Akhil Jain
GARTNERAbout Akhil Jain
Akhil Jain, age 47, is Executive Vice President, Consulting at Gartner, Inc. (ticker: IT), serving in this role since January 2021. He previously held senior leadership roles at State Street Corporation from 2015–2021 focused on strategy, growth, technology, and operational improvements, and was a partner at McKinsey & Company for 10 years in the Chicago and Dubai offices . During his tenure, Gartner delivered strong performance: in 2024, Contract Value (CV) grew 7.8% FX-neutral, revenue reached $6,331 million, adjusted EBITDA was $1,586 million, and the five-year TSR represented by a $100 initial investment was $314 vs. $159 for the peer group .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| State Street Corporation | Senior Vice President | 2015–2021 | Led strategy, growth initiatives, technology, and operational improvement programs . |
| McKinsey & Company | Partner (Chicago & Dubai) | ~10 years | Senior client advisory; multi-regional leadership and execution experience . |
Fixed Compensation
- Executive pay architecture comprises base salary, annual cash bonus, and long-term equity; salaries are set based on role responsibilities, experience, and market benchmarking, with annual merit review informed by industry data .
- The Compensation Committee uses a peer group and market data at the 25th/50th/75th percentiles to calibrate competitiveness but does not target a fixed percentile; decisions include company and individual performance and internal equity .
Performance Compensation
Annual Bonus – Company Plan Design and 2024 Results
- Bonus metrics for executive officers: EBITDA (50% weight, FX-neutral) and Revenue (50% weight, FX-neutral); payout range 0–200% of target .
- The Compensation Committee certified 2024 results and payout factors in February 2025 .
| Metric (FX-neutral) | Minimum (0%) | Target (100%) | Maximum (200%) | Actual | Payout % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EBITDA ($mm) | $973 | $1,497 | $1,591 | $1,586 | 196.7% |
| Revenue ($mm) | $5,355 | $6,274 | $6,474 | $6,331 | 128.5% |
| Overall (equal-weighted) | — | — | — | — | 162.6% |
Long-Term Incentives (LTIs) – Structure and 2024 PSU Performance
- LTI mix for executives: 70% Performance Stock Units (PSUs) and 30% stock-settled Stock Appreciation Rights (SARs); all awards vest 25% per year over four years; SARs have a seven-year term and only accrue value above grant price .
- PSU performance period is one year and ties to CV; earned units continue to vest over four years to reinforce retention .
| PSU Metric (FX-neutral) | Minimum (0%) | Target (100%) | Maximum (200%) | Actual (12/31/24) | Payout Factor |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Contract Value ($mm) | $4,392 | $5,222 | $5,456 | $5,262 | 120.8% |
LTI Mechanics Summary
| Element | Weight | Vesting | Term | Value Driver |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs | 70% | 25%/yr over 4 years | N/A | CV performance; earned units then time-vest |
| SARs | 30% | 25%/yr over 4 years | 7 years | Stock price appreciation over grant price |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Policy | Requirement |
|---|---|
| Stock ownership guideline (exec officers) | Hold company stock equal to at least 3× base salary (CEO: 6×) . |
| Counting towards guidelines | Direct, vested/unvested RSUs and earned PSUs; excludes options/SARs and unearned PSUs . |
| Holding requirement | If below guideline, must hold 50% of net after-tax shares from awards until compliant . |
| Hedging & pledging | Prohibited for all directors, executive officers, and employees . |
| Clawback | Dodd-Frank/NYSE-compliant recoupment of excess incentive compensation after a required restatement for prior 3 fiscal years . |
Note: The proxy’s beneficial ownership table lists NEOs and directors; personal share counts for Mr. Jain are not disclosed therein .
Employment Terms
| Scenario | Key Terms (Other Executive Officers) |
|---|---|
| Termination without cause (no CIC) | 12 months continued base salary; up to 12 months COBRA; unvested equity forfeited (except death, disability, retirement) . |
| CIC + termination within 12 months (double trigger) | Full vesting of all unvested outstanding equity; PSUs vest at target if performance undetermined; SARs/options exercisable for 12 months post-termination . |
| Death/Disability | Immediate 100% vesting of all outstanding awards . |
| Retirement eligibility | Age ≥55 and ≥10 years of service; eligible unvested awards continue vesting per terms; PSUs earned per certified performance; 2024 PSUs adjusted per factor . |
| Separation conditions | Severance contingent on separation agreement, release, reaffirmation of confidentiality, non-compete, and non-solicit obligations . |
Given Mr. Jain’s age (47), he would not currently meet the retirement eligibility threshold (≥55 years old) disclosed for continued vesting benefits .
Performance & Track Record (Company context during tenure)
| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| TSR – $100 initial investment (Company) | 217 | 218 | 293 | 314 |
| TSR – $100 initial investment (Peer) | 129 | 105 | 141 | 159 |
| Net Income ($mm) | 794 | 808 | 882 | 1,254 |
| Contract Value (CV, $mm) | 4,247 | 4,660 | 4,839 | 5,262 |
Additional 2024 segment note: Consulting grew 9% FX-neutral with strong backlog and pipeline; Research CV +8%, Conferences revenue $583 million (+15% FX-neutral) .
Compensation Committee & Peer Benchmarking
- Independent consultant (Exequity LLP) advises the Compensation Committee; independence affirmed; final decisions made solely by the Committee .
- 2024 peer group used for benchmarking (no fixed percentile targets; Committee considers 25th/50th/75th percentiles): Adobe, Akamai, Aon, Autodesk, Cadence, Equifax, Intuit, Moody’s, ServiceNow, Splunk*, SS&C, Synopsys, Interpublic Group, Thomson Reuters, Verisk, VMware**, Workday .
* Splunk acquired March 2024; ** VMware acquired November 2023 .
Say-on-Pay & Shareholder Feedback
| Year | Approval Rate |
|---|---|
| 2024 | 92% of votes cast |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Strong pay-for-performance alignment: 100% of executive incentive awards are performance-based or require stock appreciation; 4-year vesting promotes retention; caps at 2× target limit risk-taking .
- No single-trigger vesting on change-in-control; double-trigger required; no excise tax gross-ups; robust clawback; prohibition on hedging/pledging .
Investment Implications
- Alignment signals: 3× salary ownership guideline, mandatory post-vesting holding, clawback, and anti-hedging/pledging policies support long-term alignment and reduce agency risk .
- Retention: Four-year vesting and one-year PSU performance cycles create continuous performance checkpoints and retention hooks; double-trigger CIC vesting limits windfalls absent termination .
- Performance levers: Company-level bonus metrics (EBITDA and Revenue) and PSU CV targets directly tie executive payouts to core financial and growth outcomes; recent above-target payouts (162.6% bonus; 120.8% PSUs) reflect strong execution but also increase near-term realized comp, potentially tempering incremental retention risk .
- Risk controls: No single-trigger CIC, no tax gross-ups, equity grant timing safeguards, and formal related-party transaction oversight mitigate governance red flags .