Uri Rubin
About Uri Rubin
Uri Rubin, age 47, is Playtika’s Chief Technology Officer (CTO) since May 2024; he previously served as SVP, Research & Development (Jan 2021–May 2024) and VP of Engineering (2017–2021). He holds a B.Sc. in Software Engineering from Ben Gurion University and has prior roles at HP and Panorama Software . Company performance context during his senior R&D/CTO tenure: H1 2024 revenues were $1,278.2M vs $1,299.0M in H1 2023 (−1.6% YoY), income from operations $238.8M vs $291.6M (−18.1%), and net income $139.6M vs $159.8M (−12.7%) . For the 2024 annual bonus program, the company achieved “Retention Plan Adjusted EBITDA” of $850.6M (97.2% of the $875M target), resulting in NEO bonus payouts equal to ~86% of target; this defines the pay-for-performance framework he operates under even though his own payout is not disclosed .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Playtika | CTO | May 2024–present | Oversees company-wide technology roadmap |
| Playtika | SVP, Research & Development | Jan 2021–May 2024 | Led R&D; scaled platform and tools |
| Playtika | VP of Engineering | 2017–2021 | Built engineering org supporting live-ops games |
| HP | Engineering/Technology roles | Not disclosed | Enterprise-scale engineering experience |
| Panorama Software | Engineering/Technology roles | Not disclosed | Data/BI software experience |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| — | — | — | No public external directorships disclosed in filings reviewed |
Fixed Compensation
| Component | Terms | Amount | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Monthly Salary | Employment Agreement (Israel) | NIS 73,000 | Composed of Basic Salary and Global Compensation |
| Basic Salary | Included in Salary | NIS 58,400 | Basis for benefits contributions |
| Global Compensation | Overtime comp (64 hrs/mo) | NIS 14,600 | Fixed monthly; offsets overtime work |
| Management Bonus Plan | Discretionary | Not disclosed | Eligibility, not formulaic; must be employed at payment |
| Non‑compete consideration | Embedded in salary | 10% of Salary | Consideration for post‑employment non‑compete |
| Pension contributions (employer) | Israel Section 14 | 14.83% of Salary | 8.33% severance + 6.5% compensatory payments |
| Pension contributions (employee) | Withheld | 6% of Salary | Employee-paid to pension arrangement |
| Advanced Study Fund | Israel benefit | 7.5% employer; 2.5% employee | Up to tax ceiling |
| Transportation reimbursement | Israel policy | According to law | Monthly reimbursement per policy |
Performance Compensation
| Incentive | Metric | Target Framework | Actual/Payout | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Company Annual Bonus Program (2024) | Retention Plan Adjusted EBITDA | Target $875M; Threshold 90%; Max 110% of target | Actual $850.6M (97.2% of target); NEO payout ~86% of target (CEO/CFO/CLO/CMO/COO disclosed) | Annual; payout in Feb 2025 (for 2024) |
| Performance Stock Units (PSUs) – 2024 program | Adjusted EBITDA, Annual Revenue Growth Rate, TSR | One‑year performance periods each year (2025, 2026, 2027); max 100% of award | Not yet disclosed for Rubin; company estimates applied to NEOs; values determined at grant using Monte Carlo/Black‑Scholes | 33.3% eligible per year based on metrics |
| Restricted Stock Units (RSUs) – 2024 program | Time‑based | 33% of total executive equity grants (balance PSUs) | Not disclosed for Rubin | Quarterly, substantially equal installments over 3 years (service-based) |
Notes:
- Rubin’s Employment Agreement provides eligibility for a discretionary management bonus, not the formulaic annual bonus terms disclosed for NEOs; his specific bonus targets/payouts are not disclosed .
- 2024 executive equity design shifted to 66% PSUs (performance) and 33% RSUs (time-based), aligning pay to financial and TSR outcomes .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Policy/Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Stock Ownership Guidelines | CEO 6x base salary; other executive officers 3x base salary; common stock and RSUs count (unearned PSUs and options do not) |
| Compliance Status | As of the proxy, each executive officer satisfied the ownership requirements (includes CTO) |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited: no derivatives, short sales, options, margin purchases, or pledging company stock |
| Equity Plan Stockholders Agreement | Piggyback registration rights for employee stockholders until Jan 14, 2026; irrevocable proxy granted by employee stockholders to Giant Network Group to vote their shares until Giant falls below 40% voting power (agreement covers certain current/former management) |
Ownership amounts for Rubin (shares/percent, vested vs. unvested) are not disclosed individually in the 2025 proxy’s beneficial ownership table; NEOs and directors are tabulated separately .
Employment Terms
| Term | Provision | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Effective Date | June 4, 2024 (amend/restatement of Dec 4, 2016 agreement) | Employed by Playtika since Jan 15, 2017 |
| Position | CTO; full‑time; reports to CEO/Designee | Oversees technology roadmap |
| Notice Period | 30 days (either party) | Company may waive services during notice with compensatory payment |
| Termination for Cause | Immediate termination on defined grounds (criminal offense, breach of trust/loyalty, uncured material breach, deliberate harm, non‑compete breach, other circumstances under law) | Options, if any, expire immediately on Cause |
| Non‑Compete | 12 months post‑termination; non‑solicit of employees/partners; exceptions for ≤5% passive public stock ownership | Consideration embedded (10% of salary) |
| Confidentiality/IP | Assignment of inventions; protection of proprietary info (Israel Patent Law references) | |
| Benefits/Perqs | Mobile phone, equipment, travel reimbursements per policy; vacation (24 days), sick leave, recreation pay per Israel law | |
| Governing Law/Jurisdiction | State of Israel; Tel Aviv courts |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Shift to performance-heavy equity: In Dec 2024, executive grants moved to 66% PSUs keyed to Adjusted EBITDA, revenue growth rate, and TSR with annual performance periods through 2027, and 33% RSUs vesting quarterly over 3 years—tightening pay-for-performance and adding TSR exposure .
- Annual cash bonus formula for 2024 linked to Retention Plan Adjusted EBITDA with clear thresholds/targets—company achieved 97.2% of target; Rubin’s agreement itself references a discretionary management bonus, indicating his bonus mechanics may differ from NEOs’ formulaic plan .
- Ownership alignment: Mandatory 3x salary ownership multiple for executive officers, fully satisfied; hedging/pledging banned—mitigates misalignment and leverage risk .
- No disclosed golden parachute multiples or tax gross‑ups: Rubin’s Israel‑law Section 14 pension/severance framework governs severance rather than U.S.‑style multiples; no change‑of‑control economics are disclosed in his agreement .
Vesting Schedules and Insider Selling Pressure
- RSUs: quarterly vesting over three years can create predictable liquidity events; monitoring Form 4 filings around vesting dates is advisable to assess potential selling pressure .
- PSUs: annual performance determination (2025–2027) with 33.3% eligibility per year; no above‑target (>100%) vesting—limits windfalls and dampens excess dilution .
- Attempt to retrieve insider trading records: A Form 4 search for Uri Rubin (PLTK, 2024–2025) via the insider-trades skill failed due to an authorization error; future tracking should resume when access is available (technical error log on 2025-11-19).
Performance & Track Record
| Period | Metric | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|---|
| H1 | Revenues ($M) | 1,278.2 | 1,299.0 |
| H1 | Income from Operations ($M) | 238.8 | 291.6 |
| H1 | Net Income ($M) | 139.6 | 159.8 |
| FY 2024 Program | Retention Plan Adjusted EBITDA ($M) | 850.6 (actual) | Target 875.0 (program target) |
Notes:
- These company-level outcomes frame the operating context for Rubin’s technology leadership across monetization, live-ops tooling, and platform reliability.
Governance and Policies Relevant to Alignment
- Clawback policy: Playtika’s policy for recovery of erroneously awarded compensation is on file (Exhibit 97.1), supporting risk‑balanced compensation governance .
- Say‑on‑pay: Annual advisory vote conducted; the 2025 proxy seeks approval of NEO compensation for FY 2024 .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Strong ownership/anti‑hedging rules plus performance‑weighted PSUs tied to EBITDA, revenue growth, and TSR indicate high alignment; Rubin meets ownership guidelines (3x salary), reducing misalignment risk .
- Retention: Israeli Section 14 severance structure and 12‑month non‑compete provide retention/leverage, but absence of explicit change‑of‑control multiples means limited cash lock‑ins; retention hinges on equity value realization and career scope .
- Selling pressure: Quarterly RSU vesting could drive periodic Form 4 activity; monitor for net dispositions around vest dates—access issues prevented retrieval today; resume tracking when the insider-trades feed is available.
- Execution risk: Company-level H1 2024 softness in revenue and operating income vs 2023 and sub‑target EBITDA (97.2% of target) heighten dependency on R&D/engineering execution under Rubin’s remit to sustain live‑ops monetization and growth vectors .