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Andrew Micallef

Executive Vice President and Chief Operations and Manufacturing Officer at NXP SemiconductorsNXP Semiconductors
Executive

About Andrew Micallef

Andrew Micallef (born 1965) is Executive Vice President, Chief Operations and Manufacturing Officer at NXP (NXPI). He joined NXP in May 2021 and leads end-to-end manufacturing, quality, and supply chain strategy, building on 20+ years in semiconductor operations across manufacturing, procurement, logistics, quality, test engineering, IT, and facilities . NXP’s incentive design ties his pay to company performance using revenue, adjusted gross margin, and a sustainability scorecard in the annual plan, and three-year relative TSR in PSUs; 2024 AIP payout was 61.4% of target and PSU realizations for prior cycles ranged from 76.32% (2021 grant vesting in 2024) to 173.68% (2020 grant vesting in 2023) .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
MarvellChief Operations OfficerNot disclosedLed global operations transformation and execution as COO
Intersil CorporationOperations leadershipNot disclosedOversaw manufacturing, supply chain, and quality functions
AudienceOperations leadershipNot disclosedManaged operations across supply chain and product/test engineering
LSI CorporationOperations leadershipNot disclosedLed manufacturing and logistics initiatives
Agere SystemsOperations leadershipNot disclosedLed operations and facilities programs

External Roles

No external directorships or committee roles disclosed for Mr. Micallef .

Fixed Compensation

Metric202220232024
Salary ($)$517,635 $535,000 $547,500
Annualized Base Salary (as of Dec 31, 2024)$560,000; +5% YoY
AIP Target (% of Base Salary)80% 80%
Nonequity Incentive Plan Compensation ($)$615,464 $524,728 $275,072
Stock Awards ($) (RSUs+PSUs grant-date fair value)$2,544,850 $2,954,875 $3,283,800
All Other Compensation ($)$37,260 $43,843 $42,304
Total ($)$3,715,209 $4,058,446 $4,148,676
AIP Payout Factor (Company-wide NEOs)143.8% of target 122.6% of target 61.4% of target
Key Perquisites (2024)Home office allowance, tax preparation, 401(k) contributions, and tax gross-up for tax return preparation services

Performance Compensation

Annual Incentive Program (AIP) Design and 2024 Structure

ComponentWeightingTargetActualPayoutVesting
1H Revenue20% Not disclosedNot disclosedIncluded in overall 61.4% payout factor (NEOs) Cash paid in 2Q following year
1H Adjusted Gross Margin20% Not disclosedNot disclosedIncluded in overall 61.4% payout factor (NEOs) Cash paid in 2Q following year
2H Revenue20% Not disclosedNot disclosedIncluded in overall 61.4% payout factor (NEOs) Cash paid in 2Q following year
2H Adjusted Gross Margin20% Not disclosedNot disclosedIncluded in overall 61.4% payout factor (NEOs) Cash paid in 2Q following year
Annual Sustainability Scorecard20% Not disclosed; payout gated by ≥32% non-GAAP op margin threshold Not disclosedIncluded in overall 61.4% payout factor (NEOs) Cash paid in 2Q following year

AIP targets: 2024 AIP target remained unchanged at 80% of base salary for Micallef .

2024 Grants of Plan-Based Awards (Andrew Micallef):

PlanGrant DateThreshold ($)Target ($)Maximum ($)PSUs Target (#)RSUs (#)Grant-Date Fair Value ($)
2024 AIP$22,400 $448,000 $896,000
2019 OIP PSUs11/5/2024 9,348 $2,413,560 (weighted fair value; PSU per-share fair value $258.19)
2019 OIP RSUs11/5/2024 4,007 $870,240 (RSU per-share fair value $217.18)

PSU performance realizations (Company program history):

Grant YearVest YearRealization (% of target PSUs earned)
20182021135.29%
2019202284.21%
20202023173.68%
2021202476.32%

2021 hire and annual grants (Andrew Micallef):

Award TypeGrant DateShares/UnitsNotes
New hire RSU8/3/2021 4,750 RSUs; $978,738 grant-date fair value Vests 1/3 per year on 1st, 2nd, 3rd anniversary
Annual PSUs (target)11/2/2021 6,439 PSUs Cliff vests at 3 years; 0–2 shares per unit based on relative TSR
Annual RSUs11/2/2021 2,760 RSUs Vests 1/3 per year

Vesting schedules:

  • RSUs: Equal installments on the first, second, and third anniversaries of grant (e.g., 2024 grant vests on Nov 5, 2025/2026/2027) .
  • PSUs: Cliff vest on the third anniversary (e.g., 2024 grant vests on Nov 5, 2027) with 0–2 shares per unit based on three-year relative TSR vs peer group .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

ItemDetail
Beneficial Ownership (as of Apr 15, 2025)8,828 common shares; <1% of outstanding
Shares Outstanding Basis252,801,803 common shares; excludes 21,717,835 treasury shares
Stock Ownership Guideline3x base salary for Section 16 officers (NEOs); 5-year compliance window; NEOs in compliance
Hedging/Pledging PolicyProhibits hedging, pledging, hypothecating, short selling; derivatives restricted
Options OutstandingNone for NEOs as of Dec 31, 2024

Outstanding equity awards at year-end (Dec 31, 2024; closing price $207.85):

Award TypeUnits Not Vested (#)Market/Payout Value ($)
RSUs1,449 $301,175
RSUs2,907 $604,220
RSUs4,007 $832,855
PSUs (unearned)10,142 $2,108,015
PSUs (unearned)10,173 $2,114,458
PSUs (unearned)9,348 $1,942,982

Employment Terms

ProvisionDetail
Employer/AgreementEmployment agreement with NXP USA, Inc.
NoticeEither party may terminate; employee can resign with three months’ written notice
Severance (no cause)Lump sum equal to one year’s base salary plus pro-rata AIP for time worked (subject to bonus conditions)
Change of Control (double trigger)Minimum 24 months of base pay and 2x target bonus; accelerated vesting of unvested equity; 12 months benefits continuation for US-based NEOs; no excise tax gross-ups
Restrictive CovenantsNon-compete and non-solicit for 12 months post-termination; confidentiality obligations
ClawbacksDodd-Frank compliant clawback (2023); Dutch law-based clawback for performance awards
Insider TradingPolicy prohibits hedging/pledging and derivatives transactions

Potential Payments upon Termination or Change of Control (as of Dec 31, 2024; assumes $207.85/share):

ScenarioCash Payments ($)Equity-Related Payments ($)Benefits Continuation ($)Total ($)
Involuntary separation (Company convenience)$835,072 $2,105,936 $2,941,008
Death$275,072 $4,731,705 $5,006,777
Disability$275,072 $2,105,936 $2,381,008
Change of control with termination within 12 months (double trigger)$2,291,072 $4,731,705 $25,487 $7,048,264
Retirement
Termination for cause or voluntary resignation

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Mix and trends: Base salary increased to an annualized $560,000 (+5% YoY), while stock awards rose from $2.54M (2022) to $3.28M (2024), keeping equity a dominant pay component .
  • At-risk pay: Other NEOs average ~86% target compensation at-risk; programs cap payouts at 200% of target; PSUs are 70% of LTI and subject to RTSR with a 100% cap if TSR is negative .
  • AIP rigor: 2024 includes revenue and adjusted gross margin (1H and 2H) plus sustainability metrics; sustainability payout gated by ≥32% non-GAAP operating margin .
  • Governance safeguards: Double-trigger CoC, clawbacks (Dodd-Frank and Dutch law), prohibition on hedging/pledging; no excise tax gross-ups .

Risk Indicators & Red Flags

  • Pledging/Hedging: Prohibited for executives and directors (reduces alignment risk) .
  • Tax Gross-Up: Limited tax gross-up applied to tax preparation services for Micallef in 2024 perquisites (minor, not CoC related) .
  • Options Repricing: Not permitted without shareholder approval; no options outstanding (reduces repricing risk) .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: Strong pay-for-performance linkage via RTSR PSUs and revenue/margin AIP metrics; ownership guideline of 3x salary and prohibition on pledging/hedging enhance alignment .
  • Retention: Material unvested RSUs/PSUs (e.g., 4,007 RSUs; 9,348 target PSUs from 2024 grant; plus prior cycles) and double-trigger CoC protections suggest moderate retention risk but robust retention hooks .
  • Selling pressure: Scheduled RSU vesting on Nov 5, 2025/2026/2027 and PSU cliff vest in 2027 could create periodic supply; no options outstanding mitigates forced exercise pressure .
  • Execution focus: Role spans manufacturing and supply chain; AIP weight on revenue and gross margin plus PSU RTSR history (e.g., 76.32% for 2021 grant) tie realized pay to operational and shareholder outcomes .