Eric Gorli
Keurig Dr PepperAbout Eric Gorli
Eric Gorli is President, U.S. Refreshment Beverages at Keurig Dr Pepper (KDP), appointed in January 2025; he oversees KDP’s U.S. liquid refreshment portfolio (carbonated soft drinks, still beverages, energy) after nearly a decade at KDP in commercialization and revenue growth leadership roles and almost 20 years in The Coca‑Cola system; he holds a degree in Industrial & Systems Engineering from Georgia Tech and is 50 years old . Company context during his recent tenure: 2024 net sales grew ~4% constant currency and adjusted diluted EPS grew ~8% (aligned with KDP’s long‑term algorithm), with company TSR value of an initial $100 at $124 for 2024 versus $114 for the peer group . In January 2025, KDP elevated Gorli to lead the ~$9B U.S. liquid refreshment business and created a new KDP Energy unit reporting to him, underscoring growth focus in energy drinks; Andrew Archambault, his predecessor, departed at month end .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| KDP | President, U.S. Refreshment Beverages | Jan 2025–present | Leads U.S. liquid refreshment portfolio; scope expanded with KDP Energy unit reporting to him |
| KDP | Chief Commercial Officer | Jan 2023–Jan 2025 | Enterprise accountability across coffee and refreshment; drove pricing, promotional and growth strategies |
| KDP | SVP, Revenue Growth Management & Commercial | Jul 2018–Jan 2023 | Member of deal and integration team for KDP creation; built commercialization and revenue growth capabilities |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| The Coca‑Cola Company (system) | Various roles across bottling ops and Coca‑Cola North America; led Revenue Growth Management for CCNA | Nearly 20 years (approximate) | Revenue growth management leadership; deep beverage commercialization experience |
Fixed Compensation
- Not disclosed. Gorli is an executive officer but was not a named executive officer (NEO) in the 2024 proxy; therefore base salary/bonus specifics for him are not itemized in the executive compensation tables .
Performance Compensation
- Program architecture (applies to executive leadership, including Gorli):
- Short‑Term Incentive Plan (STIP): single enterprise scorecard for the full executive leadership team; 3 metrics with defined weights, payout scale 0–200% .
- Long‑Term Incentive Plan (LTIP): time‑based RSUs historically; starting 2025, PSUs added with three‑year performance period on constant currency Net Sales growth and Adjusted Diluted EPS growth; VP+ awards (incl. ELT) comprised 25% PSUs/75% RSUs .
- Elite Investment Program: mandatory personal stock purchase with one‑for‑one Matching RSUs; five‑year vest; forfeiture if commitment not maintained .
- Stock ownership requirement: “Other ELT” minimum ~4x salary; retention of 50% of after‑tax shares until compliant .
| Metric (USD millions unless noted) | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual | Payout % | Weight |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net Sales (constant currency) | $14,714 | $15,653 | $16,592 | $15,310 | 85% | 30% |
| Adjusted Operating Income (constant currency) | $3,744 | $3,983 | $4,222 | $3,952 | 95% | 60% |
| Free Cash Flow | $700 | $1,400 | $2,100 | $1,660 | 112% | 10% |
| Total Payout Multiplier | — | — | — | — | 94% | 100% |
- 2025 PSU design: performance metrics are three‑year average constant currency Net Sales growth (mid‑single‑digit target) and Adjusted Diluted EPS growth (high‑single‑digit target); 0–200% vesting range .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Policy/Instrument | Key Terms | Vesting | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| RSU (annual LTIP, 2020–2024) | Time‑based | 60% at year 3; 20% at years 4 and 5 | Lengthy vesting to discourage short‑term focus |
| RSU (awards granted in/after 2025) | Time‑based | 25% per year over 4 years | Aligns with market norms while maintaining long vesting |
| PSU (introduced 2025) | Performance‑based | Cliff after 3 years; 0–200% based on Net Sales & Adjusted Diluted EPS growth | VP+ mix: 25% PSUs / 75% RSUs |
| Elite Investment Program (Matching RSUs) | 1:1 match on personal share purchases up to commitment; must maintain full commitment | 5‑year cliff; forfeiture if commitment not maintained or termination (subject to exceptions) | Historically counted 20% of grant value in benchmarking; discontinued from Feb 2025 |
| Stock Ownership Requirement | Minimum ownership equals role tier; “Other ELT” ≈ 4x salary; must retain 50% of after‑tax shares until compliant | Ongoing | Separate from Elite; non‑compliance may lead to LTIP forfeiture at RemCo discretion |
| Hedging & Pledging | Hedging prohibited; pledging requires pre‑clearance; speculative pledging prohibited | — | Alignment safeguard |
| Clawbacks | Rule 10D‑1 restatement clawback; Senior Leadership Clawback extends to time‑based equity for misconduct | Up to prior 3 years for restatement clawback | Risk control; enforcement scope beyond minimum |
- Section 16 compliance note: A Form 3 for Eric Gorli was filed late on Feb 25, 2025 due to administrative error (no other Section 16 delinquency noted) .
Employment Terms
| Topic | Terms for Executive Leadership Team (ELT) | Change in Control (CIC) Terms |
|---|---|---|
| Severance multiples | If terminated without Cause or decline non‑comparable position: 1.5x base pay + target bonus, paid over 18 months; outplacement services | If terminated without Cause or resign for Good Reason within CIC window (−6 months/+2 years): 2.25x base pay + target bonus lump sum |
| Equity vesting | RSUs granted Mar 2023+ pro‑rata on “Qualifying Termination”; death/disability full vest; retirement pro‑rata | Double‑trigger; full vest upon qualifying termination in CIC window |
| Definitions | Cause, Good Reason, Comparable Position defined; non‑compete/confidentiality compliance required for benefits | CIC definition includes >50% voting power change or sale of substantially all assets/merger not maintaining >50% voting continuity |
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Mandatory Elite investment with five‑year matched RSU vest and strict stock ownership requirements (retention of 50% of after‑tax shares until compliant) drive strong skin‑in‑the‑game incentives and can moderate near‑term selling pressure at vesting; hedging prohibited, pledging restricted .
- Pay for performance momentum: 2025 adoption of PSUs tied to Net Sales and Adjusted Diluted EPS growth increases leverage to long‑term value creation; enterprise STIP metrics and 2024 payout multiplier (94%) show balanced focus on Growth/Profit/Cash for ELT, including Gorli .
- Retention economics: ELT severance (1.5x) and CIC (2.25x) multiples, plus double‑trigger equity vesting, reduce voluntary departure risk and mitigate adverse outcomes in change‑of‑control scenarios; equity vesting frameworks provide continuity incentives .
- Monitoring flags: Late Form 3 filing (admin error) suggests process friction but no material governance red flag; continue to monitor Forms 4 and any 10b5‑1 plans for selling cadence after major vest dates and Elite cliffs (data not disclosed in proxy) .
- Peer dynamics and shareholder voice: RemCo targets 50th percentile for cash, 75th for equity, and 50th–75th for total target compensation versus a rigorous peer set updated in 2025; say‑on‑pay support remained robust (85% in 2024; 82% in 2023; 94% in 2022), indicating investor acceptance of KDP’s owner‑operator model .
Notes: Gorli’s individual cash compensation elements (base salary, target bonus, actual bonus, award values) are not disclosed because he was not a 2024 NEO; the compensation structure, metrics, and policies above apply to ELT executives generally, including Gorli .