Baaziz Achour
About Baaziz Achour
Dr. Baaziz Achour, age 64, is Chief Technology Officer of Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. (QTI) since February 2025, after serving as CTO‑elect (Dec 2024–Feb 2025), Deputy CTO (Apr 2023–Dec 2024), and Senior Vice President, Engineering (Jul 2006–Apr 2023). He joined Qualcomm in 1993 as a Systems Engineer and has held several leadership roles in the engineering organization; he holds a B.S. in Physics (University of Algiers) and master’s and doctorate degrees in Electrical Engineering (Tufts University) . Executive pay at Qualcomm ties incentives to company performance via annual Adjusted Revenues/Adjusted Operating Income and a human capital modifier (ACIP), plus three‑year PSUs based on relative TSR and Adjusted EPS, with robust clawbacks and ownership guidelines that will apply to Achour in his CTO role .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. | Chief Technology Officer | Feb 2025–present | Executive technology leadership of QTI engineering |
| Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. | CTO‑elect | Dec 2024–Feb 2025 | Transition planning to CTO following CTO retirement |
| Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. | Deputy Chief Technology Officer | Apr 2023–Dec 2024 | Engineering leadership within CTO organization |
| Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. | SVP, Engineering | Jul 2006–Apr 2023 | Senior leadership within engineering organization |
| Qualcomm | Systems Engineer; various engineering leadership roles | 1993–2006 | Technical and leadership roles across engineering |
External Roles
No public external directorships or external board roles for Dr. Achour were disclosed in the executive officers section reviewed .
Fixed Compensation
- As of the latest proxy filings, Dr. Achour was not a named executive officer (NEO) for FY2024; specific base salary, target bonus %, and actual bonus paid for Achour are not disclosed in FY2024/FY2025 proxy materials reviewed .
- Qualcomm policy highlights for executive officers: at‑will employment (no individual employment contracts), no unique tax gross‑ups (except certain relocation benefits per broad policy), prohibition on single‑trigger CIC payouts, and restrictions on pledging/hedging/options trading .
Performance Compensation
| Incentive Component | Metric | Weighting/Design | Performance Period | Payout/Cap | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Annual Cash Incentive Plan (ACIP) | Adjusted Revenues; Adjusted Operating Income; human capital advancements modifier | Company performance‑based; differentiated measures/time periods | 1 year | ACIP payouts capped at 2x target | Cash award (annual) |
| PSUs – RTSR | Relative TSR vs peers | 50% of PSUs; 55th percentile for target; 90th percentile for max; capped at target if absolute TSR negative | 3 years | Up to 2x target shares (subject to negative TSR cap) | 3‑year cliff vest |
| PSUs – Adjusted EPS | Average annual Adjusted EPS | 50% of PSUs; target rigor assessed; goal disclosed post‑period | 3 years | Up to 2x target shares | 3‑year cliff vest |
| RSUs | Continued service | Executive equity mix historically 40% RSUs (with 60% PSUs) for NEOs; vest annually | 3 years | N/A | Annual over three years |
Notes:
- PSU goal details (EPS target values) are disclosed after completion of the performance period per policy .
- Qualcomm’s executive equity awards follow this design; Achour’s CTO grants are expected to conform to LTIP terms (actual Achour grant specifics not disclosed in FY2024 proxy) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Alignment Mechanism | Detail |
|---|---|
| Executive stock ownership guidelines | Executives must own 2x–10x base salary; CEO 10x; others (including CTO) typically 2x; only actual owned shares count; compliance within 5 years of becoming an executive/promoted; retention of net shares required until guideline met |
| Insider trading restrictions | Executives are prohibited from pledging Qualcomm stock, hedging, and trading in derivative instruments |
| Clawback policy | Enhanced clawback effective Oct 2, 2023; applies to cash and equity incentive compensation under SEC/NASDAQ rules |
| LTIP share reserve and broad equity participation | Restated 2023 LTIP increased share reserve by ~22.95 million; equity broadly granted to ~90% of employees in FY2024 |
| Aggregate RSU activity (company‑wide) | RSUs generally vest over three years; FY2025 RSUs granted 22M; vested 20M; unrecognized expense $3.6B (company total, not Achour‑specific) |
Ownership specifics for Achour (shares owned, vested/unvested, options) are not disclosed in proxy tables; Form 4 data could not be retrieved here, but Qualcomm policy prohibits pledging/hedging, which mitigates alignment risks .
Employment Terms
| Provision | Terms (Executive Officer Plans/Agreements) |
|---|---|
| Executive Officer Severance Plan (non‑CIC) | If terminated without Cause or resigns for Good Reason: lump sum of 1.5x base salary + target bonus (2x for CEO), pro‑rata target bonus for year of termination, and COBRA premiums for severance months; prorated RSU vesting (service fraction) and PSU vesting prorated based on actual performance through fiscal year end |
| Executive Officer CIC Severance Plan | Double‑trigger: upon qualifying termination following change‑in‑control, equity accelerates; RTSR measured at period end, EPS assumed at target; no excise tax gross‑ups; benefits consistent with market practice |
| RSU vesting terms | RSUs vest annually over three years; post‑termination timing governed by grant agreements; retirement continuation vesting subject to Consulting Agreement, release conditions, and not for Cause |
| PSU vesting/settlement mechanics | Two conditions: service vesting and performance vesting; settlement occurs within 30 days after service vesting date and Committee certification; forfeiture if Cause occurs prior to issuance |
| Retirement eligibility | Earlier of age 55 with 10 years of service or “Rule of 80” (age + service = 80); retirement provisions allow continued vesting per original schedules (subject to terms) |
| Change‑in‑control—non‑assumed awards | If awards are not assumed, RSUs and PSUs vest; RTSR measured around CIC, EPS assumed at target |
Performance & Track Record
- Career progression: Systems Engineer (1993) to SVP Engineering (2006–2023) to Deputy CTO (2023–2024) to CTO (2025), reflecting sustained internal leadership within QTI’s engineering organization .
- Company compensation programs emphasize pay‑for‑performance alignment via ACIP and PSUs linked to revenue growth, operating income, EPS, and TSR, which will influence Achour’s incentive outcomes in CTO capacity .
Compensation Committee & Governance Highlights
- Independent compensation consultant (Pay Governance) supports program design and risk assessments; annual stockholder engagement on compensation .
- Historical say‑on‑pay support: >94% votes cast in favor for FY2020 program (2021 proxy) .
- Committee oversight and best practices persist in 2024/2025 programs (double‑trigger CIC, caps on ACIP/PSU payouts, robust ownership guidelines, clawbacks) .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Executive ownership guidelines (2x salary for CTO), clawbacks, and anti‑pledging/hedging policies mitigate misalignment risk and discourage leveraged collateralization—reducing red flags for hedging/pledging .
- Retention/vesting dynamics: Achour likely qualifies for retirement criteria during his tenure (age 64 and long service), which means certain RSU/PSU retirement provisions could allow continued vesting—reducing forced selling pressure around retirement events but increasing equity continuity risk if leadership transitions occur .
- Pay‑for‑performance levers: PSU structure (RTSR/EPS with strict caps and negative TSR cap) plus ACIP revenue/operating income metrics tie Achour’s realizable compensation to execution in QTI’s roadmap and broader Qualcomm financial outcomes—positive for alignment; monitoring PSU outcomes across the 3‑year windows is key for trading signals .
- Change‑in‑control economics: Double‑trigger acceleration avoids windfalls absent termination and assumes EPS at target while measuring actual RTSR—important in deal scenarios; lack of excise tax gross‑ups reduces shareholder‑unfriendly optics .
- Data gaps: Achour‑specific grant values, base salary, bonus outcomes and current share ownership are not disclosed in FY2024/FY2025 proxy tables; monitor future DEF 14A and Form 4 filings to quantify selling pressure and ownership alignment at the individual level .