Edward Sebold
About Edward Sebold
Edward Sebold is General Counsel and Secretary of Kyndryl Holdings, Inc. (KD), appointed effective November 3, 2021; he was 56 at appointment per the Company’s initial 8‑K roster, and continues to serve in that role . Company performance during fiscal 2025 featured adjusted EBITDA of $2,559 million and net income of $252 million, while KD’s pay‑vs‑performance TSR index value rose to 119 (vs peer group 102), underscoring positive value creation over the period . Fiscal 2025 annual bonus metrics were met above target on adjusted EBITDA ($2.6B result vs $2.5B target), with revenue slightly below target ($15.2B vs $15.3B), yielding a weighted payout of 118.4% . KD’s long‑term PSU program (FY2023–FY2025) paid out at a weighted 110% based on 104% AOCF attainment, 83% signings, and 97th percentile relative TSR, with PSUs earned disclosed per executive .
Education and detailed pre‑Kyndryl biography were referenced to the Information Statement but not disclosed in the proxy materials cited here .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kyndryl Holdings, Inc. | General Counsel & Secretary | 2021–present | Led governance and legal oversight post spin‑off; signatory on severance and clawback adoptions . |
| IBM (former parent) | Transferred to KD at spin‑off (role not specified in proxy) | Pre‑2021 | Transfer eligibility referenced in Excess Plan and IBM Excess 401(k) plan participation . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Not disclosed | — | — | No external directorships or committee roles disclosed in cited KD filings. |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | FY 2023 | FY 2024 | FY 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 666,667 | 691,667 | 726,250 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | 67,500 | 101,253 | 142,093 |
| Total Cash Compensation ($) | 734,167 | 792,920 | 868,343 |
| Annual Base Salary as of Date | Amount ($) |
|---|---|
| March 31, 2024 | 700,000 |
| March 31, 2025 | 735,000 |
| Annual Cash Bonus Design (FY 2025) | Weighting | Target/Result | Payout % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBITDA | 60% | $2.5B / $2.6B | 134% |
| Revenue | 30% | $15.3B / $15.2B | 94% |
| Corporate Citizenship | 10% | Qualitative goals | 100% |
| Weighted Payout | — | — | 118.4% |
| Individual Bonus (FY 2025) | Base ($) | Target % | Target ($) | Weighted Payout | Actual Bonus ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Edward Sebold | 735,000 | 125% | 907,842 | 118.4% | 1,074,885 |
Performance Compensation
| Long-Term Incentive (FY 2025–2027 grant, $ values) | RSU | PSU AOCF (50%) | PSU Signings (25%) | PSU Relative TSR (25%) | Total LTI | LTI At‑Risk % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Edward Sebold | 525,000 | 487,500 | 243,750 | 243,750 | 1,500,000 | 48% |
| FY 2025 Grants (shares) | Grant Date | Award Type | Threshold (#) | Target (#) | Maximum (#) | RSU (#) | Grant Date FV ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Edward Sebold | 6/3/2024 (approved 5/30/2024) | PSU (AOCF, Signings, TSR) | 1,846 | 36,920 | 55,380 | — | 975,041 |
| Edward Sebold | 6/3/2024 (approved 5/30/2024) | RSU | — | — | — | 19,834 | 525,006 |
| PSU Metric Design (FY 2024–2026 and FY 2025–2027) | Weight | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Adjusted Operating Cash Flow | 50% | Defined addbacks for comparability; investor‑aligned measure . |
| Total Signings | 25% | Indicator of future revenue and value creation . |
| Relative TSR vs S&P MidCap 400 | 25% | Percentile rank; capped at target if absolute TSR negative . |
| PSU Outcome (FY 2023–FY 2025 3‑yr) | Target Award | Payout | Shares Earned |
|---|---|---|---|
| AOCF | 45,926 | 110% | 50,473 |
| Signings | 22,963 | 34% | 7,761 |
| Relative TSR | 19,485 | 200% | 38,970 |
| Total PSUs Earned | — | — | 97,204 |
| FY 2025 Vests (actual) | Shares | Vest Date |
|---|---|---|
| RSUs | 1,464 | June 8, 2024 |
| RSUs | 22,182 | August 1, 2024 |
| RSUs | 8,453 | December 16, 2024 |
| PSUs (Launch) | 21,739 | February 1, 2025 |
KD’s “Launch PSUs” vested 50% after share price exceeded 1.25x the $19.338 initial price (Tier 1) in July 2024; Edward Sebold earned 21,739 Launch PSUs, remainder forfeited .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Beneficial Ownership (as of June 3, 2025) | Direct/Indirect Shares | Options + RSUs <60 days | Total Beneficial |
|---|---|---|---|
| Edward Sebold | 101,077 | 90,972 (22,182 RSUs + 68,790 options) | 192,049 |
| Outstanding Equity Awards (as of March 31, 2025) | Grant Date | Type | Unvested (#) | Market Value ($) | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 12/16/2021 | RSU | 8,454 | 265,456 | Single installment vests 12/16/2025 . | |
| 12/16/2021 | Options | 68,790 exercisable; 22,931 unexercisable | — | $17.78 strike; expire 12/16/2031 . | |
| 8/1/2022 | RSU | 24,730 | 776,522 | — . | |
| 8/1/2023 | RSU | 29,451 | 924,761 | RSUs vest over 3 tranches (Aug 1, 2025/26/27) . | |
| 8/1/2023 | PSU (max shown) | 107,975 | 3,390,415 | 3‑yr performance to 3/31/2026; number depends on actuals . | |
| 6/3/2024 | RSU | 19,834 | 622,788 | Four annual tranches from Grant Anniversary . | |
| 6/3/2024 | PSU (max shown) | 46,172 | 1,449,801 | 3‑yr performance to 3/31/2027 . |
- Stock ownership guidelines: 3x base salary for NEOs; retain 100% of shares until met; unexercised options and unvested PSUs excluded from compliance; KD states all NEOs meet the guidelines .
- Hedging and pledging prohibited for directors and executive officers .
- Trading policy uses pre‑clearance and quarterly trading windows to mitigate insider trading risks .
Employment Terms
- No multi‑year employment agreements; executives are covered by KD’s Severance Plan and restrictive covenants .
- Non‑compete: during employment and 12 months post‑termination (24 months if qualifying retirement for continued RSU vesting); non‑solicit: 12 months (two years if retirement under Severance Plan) .
- Clawbacks: SEC‑compliant financial restatement clawback plus supplemental misconduct/restatement clawback applicable to NEOs; LTPP allows rescission for “Detrimental Activity” and prohibits hedging/pledging .
| Severance & Change‑in‑Control Economics (as of FY 2025) | Covered Termination | CIC + Covered Termination | Qualifying Retirement | Death/Disability |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash Severance Payment ($) | 2,177,385 | 3,399,375 | — | — |
| Acceleration of Equity Awards ($) | — | 7,258,321 | 2,279,059 | 7,258,321 |
| Continuing Benefits ($) | 45,001 | 45,001 | — | — |
| Financial Advisory Services ($) | 7,500 | 7,500 | — | — |
| Outplacement ($) | 3,355 | 3,355 | — | — |
| Total ($) | 2,233,241 | 10,713,552 | 2,279,059 | 7,258,321 |
- Plan design is double‑trigger; KD states no single‑trigger CIC equity vesting or severance .
Multi‑Year Compensation
| Component ($) | FY 2023 | FY 2024 | FY 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary | 666,667 | 691,667 | 726,250 |
| Stock Awards (RSUs/PSUs grant date FV) | 1,500,020 | 1,500,046 | 1,500,047 |
| Non‑Equity Incentive (Annual Bonus Paid) | 833,333 | 1,400,717 | 1,074,885 |
| All Other Compensation | 67,500 | 101,253 | 142,093 |
| Total | 3,067,520 | 3,693,683 | 3,443,275 |
Deferred Compensation and Pensions
| Plan | Exec Contributions (FY 2025) | Company Contributions (FY 2025) | Earnings (FY 2025) | Aggregate Balance (FY 2025) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kyndryl Excess Plan | 841,551 | 106,393 | 96,887 | 2,278,302 |
| IBM Excess 401(k) Plus Plan | — | — | 167,207 | 3,062,142 |
- KD provides no above‑market earnings; balances fully vested; distributions per elections and 409A compliance .
- KD states no participation in defined benefit pensions during FY 2025 .
Performance & Track Record
| Pay‑vs‑Performance (FY) | TSR (Value of $100) | Peer TSR (Value of $100) | Net Income ($m) | Adjusted EBITDA ($m) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 119 | 102 | 252 | 2,559 |
| 2024 | 82 | 116 | (340) | 2,361 |
| 2023 | 56 | 87 | (1,374) | 2,202 |
- FY2025 annual bonus pooled at 118.4% with non‑use of discretion; targets set above FY2024 adjusted EBITDA by >4% to reinforce profitability focus .
- KD’s 2024 say‑on‑pay passed with ~96% support, indicating broad shareholder alignment with program design .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Mix shift: Stable equity grant value year‑over‑year ($1.5M), with PSUs at 65% of LTI and RSUs at 35%, keeping performance leverage while retaining talent .
- Metric rigor: FY2025 AIP adjusted EBITDA target raised vs FY2024, with explicit currency and special‑item adjustments to align payouts to underlying performance .
- Governance safeguards: stringent clawbacks; prohibition on hedging/pledging; robust ownership guidelines; independent consultant (FW Cook) and compensation committee oversight .
- No single‑trigger CIC, no repricing of options without shareholder approval, no tax gross‑ups .
Equity Ownership & Alignment (Additional)
- Near‑term vesting and exercisability: 22,182 RSUs vesting within 60 days of June 3, 2025; 68,790 options exercisable—potential short‑term supply overhang if sales occur, mitigated by trading windows and pre‑clearance .
- Compliance: KD reports all NEOs meet stock ownership guidelines; continued retention of shares until target covered .
Employment Terms (Additional Detail)
- Severance plan provides 18 months base salary for NEOs (24 months for CEO), pro‑rated bonus, continued health benefits for 18 months, and six months outplacement; enhanced multiples on CIC (1.5x target AIP for NEOs) .
- Non‑competition and non‑solicitation durations explicitly tied to retirement treatment under the plan .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: High PSU weighting, rigorous AOCF/signings/relative TSR design, and ownership requirements suggest strong pay‑for‑performance alignment; governance prohibitions on hedging/pledging reduce misalignment risk .
- Retention risk: Material outstanding RSUs/PSUs and sizable Excess Plan balances incent continuity; severance economics are moderate and double‑trigger, reducing opportunistic departure risk .
- Trading signals: Upcoming RSU vesting and in‑the‑money options (given $31.40 reference price vs $17.78 strike) could create episodic selling pressure around vest/exercise windows; policy pre‑clearance may smooth timing .
- Execution track record: FY2025 delivered adjusted EBITDA above target while revenue slightly missed planned decline; 3‑year PSU payout driven by 97th percentile TSR highlights value creation during the period .