Jennifer Wuamett
About Jennifer Wuamett
Jennifer B. Wuamett (born 1965) is Executive Vice President, General Counsel, Corporate Secretary, and Chief Sustainability Officer at NXP. She has served on NXP’s management team since 2018, overseeing worldwide legal, governance, compliance, intellectual property, and sustainability/risk programs, and signs shareholder communications in her capacity as Secretary . Prior roles include Senior Vice President, General Counsel and Secretary at Freescale, and various positions at Motorola dating back to 1997 . Company performance under the executive team in 2024: revenue $12.61B (-5% y/y), GAAP gross margin 56.4% (-50 bps y/y), GAAP operating margin 27.1% (-50 bps y/y), diluted EPS $9.73, and cash from operations $2.78B; shareholder say‑on‑pay received ~96% approval in 2024, and pay-versus-performance disclosures highlight TSR and CAP linkages .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| NXP Semiconductors N.V. | EVP, General Counsel; Corporate Secretary; Chief Sustainability Officer | Since 2018 | Oversees worldwide legal, governance, compliance, IP; leads sustainability and risk programs; corporate Secretary signing Board materials |
| Freescale Semiconductor | Senior VP, General Counsel & Secretary | Beginning 1997 | Senior legal and corporate governance leadership |
| Motorola | Various legal roles | Beginning 1997 | Legal roles building foundation for later GC responsibilities |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Plexus Corp. | Director | Current | Board-level oversight at an electronics manufacturer |
Fixed Compensation
Multi-year NEO compensation (USD):
| Year | Salary ($) | Stock Awards ($) | Non-Equity Incentive ($) | All Other Compensation ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 583,750 | 3,283,800 | 289,808 | 20,834 | 4,178,192 |
| 2023 | 563,750 | 3,009,558 | 566,412 | 19,600 | 4,159,320 |
| 2022 | 532,635 | 2,776,173 | 632,720 | 18,644 | 3,960,172 |
Key fixed pay and perquisites:
- Annualized base salary as of Dec 31, 2024: $590,000; target AIP bonus 80% of base .
- Perquisites included in 2024 “All Other Compensation”: executive physical and Company 401(k) contributions ($17,250) .
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Program (AIP) framework (2024):
- Metrics and weights: 1H Revenue (20%), 1H Adjusted Gross Margin (20%), 2H Revenue (20%), 2H Adjusted Gross Margin (20%), Annual Sustainability Scorecard (20%); sustainability payout requires non‑GAAP operating margin ≥32% .
- Payout mechanics: single annual payout capped at 200% of target; paid in Q2 of the following year .
AIP outcome (2024):
| Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout | Vesting/Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AIP (overall) | — | $472,000 | — | $289,808 (61.4% of target) | Paid Q2 2025 |
2024 Sustainability Scorecard results incorporated in AIP:
| Goal | Why Chosen | Achievement |
|---|---|---|
| Retention (voluntary attrition) | Continuity of talent drives innovation/productivity | 3 of 3 points (met stretch goal) |
| IDL Engagement ≥75th percentile (tech benchmark) | Engagement supports long-term value | 2 of 3 points (between 75th–90th percentile) |
| Increase women in IDL | Improve representation | 1 of 3 points (below aspiration) |
| Carbon emissions reduction (load‑adjusted) | Efficiency and emissions reduction roadmap | 2 of 3 points (5% reduction) |
| Water recycling in manufacturing | Conserve/withdraw less water via recycling | 3 of 3 points (met stretch goal) |
| Scope 3 emissions (sold products) | Address full value-chain impact | 1 of 3 points (below goal) |
Long-Term Incentive (LTI) program design:
- 70% PSUs; 30% RSUs; PSUs vest 100% after 3 years based on Relative TSR vs peer group (linear schedule: 0% <25th percentile, 25% at 25th, 100% at 50th, 200% at ≥75th; PSU payout capped at 100% if absolute TSR is negative) .
- RSUs vest 1/3 per year on each grant anniversary .
2024 LTI awards (grant date Nov 5, 2024):
| Component | Target Value ($) | Target Units (#) | Grant Date Fair Value ($) | Vesting | Performance Measure |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs | 2,100,000 | 9,348 | 2,413,560 | 100% on Nov 4, 2027 (cliff) | Relative TSR (0–200% schedule; 100% cap if negative TSR) |
| RSUs | 900,000 | 4,007 | 870,240 | 1/3 per year on grant anniversaries | Time-based |
Outstanding PSUs status (as of Dec 31, 2024):
| Grant Date | Target PSUs (#) | Scheduled Vest Date | Performance Factor as of 12/31/2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Nov 1, 2022 | 11,064 | Oct 31, 2025 | 78.57% (subject to final certification) |
| Nov 7, 2023 | 10,361 | Nov 6, 2026 | 35.71% (subject to final certification) |
| Nov 5, 2024 | 9,348 | Nov 4, 2027 | 29.95% (subject to final certification) |
PSU realization history for NXP’s 2018–2021 grants ranged from 76.32% to 173.68% of target, evidencing a direct connection to relative TSR outcomes .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership | 36,220 common shares; <1% of shares outstanding (Company total 252,801,803 as of Apr 15, 2025) |
| Options | None outstanding for NEOs as of Dec 31, 2024 |
| Unvested RSUs (by grant) | 1,582 (11/1/2022), 2,961 (11/7/2023), 4,007 (11/5/2024) |
| RSU market value (12/31/2024) | $328,819; $615,444; $832,855 respectively |
| Unearned PSUs (target) | 11,064 (2022 grant), 10,361 (2023), 9,348 (2024) |
| PSU payout value (est. at target) | $2,299,652; $2,153,534; $1,942,982 respectively (subject to performance) |
| Vesting schedules | RSUs: equal installments annually on grant anniversaries; PSUs: cliff vest on scheduled dates subject to RTSR performance |
| Ownership guidelines | Executives (Section 16 officers): 3x base salary; 5-year compliance window; retain 100% of net shares until met; all NEOs in compliance |
| Hedging/pledging | Prohibited for employees/directors; no shorting or margin pledging allowed |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Details |
|---|---|
| Employment agreement | With NXP USA, Inc.; sets base salary, AIP target, benefits participation |
| Termination (without misconduct) | Lump-sum severance equal to one year’s base salary + pro‑rata AIP for period worked (if conditions met), contingent on release of claims |
| Change-of-control (double trigger) | If involuntary termination without cause or resignation for good reason within 12 months post-CoC: minimum 24 months base pay + 2x target bonus; accelerated vesting per plan; 12 months benefits continuation for US executives; no excise tax gross‑up |
| Non-compete / non-solicit | 12-month non‑competition and non‑solicitation post-termination; confidentiality obligations maintained |
| Clawbacks | Dodd-Frank compliant clawback adopted in 2023; Dutch law clawbacks also apply to performance-based pay |
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Significant at‑risk pay via PSUs tied to 3‑year relative TSR; RSUs provide retention; stock ownership guidelines enforced; hedging/pledging prohibited—strong alignment with shareholders and reduced misalignment risk .
- Near-term selling pressure: Scheduled RSU vesting across 2025–2027 and potential PSU settlements (2025–2027) can create episodic liquidity events, but prohibitions on hedging/pledging and guideline retention requirements temper forced selling; current PSU performance factors are below target for 2023/2024 grants (35.71%, 29.95%) which may limit near-term realized shares absent improved TSR .
- Retention/CoC: Standard severance (1x salary + pro‑rata bonus) and robust double-trigger CoC terms (≥24 months base + 2x bonus with accelerated vesting) reduce retention risk through corporate transitions and align focus during potential M&A without shareholder‑unfriendly excise tax gross‑ups .
- Governance/ESG link: Sustainability goals comprise 20% of AIP with explicit outcomes disclosed; 2024 results show mixed achievement (strong retention/water recycling; below aspiration for women in IDL and Scope 3 product emissions), informing ongoing execution risk/opportunity in ESG-linked incentives .
Citations: All facts, figures, and dates above are cited inline using [doc_id:chunk_idx] from NXP’s 2025 DEF 14A and related 8-K.