John Meyne
Senior Vice President & President of Wholesale - North America at LKQ
Executive
About John Meyne
Senior Vice President & President of Wholesale – North America at LKQ (appointed January 1, 2024). He joined LKQ in 2009 via an acquisition and has held multiple operating leadership roles; prior experience includes Keystone Automotive Industries and founding an aftermarket collision parts company acquired by LKQ in 2009 . Education and age not disclosed in filings . 2024 corporate pay-for-performance context: LKQ’s cumulative TSR for 2020–2024 equated to $111 on a $100 base vs. peer group $81, GAAP net income was $693M, and adjusted diluted EPS used for incentives was $3.65 . Segment bonus outcomes: Wholesale – North America achieved 17.3% of target in 2024, reflecting EBITDA margin and ATWC performance dynamics .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| LKQ – Wholesale North America | Senior VP & President | 2024–present | Oversees LKQ’s largest NA wholesale segment; promoted amid leadership succession . |
| LKQ – Wholesale North America | East Division Vice President | 2022–2023 | Drove divisional growth and operations execution leading to promotion . |
| LKQ – Wholesale North America | Regional VP, Southeast | 2011–2021 | Led regional P&L for a decade during growth and profit transformation . |
| LKQ | Joined via acquisition | 2009–present | Integration of acquired business; progressive operating leadership roles . |
| Founder, aftermarket collision parts company | Founder/Owner (acquired by LKQ) | 2006–2009 | Built independent distributor acquired by LKQ, adding entrepreneurial expertise . |
| Keystone Automotive Industries | Various roles | 1987–2006 | Early career in aftermarket parts operations and sales . |
External Roles
- Not disclosed in company filings reviewed for 2023–2025 .
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Base salary ($) | 323,200 | 600,000 |
| Target annual bonus (% of salary) | 40% | 60% (increased upon promotion effective Jan 1, 2024) |
| All other compensation ($) | — | 54,646 (retirement match, insurance premiums) |
Notes: 2023 base shown as year-end rate; Meyne became a named executive officer in 2024 .
Performance Compensation
Annual Bonus – Structure and 2024 Outcome
- Corporate NEO bonus metrics: EBITDA (30%), EBITDA margin (30%), Free cash flow (40%) .
- Business unit leaders (Meyne): 20% corporate metrics; 80% business unit metrics (Wholesale – North America: EBITDA 30%, EBITDA margin 30%, ATWC 40%) .
| Program | Metric (weight) | Threshold | Target | Max | Achieved | Payout vs target |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Corporate | EBITDA (30%) | 1,799 | 1,946 | 2,093 | 1,763 | —% |
| Corporate | EBITDA margin (30%) | 11.7% | 12.7% | 13.7% | 12.2% | 76.4% |
| Corporate | Free cash flow (40%) | 900 | 1,000 | 1,100 | 836 | —% |
| Corporate | Weighted total | — | — | — | — | 22.9% |
| Wholesale – NA | EBITDA (30%) | 1,048 | 1,133 | 1,218 | 989 | —% |
| Wholesale – NA | EBITDA margin (30%) | 17.0% | 17.9% | 18.8% | 17.1% | 57.7% |
| Wholesale – NA | ATWC (40%) | 20.8% | 20.2% | 19.6% | 22.0% | —% |
| Wholesale – NA | Weighted total | — | — | — | — | 17.3% |
| Executive | 2024 Target bonus (% of salary) | 2024 Target ($) | Actual payout (% of target) | Actual payout ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| John Meyne | 60% | 360,000 | 18.4% | 66,312 |
Long-Term Incentive (LTI) Programs
- Design for 2024 grants:
- Cash-based LTI (2024–2026): Adjusted diluted EPS (40%), 3-yr avg parts & services organic revenue growth (40%), 3-yr avg ROIC (20%); ±10% sustainability modifier .
- PSU-1 (time-based with performance gate): Semi-annual vesting over 3 years, contingent on achieving positive adjusted diluted EPS within 5 years; condition met for 2024 and confirmed February 2025 .
- PSU-2 (performance-based): Same 3-year metrics and weights as cash LTI; earnout 0–200% .
| LTI element | 2024 John Meyne grant details |
|---|---|
| Cash LTI (2024–2026) | Threshold $225,000; Target $450,000; Max $900,000 (pre-sustainability modifier) |
| PSU-1 | 17,283 units; grant date fair value $900,014; time-based vesting with EPS gate (met) |
| PSU-2 | Target 8,642 units (threshold 4,321; max 17,284); grant date fair value $450,033; performance vesting 0–200% |
Historical LTI payout context (company-wide performance basis):
- 2022–2024 LTI financial results produced a 27.6% of target earnout; after +5% sustainability modifier, cash LTI paid at 29.0% of target. Meyne’s 2024 non-equity LTI payout was $31,406 .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Ownership measure | Value |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership (3/11/2025) | 7,245 shares (<1% of outstanding) |
| Shares outstanding (3/11/2025) | 258,553,115 |
| Approximate ownership % | ~0.0028% (7,245 / 258,553,115) |
| Unvested stock awards (12/31/2024) | 24,536 units; market value $901,698 (@ $36.75) |
| Unearned PSU-2 (12/31/2024) | 17,284 units potential; market value $635,187 at 12/31 price; performance-dependent |
| Scheduled vesting profile (units) | 2025: 11,957; 2026: 7,976; 2027: 21,449; 2028: 438 (assumes time-based and maximum for in-flight PSU-2s) |
| Stock ownership guideline | Senior Vice Presidents: 2x base salary; 5-year compliance window; retain ≥50% net-after-tax vested shares until met |
| Hedging/pledging | Prohibited for directors, officers, employees |
Notes: Scheduled vesting includes PSU-2s shown at maximum potential for 2023–2024 grants; actual PSU-2 vesting depends on performance outcomes .
Employment Terms
- Severance Policy (non‑change-of‑control): For involuntary termination without cause or resignation for good reason, provides pro‑rata bonus, salary+bonus-based severance (12 months for SVPs), pro‑rata cash LTI based on actual performance, continued vesting of RSUs/PSU‑1s during severance period, subsidized benefits, and outplacement; subject to release and covenants (confidentiality, non‑compete, non‑solicit) .
- Change of Control Agreements: Double‑trigger cash severance and equity treatment if terminated within 12 months before to 24 months after a CoC; agreements auto‑renew; no single‑trigger cash or equity vesting .
- Clawback: Dodd‑Frank compliant recoupment of incentive compensation upon required restatements (3-year lookback) .
- Tax gross‑ups: No golden parachute excise tax gross‑ups; no single‑trigger severance; options repricing prohibited without shareholder approval .
Estimated severance/change‑in‑control values for John Meyne (as of 12/31/2024; $ in thousands):
| Scenario | Cash severance | Unvested & accelerated share-based | PSU‑2 awards | Cash LTI | Benefits/Other | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Involuntary termination | 771.3 | 439.4 | — | 150.0 | 38.7 | 1,399.4 |
| CoC – awards not assumed | — | 901.7 | 317.6 | 587.6 | 69.9 | 1,806.9 |
| Involuntary termination in connection with CoC | 1,920.0 | 901.7 | 317.6 | 587.6 | 69.9 | 3,796.7 |
| Death/Disability | 2,144.7 | 901.7 | 317.6 | 587.6 | — | 3,951.6 |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Cash vs equity mix: In 2024, Meyne’s compensation leaned heavily to equity and LTI (stock awards $1.35M vs. base $0.60M and bonus $0.10M), aligning pay with multi‑year performance and stock price .
- Metric design and rigor: 2024 corporate bonus paid at 22.9% and Wholesale – NA at 17.3% of target; 2022–2024 LTI paid at 29.0% of target after sustainability modifier, indicating a pay‑for‑performance framework with below‑target payouts when financial goals are not met .
- 2025 program shift: Discontinued cash LTI; long-term incentives rebalanced 50% PSU‑1 and 50% PSU‑2; PSU‑2 metric weights shifted to ROIC 40%, organic growth 20%, EPS 40%, increasing capital efficiency focus and equity exposure (potentially more share‑settled vesting events) .
Say‑on‑Pay, Governance, and Peer Group
- Say‑on‑pay approval: 96% support at 2024 annual meeting, indicating strong shareholder backing of compensation design .
- Peer group for benchmarking: Mix of distributors and industrial/auto parts companies (e.g., Genuine Parts, W.W. Grainger, United Rentals), used to inform pay levels/programs .
- Restrictions: No hedging/pledging; double‑trigger equity; no single‑trigger cash severance; clawback in place .
Performance & Track Record
| Measure | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cumulative TSR ($100 initial) | 99 | 169 | 153 | 140 | 111 |
| GAAP Net Income ($M) | 640 | 1,092 | 1,150 | 938 | 693 |
| Adjusted diluted EPS | 2.68 | 3.94 | 3.95 | 3.98 | 3.65 |
| 3‑yr avg organic parts & services growth (for LTI) | — | — | — | — | 2.6% (2022–2024 actual) |
- CEO comment on Meyne: “Instrumental in NA growth and profit transformation,” signalling internal recognition of execution track record leading to role elevation .
- Segment bonus outcome: Wholesale – NA paid at 17.3% of target for 2024, reflecting challenging EBITDA/ATWC outcomes versus targets .
Investment Implications
- Alignment and retention: Significant unvested and potential unearned equity (total scheduled vesting up to 41,820 units through 2028) and ownership guidelines (2x salary) create retention hooks and alignment; hedging/pledging prohibitions reduce governance risk .
- Limited near‑term selling pressure: Vesting cadence is spread over 2025–2028; PSU‑2s are performance‑contingent, tempering automatic supply; however, meeting ownership guidelines will require share retention until the 2x multiple is achieved .
- Performance sensitivity: Below‑target 2024 bonuses and 29% LTI payout indicate incentive difficulty; 2025 shift to equity‑only LTI with higher ROIC weighting increases exposure to capital‑efficient growth execution—positive if targets are met, but increases risk to realized pay if underperformance continues .
- Change‑of‑control terms: Double‑trigger economics are meaningful but standard; no single‑trigger windfalls; equity acceleration subject to standard assumptions/termination conditions, reducing transaction‑timing concerns .