Craig Abrahams
About Craig Abrahams
Craig Abrahams (age 48) is Playtika’s President and Chief Financial Officer since October 2019, overseeing strategy and corporate development, corporate finance, investor relations, accounting and treasury . He previously served as President of Global Development (Oct 2016–Sep 2019) and, prior to Playtika, co-founded and served as President/CFO of Caesars Interactive Entertainment (CIE), leading acquisitions including Buffalo Studios, EA Mobile Montreal, and Pacific Interactive; he was also CFO of Caesars Acquisition Company (Oct 2013–Oct 2017) and held strategic planning (Disney) and investment banking (Bear Stearns) roles . He holds a B.S. in finance from Indiana University (High Distinction) and an MBA from Harvard Business School (Distinction) . In FY2024, Playtika reported $2.549B in revenue and $620M in EBITDA*, providing context to pay-for-performance analysis during Abrahams’ tenure .
*Values retrieved from S&P Global.
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Caesars Interactive Entertainment (CIE) | Co‑founder, President & CFO | Jan 2011 – Sep 2016 | Led CIE’s purchase of Playtika (2011); oversaw acquisitions of Buffalo Studios (Bingo Blitz, 2012), EA Mobile Montreal (WSOP, 2013), Pacific Interactive (House of Fun, 2014) |
| Caesars Acquisition Company (CAC) | Chief Financial Officer | Oct 2013 – Oct 2017 | Corporate finance oversight for listed entity |
| Playtika | President of Global Development | Oct 2016 – Sep 2019 | Corporate development, M&A integration and growth initiatives |
| The Walt Disney Company | Strategic Planning | Not disclosed | Strategy roles (pre‑Playtika) |
| Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc. | Investment Banking | Not disclosed | Capital markets experience (pre‑Playtika) |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Redwood Holdco LLC (affiliate of Redbox) | Director; Audit Committee | Since Dec 2016 | Board service and audit oversight |
| CareerBuilder, LLC | Director | Aug 2017 – Feb 2021 | Human capital solutions company |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $350,000 | $1,150,000 (effective Jan 1, 2025) |
| Target Annual Bonus ($) | $2,000,000 | $1,150,000 (effective 2025) |
| Actual Annual Bonus Paid ($) | $1,720,945 (paid Feb 2025 based on 2024 results) | — |
Key observations:
- Guaranteed cash increased materially for 2025 as the legacy 2021–2024 Retention Plan expired; target bonus reduced to market levels .
Performance Compensation
Annual Bonus Plan (2024)
| Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Retention Plan Adjusted EBITDA | 100% | $875.0M target; threshold 90% of target; maximum 110% | $850.6M (97.2% of target) | ~86% of target (straight‑line interpolation) | Cash; paid Feb 2025 |
Definition notes:
- Retention Plan Adjusted EBITDA is Adjusted EBITDA per Credit Agreement with specified add‑backs (stock‑based comp, acquisition costs, etc.) plus plan payments and certain adjustments .
PSUs Granted in December 2024
| PSU Metric | PSUs Granted (#) | Threshold | Target | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Annual Revenue Growth | 313,725 | 1% growth = 50% | 2%+ growth = 100% | Up to 33.3% per year over 2025–2027 |
| Adjusted EBITDA | 313,725 | Not disclosed | Committee‑set target (only target established) | Up to 33.3% per year over 2025–2027 |
| 1‑Year TSR | 627,451 | 10% TSR = 50% | 15%+ TSR = 100% | Up to 33.3% per year over 2025–2027 |
Additional details:
- Maximum vesting per metric per year is 100% of tranche; linear interpolation between levels; TSR measurement uses December averages and includes dividends .
- Change‑in‑control: PSUs convert to time‑based vesting across remaining periods; full acceleration on Qualifying Termination after CoC; completed performance periods vest based on actuals at CoC .
RSUs (Time‑based) Granted in December 2024
| Award | Units | Vesting |
|---|---|---|
| 2024 RSUs | 627,451 | Quarterly, substantially equal installments from Mar 15, 2025 through Dec 15, 2027 (3‑year schedule) |
Legacy PSUs (Feb 2022 grant)
| Award | Units | 2024 Outcome |
|---|---|---|
| 2022 PSUs (revenue growth‑based) | 378,378 | 2024 revenue growth <1% → 0 PSUs vested for Abrahams (Israel‑based executives had a minimum 25 PSUs; not applicable to Abrahams) |
2022 Option Exchange → RSUs
| Item | Terms | Abrahams Allocation |
|---|---|---|
| Exchange | 2.5 surrendered options → 1 new RSU; same acceleration terms as options | 960,000 options surrendered → 384,000 new RSUs (vest quarterly over 3 years from Dec 15, 2022) |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Beneficial Ownership (Common Shares)
| Metric | Apr 2023 | Apr 2024 | Apr 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Shares Beneficially Owned (#) | 511,188 | 622,608 | 747,509 |
| % Outstanding | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.2% |
Outstanding Unvested Equity at 12/31/2024 (Market value at $6.94/sh)
| Award | Units (#) | Market Value ($) |
|---|---|---|
| RSUs (Dec 2022 Option Exchange) | 128,000 | $888,320 |
| 2024 RSUs | 627,451 | $4,354,510 |
| 2024 TSR PSUs (unearned) | 392,157 | $2,721,570 |
| 2024 Revenue Growth PSUs (unearned) | 196,078 | $1,360,781 |
| 2024 Adjusted EBITDA PSUs (unearned) | 196,078 | $1,360,781 |
| 2022 PSUs (unearned for 2025 period) | 50,676 | $351,691 |
Alignment policies:
- Anti‑hedging and anti‑pledging policies prohibit derivatives, short sales, and pledging company stock, with margin purchases prohibited .
- Stock ownership guidelines: CEO 6x salary; other executive officers 3x salary; all executive officers were in compliance as of the proxy date .
Potential selling pressure:
- Quarterly RSU vesting from Mar 2025–Dec 2027 (627,451 units) may create periodic supply as taxes are withheld/settled; anti‑hedging/pledging mitigates misalignment risk .
Employment Terms
Acceleration and Severance—Key Provisions
| Trigger | Cash Severance | RSU Acceleration | PSU Acceleration |
|---|---|---|---|
| Termination without Cause or Resignation for Good Reason (apart from CoC) | — | $444,160 (Dec 2022 RSUs) | — |
| Change in Control with Qualifying Termination | — | $888,320 (Dec 2022 RSUs) | $9,365,502 (PSUs at target, incl. completed period actuals) |
Additional terms:
- Option‑exchange RSUs retain accelerated vesting: if Qualifying Termination, RSUs scheduled through first anniversary vest (minimum 50% if <50% vested); if within three months before/on/after a CoC, all RSUs vest at the later of termination or CoC, subject to release .
- PSUs under 2024 grants convert to time‑based vesting post‑CoC; full acceleration on Qualifying Termination post‑CoC; completed periods vest at actuals .
- Clawback policy (SEC/Nasdaq compliant): recovers erroneously awarded incentive compensation upon an accounting restatement for Section 16 officers .
- 280G/4999 excise tax gross‑ups: for awards granted prior to 2024, Abrahams is eligible for gross‑ups if excise tax applies in a CoC event .
Non‑compete / non‑solicit:
- Not disclosed for U.S.‑based executives; Israel‑based employment terms are detailed separately (not applicable to Abrahams) .
Performance & Track Record
- Led M&A and value creation at CIE: acquisitions of Buffalo Studios (Bingo Blitz, 2012), EA Mobile Montreal (WSOP, 2013), Pacific Interactive (House of Fun, 2014), and Playtika acquisition (2011) .
- Transitioned Playtika’s incentive program post‑Retention Plan, implementing performance‑linked PSUs on revenue growth, Adjusted EBITDA, and TSR, and introducing RSUs to balance retention and alignment .
- Executed 2022 option exchange to replace significantly out‑of‑the‑money options with RSUs to improve retention and alignment, maintaining robust acceleration protections .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Shift from options to RSUs: 2022 option exchange replaced underwater options with RSUs (2.5:1), reducing risk and increasing certainty of value for executives .
- Increase in guaranteed compensation: Base salary increased to $1.15M in 2025 as Retention Plan expired; target bonus reduced to align with market, moving mix toward fixed cash and equity .
- Introduction of performance equity: 2024 PSUs split across revenue growth, Adjusted EBITDA, and TSR with clear annual thresholds/targets and equal tranche vesting .
- Say‑on‑pay support: ~85% approval in 2024, indicating shareholder support for compensation program changes .
Compensation Peer Group (Benchmarking)
- Peer group includes AppLovin, DraftKings, Electronic Arts, Match Group, Pinterest, Roku, Take‑Two, Light & Wonder, CyberArk, IAC, Xperi, Ziff Davis (Activision removed post acquisition) .
- Committee intended to set 2025 target total cash around the 75th percentile and total direct compensation between 50th–75th percentile of the peer group .
Equity & Financial Performance Context
Playtika Revenues and EBITDA (Annual)
| Metric | FY 2020 | FY 2021 | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenues ($) | $2,371,500,000 | $2,583,000,000 | $2,615,500,000 | $2,567,000,000 | $2,549,300,000 |
| EBITDA ($) | $552,500,000* | $722,600,000* | $636,100,000* | $688,900,000* | $619,900,000* |
*Values retrieved from S&P Global.
Equity Ownership & Risk Indicators
- No pledging or hedging allowed; margin purchases prohibited .
- Ownership guidelines (3x salary) met for all executive officers as of the proxy .
- Related party transactions and legal proceedings: Not disclosed for Abrahams in the latest proxy.
Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback
- 2024 say‑on‑pay approval ~85%; program viewed as more market‑standard post‑Retention Plan and responsive to stakeholder feedback via consultant Pearl Meyer .
Investment Implications
- Alignment improving: Transition to PSUs tied to revenue growth, Adjusted EBITDA, and TSR should better align realized pay with value creation; anti‑hedging/pledging and ownership guidelines further strengthen alignment .
- Cash mix normalized: Elevation of base salary and reduced target bonus post‑Retention Plan lowers reliance on discretionary cash pools and clarifies incentives; however, higher guaranteed cash reduces at‑risk pay sensitivity .
- Near‑term supply risk: Quarterly RSU vesting through 2027 (627,451 units) could generate periodic selling/withholding activity; monitor Form 4s for tax‑related dispositions once available .
- Change‑in‑control terms: Full acceleration of PSUs after CoC with Qualifying Termination and excise tax gross‑ups on pre‑2024 awards represent shareholder‑unfriendly features; weigh governance risk against overall alignment improvements .