Russell Torres
About Russell Torres
President, North America at Kimberly-Clark (KMB). Joined KMB in 2020, previously serving as President, Kimberly‑Clark Professional; elected Group President, K‑C North America on April 14, 2021; role expanded to President, North America effective October 1, 2024, covering both consumer and professional businesses . Education: MBA, Northwestern University; BA, Dartmouth College; prior senior leadership roles at Bain & Company, Mondelez International/Kraft Foods, and Newell Brands . Company performance drivers tied to his incentives include organic sales growth (3.2% vs 4.0% target in 2024) and adjusted EPS ($7.36 vs $6.95 target in 2024), plus market share and inclusion/equity/diversity goals; his business unit goals paid out at 83% in 2024 .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kimberly‑Clark | President, North America | 2024‑present (effective 10/1/2024) | Oversight of consumer and professional North America; executed 2024 transformation initiative and structure realignment |
| Kimberly‑Clark | Group President, K‑C North America | 2021‑2024 (elected 4/14/2021) | Led North American consumer business across brands; successor to departing leader; reported to CEO |
| Kimberly‑Clark | President, Kimberly‑Clark Professional (KCP) | 2020‑2021 | Ran global professional unit; springboard to Group President NA appointment |
| Bain & Company; Mondelez International/Kraft Foods; Newell Brands | Senior leadership roles | Not disclosed | 20+ years CPG and advisory experience; deep operating/strategy credentials |
External Roles
No outside board or external roles disclosed for Torres in available filings.
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $822,500 | $856,250 | $891,250 |
| Annual Incentive Target (% of Base) | 100% (program design; individual 2022 target not itemized here) — | 100% | 100% |
| 2024 Direct Annual Compensation Target ($) | — | — | $5,100,000 |
Performance Compensation
Annual Cash Incentives
| Year | Target (% of Base) | Target ($) | Maximum ($) | Payout (% of Target) | Actual Payout ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | 100% | $865,000 | $1,708,375 | 129% | $1,115,915 |
| 2024 | 100% | $900,000 | $1,800,000 | 96% | $860,178 |
Annual Incentive Performance Structure (2024)
| Element / Metric | Weighting (Torres) | Target | Actual | Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Corporate financial: Organic Sales Growth | Not disclosed | 4.0% | 3.2% | Not disclosed |
| Corporate financial: Adjusted EPS | Not disclosed | $6.95 | $7.36 | Not disclosed |
| Corporate strategic: Market Share | 6% (Torres; others 20%) | Confidential | Achieved | 110% |
| Corporate strategic: Inclusion/Equity/Diversity | 3% (Torres; others 10%) | Qualitative | Achieved | 100% |
| Business Unit goals (North America) | Not disclosed | Confidential; requires outperformance vs prior year | Assessed by CEO/Committee | 83% |
Long‑Term Incentives and Vesting (Design)
- PRSUs: 60% of target LTI value; vest on the third anniversary of grant; payout contingent on specified financial targets over three years; payouts can range 0–200% of target. Committee determined 2022 grant paid at 200% based on organic sales growth and modified free cash flow exceeding maximum goals .
- Time‑vested RSUs: 40% of target LTI value; vest 30%/30%/40% beginning on the first anniversary of grant date .
2024 Grants (by type)
| Grant Type | Grant Date | Target Shares/Units (#) | Maximum (#) | Grant Date Fair Value ($) | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Performance‑based RSU (PRSUs) | 5/1/2024 | 14,509 | 29,018 | $1,980,043 | 100% vests on 3rd anniversary; 0–200% payout |
| Time‑vested RSU | 5/1/2024 | 9,672 | — | $1,319,938 | 30%/30%/40% from first anniversary |
2023 LTI Target Allocation
| Total Target LTI ($) | Target PRSU Value ($) | Time‑Vested RSU Value ($) |
|---|---|---|
| $3,000,000 | $1,800,000 | $1,200,000 |
2023 Stock Vested
| Metric | 2023 |
|---|---|
| Shares acquired on vesting (#) | 16,516 |
| Value realized on vesting ($) | $2,393,139 |
| Options exercised (#) | — |
| Value realized on option exercise ($) | — |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Measure | Value |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership (12/31/2024) | 223,622 shares; <1% of class |
| Unvested time‑vested RSUs held | 24,508 units |
| Performance‑based RSUs at target | 45,829 units |
| Shares acquirable within 60 days (incl. options) | 114,529 shares |
| Pledged shares | None for executives/directors |
| Ownership guideline | 3× annual base salary for NEOs |
| Compliance status | Each NEO has met guideline or is within 5‑year compliance window |
| Anti‑hedging/pledging | Prohibited for covered persons |
Outstanding Equity Awards (selected as of 12/31/2024)
| Type | Grant Date | Status | Quantity (#) | Price/Value | Expiration/Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Stock Options | 4/26/2022 | Exercisable | 24,141 | $139.18 | 4/26/2032 |
| Stock Options | 4/26/2022 | Unexercisable | 16,095 | $139.18 | 4/26/2032 |
| Stock Options | 4/29/2021 | Exercisable | 49,009 | $132.63 | 4/29/2031 |
| Stock Options | 4/29/2020 | Exercisable | 41,379 | $138.96 | 4/29/2030 |
| PRSUs (unearned) | 5/1/2024 | Outstanding | 29,526 | $3,869,087 market/payout value | 3rd anniversary |
| Time‑vested RSUs | 5/1/2024 | Unvested | 9,841 | $1,289,565 market value | 30%/30%/40% schedule |
| PRSUs (unearned) | 4/26/2023 | Outstanding | 26,480 | $3,469,939 market/payout value | 3rd anniversary |
| Time‑vested RSUs | 4/26/2023 | Unvested | 6,178 | $809,565 market value | 30%/30%/40% schedule |
| PRSUs (unearned) | 2/28/2022 | Outstanding | 35,650 | $4,671,576 market/payout value | 3rd anniversary |
| Time‑vested RSUs | 2/28/2022 | Unvested | 8,487 | $1,112,136 market value | Special vest schedule noted |
Employment Terms
| Scenario (as of 12/31/2024) | Cash Payment ($) | Equity with Accelerated Vesting ($) | Additional Retirement Benefits ($) | Continued Benefits & Other ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Qualified Termination of Employment | $4,460,178 (incl. Committee‑assumed full annual incentive) | $10,738,283 (PRSUs at 3‑yr avg payout assumption) | $324,000 (two years’ supplemental contributions) | $50,856 (24 months COBRA) | $15,573,317 |
| Involuntary Termination (Severance Pay Plan) | $4,500,000 | — | — | $21,887 (COBRA/outplacement/EAP) | $4,521,887 |
| Death | $2,590,178 | $8,843,272 | — | — | $11,433,450 |
| Disability | $860,178 | $8,843,272 | — | — | $9,703,450 |
- Change‑in‑control protection: Double‑trigger policy; accelerated vesting generally upon termination following change‑in‑control; no excise tax gross‑ups; robust clawbacks in place under Compensation Recoupment and SEC/NYSE‑aligned recovery policies .
Benefits, Perquisites, and Deferred Compensation
| Category | 2023 Torres ($) |
|---|---|
| Perquisites total | $17,295 (Financial counseling $13,000; Executive health screening $4,295) |
| Defined contribution plan amounts (incl. profit‑sharing) | Per All Other Compensation: $142,441 |
| Tax gross‑ups | $12,411 (moving/promotion in 2022) |
| Supplemental 401(k) – Company contributions | $109,111 |
| Supplemental 401(k) – Aggregate earnings | $26,876 |
| Supplemental 401(k) – Balance (12/31/2023) | $287,127 |
| Voluntary Deferred Compensation Plan | Not participating (none of NEOs) |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Mix shift: In 2023, KMB replaced stock options with time‑vested RSUs alongside PRSUs (60/40), aligning with peers and balancing pay‑for‑performance with retention; Torres’ 2023 LTI target was $3.0M (PRSU $1.8M; RSU $1.2M) .
- Upward adjustments with expanded role: 2024 LTI target increased 10% for Torres to $3.3M; base salary increased 4% to $900,000 effective 2024 to better align with market levels .
- Performance realization: 2022 PRSUs paid at 200% based on organic sales growth and modified free cash flow exceeding maximum goals, reinforcing long‑term performance linkage .
Performance & Track Record
- 2024 execution: Delivered above‑target adjusted EPS and market share with below‑target organic sales growth; advanced transformation initiatives (global supply chain/overhead efficiency), targeted growth and innovation, PPE business divestiture, market share improvements, disciplined cost management, and shareholder returns (~$2.6B via dividends and buybacks; dividend up 3.4%) .
- Business unit assessment: North America business unit goals (Torres) assessed at 83% payout for 2024, indicating mixed unit‑level performance versus objectives .
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
- Hedging/pledging prohibited; no pledged shares for executives/directors .
- Clawbacks: Two complementary policies enable recovery on restatements and misconduct; SEC/NYSE “no‑fault” recovery for erroneously awarded incentive comp .
- Change‑in‑control governance: Double‑trigger; no repricing of underwater options without shareholder approval; no excise tax gross‑ups .
- Tax gross‑ups: One‑time relocation/promotion gross‑ups in prior years (2022) .
Equity Ownership & Vesting Pressure Outlook
- Scheduled RSU vesting from 5/1/2024 grants: 30% expected around 5/1/2025; 30% around 5/1/2026; 40% around 5/1/2027, creating periodic settlement events that can influence selling pressure depending on net‑settled shares for taxes .
- PRSU cliffs on 2022–2024 cycles (0–200% payouts) could produce larger lump‑sum share deliveries; 2022 cycle paid at 200%, demonstrating sensitivity to multi‑year metrics .
Employment Terms
- Severance economics are meaningful under Qualified Termination of Employment, driven largely by accelerated equity ($10.74M) and cash ($4.46M), supporting retention but implying event‑risk leverage for equity holders .
- Standard severance plan provides ~$4.52M in cash/benefits for involuntary termination without change‑in‑control .
Investment Implications
- Alignment is strong: Significant equity mix (PRSUs/RSUs), strict anti‑hedging/pledging, ownership guidelines (3× salary) and clawbacks tie pay to multi‑year performance and compliance, reducing agency risk .
- Near‑term selling pressure: Layered RSU vesting and potential PRSU payouts create periodic supply; however, ownership guidelines and prohibition on pledging mitigate adverse behaviors .
- Execution risk: 2024 unit goals at 83% suggest room for improvement in North America versus elevated LTI targets following role expansion; watch organic growth momentum, market share trajectories, and PRSU metric attainment into upcoming cycles .
- Event‑risk leverage: Double‑trigger change‑in‑control mechanics and sizable accelerated equity could align Torres with shareholder value realization in corporate actions, while minimizing single‑trigger windfalls .