Dean Berry
Group Chief Operating Officer and Chief Executive Officer, EMEA & APAC at 
MARKETAXESS HOLDINGS
MARKETAXESS HOLDINGSExecutive
About Dean Berry
Dean Berry, age 52, is appointed Group Chief Operating Officer and Chief Executive Officer, EMEA & APAC at MarketAxess, with principal operating officer designation for SEC filings. He is expected to start on November 24, 2025 (or Q4 2025, subject to final employer transition), based in London, overseeing Global Operations, Risk, Product and Technology and commercial/operational responsibility for EMEA & APAC. Berry holds a BSc in Mathematics & Statistics from Coventry University and brings a track record of product-led innovation and electronic trading leadership across LSEG and BGC, preceded by 16 years as a fixed income trader at Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein and Société Générale, with overseas experience in Singapore, Tokyo, Copenhagen, Frankfurt and London .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| LSEG | Group Head of Workflows; Interim Group Co‑Head of Data & Analytics | 2024–2025 | Led enterprise workflows and data/analytics; scaled technology and product transformation |
| LSEG | Global Head of Trading & Banking Solutions; Global Head of Trading | 2020–2024 | Drove trading solutions and electronic trading leadership |
| BGC Partners | Executive Managing Director, Global Head of Electronic & Hybrid Markets | 2017–2020 | Built electronic/hybrid markets franchises |
| Deutsche Bank; Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein; Société Générale | Fixed-income trader (overseas roles across Asia/Europe) | Not disclosed | Deep markets experience; trading workflows and analytics expertise |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| — | — | — | None disclosed in filings |
Fixed Compensation
- Currency GBP; U.K. employment contract via MarketAxess Europe Limited.
- Eligible for UK benefits (medical/dental, life assurance, pension, income protection) per plan terms .
| Component | Amount | Timing/Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Base salary | £560,000 per year | Paid monthly; eligible for annual salary review from 2026 |
| 2026 Target Cash Incentive | £840,000 | Paid ~Feb 2027; subject to company and individual performance |
| 2026 Target Equity Incentive | £1,800,000 | Granted ~Feb 2027; 50% RSUs, 50% PSUs |
| 2025 Cash Lost Opportunity | £500,000 | Paid after Start Date; repayment required if resigns (various conditions) |
| 2025 Equity Lost Opportunity (PSUs) | £1,563,000 | Grant ~Feb 2026; cliff‑vest at 3 years, subject to performance and service |
| 2026 Cash Make‑Whole | £500,000 | Pay by Mar 31, 2026; repayment required if resigns (various conditions) |
| 2025 Equity Make‑Whole (RSUs) | £3,437,000 | Granted first day of first month after Start Date; vests ratably over 3 years |
Performance Compensation
- Annual equity design mirrors MKTX NEO structure: PSUs weighted equally on U.S. credit market share, revenue growth excluding U.S. credit, and operating margin; payout range 0–200%; RSUs vest time‑based .
| Metric | Weighting | Target/Payout Mechanics |
|---|---|---|
| U.S. Credit Market Share | 1/3 | Committee‑set annual targets; relative share; 0–200% payout |
| Revenue Growth ex U.S. Credit | 1/3 | Multi‑product growth (eurobonds, EM, munis, rates, services/data) |
| Operating Margin | 1/3 | Committee‑set targets; adjusted per plan provisions |
| Award Type | Vesting | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| 2025 Equity Lost Opportunity (PSUs) | Cliff at 3 years | Performance criteria materially similar to annual PSUs; continued vesting if terminated without Cause or resigns with Good Reason during CIC period; subject to compliance |
| 2025 Equity Make‑Whole (RSUs) | 1/3 per year over 3 years | Continued vesting if terminated without Cause or resigns with Good Reason during CIC period; subject to compliance |
| 2026 Annual RSUs | 1/3 per year over 3 years | Service condition; “Qualified Retirement” RSU continued vesting after 7 years of service |
| 2026 Annual PSUs | Cliff at 3 years | Committee‑set metrics; service condition |
Notable precedent: MKTX’s 2022 PSU cycle funded at 45% of target (42% U.S. credit share; 14% revenue ex U.S. credit; 79% operating margin), calibrating expectations on rigor .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Policy/Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Stock Ownership Guidelines (SOGs) | 5× base salary; counts owned, vested/unvested RS/RSUs/settled PSUs; excludes options and unearned PSUs |
| Clawbacks | Subject to UK Malus & Clawback (MRT) and global clawback policies (incl. Nasdaq 5608 restatement recovery; misconduct triggers) |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited for employees and directors; no margin pledging allowed |
| Beneficial Ownership/Trading Plans | No Berry trading plans disclosed in Q3 2025; only General Counsel plan changes noted |
Employment Terms
| Term | Provision |
|---|---|
| Start Date | November 24, 2025 (or later if required); expected Q4 2025 |
| Role/Scope | Group COO & CEO EMEA/APAC; principal operating officer; oversight of Operations, Risk, Product, Technology; EMEA/APAC commercial/operational responsibility |
| Reporting | To CEO (functional) and Company Board; global heads in operations/data/risk/product/technology report to Berry (subject to local licensing) |
| Regulatory Status | SMF1 and SMF3 under UK SMCR; annual fit‑and‑proper certification; MRT designation at MAL (UK consolidated group) |
| Licensing | Must obtain FINRA Series 7 & 24 within 12 months of Start Date; title subject to modification if not obtained |
| Place/Hours | London office; min. 4 days/week on site; 8:30–17:30 Mon–Fri; >48h opt‑out |
| Notice | 6 months by either party; PILON permitted; pro‑rata cash incentive at Company discretion upon PILON |
| Garden Leave | Up to 6 months; access restrictions; continued salary/benefits (excluding incentives); deemed holiday use |
| Restrictive Covenants | 12‑month non‑compete, non‑solicit customers/prospects, and no poach key employees; carve‑outs for <1% public holdings and non‑competing units |
| Change in Control (CIC) | CIC defined; protection period 2 years; continued vesting of certain equity if terminated without Cause or resigns with Good Reason during CIC period |
| Cause/Good Reason | Detailed definitions; cure periods; repayment obligations tied to certain terminations |
| Malus/Clawback | UK MRT malus/clawback plus global executive clawbacks apply to all variable pay |
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: Annual equity split (50% PSUs tied to market share, growth ex‑U.S. credit, margin; 50% RSUs) mirrors MKTX NEO design, supporting long‑term value creation incentives; PSU precedent payouts show rigorous calibration .
- Retention and selling pressure: Significant make‑whole and lost‑opportunity awards with 3‑year vesting, cash repayment obligations upon certain early exits, and 12‑month non‑compete/garden leave reduce near‑term departure risk; hedging/pledging prohibitions limit misalignment risk .
- Execution risk/benefit: Berry’s remit spans operations, risk, product, technology and regional P&L; licensing/SMCR fit‑and‑proper requirements introduce compliance gating but institutionalize accountability; his product‑led innovation background is consistent with MKTX’s data/automation strategy .
- Governance safeguards: 5× salary ownership guidelines, robust clawbacks (restatement and misconduct), MRT malus, and PSU structures mitigate adverse incentive outcomes .