Shares (post-transactions 01/16/2025) | Reported per line items in Form 4; adjustments via M/A/F codes; see award activity table |
| RSUs Beneficially Owned (Derivative) | 18,717 units after transactions |
| Ownership Guidelines | 3x base salary for executive officers; retain 100% of LTIP shares until guideline met |
| Hedging/Pledging | Hedging/short sales prohibited; pledging only with pre-approval |
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: Mullaney’s equity awards vest over multi-year periods and are tied to EBITDA and rTSR under LTIP, while annual cash incentives hinge on OPBSI and OWC—linking compensation to profitability, working capital discipline, and shareholder value creation .
- Retention risk appears moderate: RSU/PSU structures and five-year ownership guideline compliance windows promote retention; non-compete covenants apply post-employment; no guaranteed severance or change-in-control packages reduce potential misalignment costs .
- Trading signals: Recent Form 4 activity reflects vesting and tax withholding rather than discretionary selling, suggesting limited near-term selling pressure beyond standard withhold events around vest dates .
- Execution track record context: Company metrics during his SVP/CBU tenure show sustained profitability but lower net income/EBITDA vs 2022 peaks; incentive design maintains pressure on OPBSI/OWC and multi-year EBITDA/TSR goals to drive future improvements .