Daniel Boehle
TTM TECHNOLOGIESAbout Daniel Boehle
Daniel L. Boehle, 53, is Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of TTM Technologies, Inc. (CFO since September 11, 2023; joined August 21, 2023). He serves as both Principal Financial Officer and Principal Accounting Officer. Prior roles include CFO of Aerojet Rocketdyne (2020–2023), Controller/Chief Accounting Officer at Aerojet (2017–2020), and finance leadership at Northrop Grumman; earlier career at KPMG in the U.S. and Australia. He holds a B.S. in Accounting from Loyola Marymount University, an MBA from UCLA Anderson, and is a CPA . Under Boehle’s finance leadership, TTM reported FY2024 results including approximately $2.4B revenue, cash from operations of $236.9M, 12% A&D revenue growth, and Non-GAAP EPS rising to $1.71 from $1.33, while total shareholder return (TSR) since 2020 rose to a $166 value of a fixed $100 investment in 2024 (vs $106 in 2023), reflecting improved operating performance and equity value creation .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Aerojet Rocketdyne Holdings, Inc. | CFO | Aug 2020 – Aug 2023 | Drove profitable growth; actively involved in strategic analysis culminating in Aerojet’s $4.7B sale to L3 Harris . |
| Aerojet Rocketdyne Holdings, Inc. | VP, Controller & Chief Accounting Officer | Aug 2017 – Jul 2020 | Led corporate accounting, reporting, FP&A . |
| Northrop Grumman Corporation | Finance leadership roles | Prior to 2017 | Corporate accounting, reporting, FP&A leadership . |
| KPMG LLP / KPMG Australia Ltd. | Audit/Advisory | Earlier career | Assurance and advisory foundation . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Committee/Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ducommun Incorporated (NYSE: DCO) | Director | Nov 2024 – present | Audit Committee member . |
Fixed Compensation
| Component | 2023 | 2024 | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary | $540,000 | $550,260 | Standard July review cadence . |
| Target Bonus % | 80% of eligible earnings | 80% of eligible earnings | Per offer letter (TIP plan) . |
| Actual Bonus Paid | — | $458,623 (105% of target payout) | Company certified global OI at 102.3% of target and cash flow as % of revenue at 100.9% . |
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan (FY2024)
| Metric | Weighting (CFO) | Target | Actual | Payout | Vesting/Timing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Global Operating Income | 70% | Committee-set | 102.3% of target | Contributed to 105% total payout | Cash bonus; paid Q1 FY2025 . |
| Global Cash Flow from Operations as % of Revenue | 20% | Committee-set | 100.9% of target | Contributed to 105% total payout | Cash bonus; paid Q1 FY2025 . |
| Individual Goals | 10% | Committee-set | Assessed by HCCC | Capped at 100% | Cash bonus; paid Q1 FY2025 . |
Long-Term Equity Awards (FY2024 grants)
| Award Type | Grant Date | Target Shares | Max Shares | Fair Value Basis | Vesting / Performance Design |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PRUs | 06/21/2024 | 41,772 | 83,544 | Monte Carlo for first tranche; per-share $28.45 | 3-year program; 40% Revenue, 40% EBITDA (annual tranches), plus 20% 3-year relative TSR adder (0–200% of target) . |
| RSUs | 06/21/2024 | 34,177 | — | Grant-date price $19.40 | Time-based: vest 1/3 annually over 3 years . |
Program structure emphasizes pay-for-performance with equal weighting of revenue and adjusted EBITDA each year and an additive TSR component assessed against a defined peer group (threshold 25th percentile; target 50th; max 75th+), yielding 0–200% TSR credit and total PRU payout of 0–200% of target .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Total Beneficial Ownership | 4,906 shares; less than 1% of outstanding . |
| Shares Outstanding (record date) | 101,621,163 . |
| Vested vs. Unvested as of FY2023 YE (Jan 1, 2024) | Unvested RSUs: 32,105; unearned PRUs: 12,574; market values reported per table . |
| FY2024 Equity Grants | RSUs: 34,177; PRUs (target): 41,772 . |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited by Insider Trading Policy for officers/directors (puts/calls, collars, short sales, pledging, margin accounts) . |
| Stock Ownership Guidelines | Company maintains significant stock ownership guidelines for NEOs; specific multiples referenced for CEO and direct reports (see page 45); guidelines exist for directors (5x cash retainer) . |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Terms |
|---|---|
| Employment Start | Joined TTM Aug 21, 2023; CFO effective Sep 11, 2023 . |
| Severance (Change-in-Control) | Double-trigger: if terminated without cause during/within 12 months after a change-in-control, or resigns for good reason within 12 months post-CIC → cash lump sum equal to 2×(base salary + target annual bonus at 100% target); immediate full vesting of all unvested RSUs/PRUs; 12-month non-solicitation; confidentiality obligations . |
| Equity Treatment (CIC: awards not assumed) | Immediate vesting at CIC; PRU payout equals the greater of (i) target shares or (ii) pro-forma calculation based on financial and TSR results to date plus remainder of target shares . |
| Deferred Compensation | Eligible; no FY2024 contributions or balances reported for Boehle . |
| Non-Compete | Not disclosed. |
Compensation Structure and Governance Notes
- Target market positioning: Total compensation generally targeted around the 50th percentile of comparable companies; heavy performance linkage via annual cash and multi-year equity .
- Equity mix: For NEOs, RSUs 45% and PRUs 55% (CEO: RSUs 30%, PRUs 70%) .
- Clawbacks: Company states a robust clawback policy and conducts annual compensation risk assessments .
- No gross-ups/repricing/perquisite excess: No tax gross-ups on parachutes; no option repricing without stockholder approval; no excessive perquisites .
- Say-on-Pay: 2024 advisory approval ~97.7% “For” .
- Compensation consultants: Exequity engaged; independence affirmed; additional providers for TSR computation and deferred comp administration .
Performance & Track Record (Company context under Boehle’s finance leadership)
| Metric | FY2024 Result | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue | ~$2.4B | Diversified end markets; AI/data center demand and A&D strength . |
| Cash from Operations | $236.9M | Operational execution and cost management . |
| A&D Revenue Growth | 12% YoY | Strategic focus; improved execution . |
| Non-GAAP EPS | $1.71 vs $1.33 prior year | Driven by higher revenues and improved operations . |
| TSR (value of $100 investment) | $166 (2024); prior years: $106 (2023), $101 (2022), $102 (2021), $92 (2020) | Performance improved alongside compensation actually paid and operating metrics . |
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
- Hedging/pledging prohibited for insiders; mitigates misalignment risk .
- No tax gross-ups; no option repricing; double-trigger CIC mitigates windfalls and retention risk misalignment .
- Related party transactions overseen; policies exist; no specific Boehle-related RPTs disclosed .
- Insider ownership is modest (4,906 shares, <1%); monitor future Form 4 activity for selling pressure around RSU/PRU vesting .
Compensation Peer Group (Benchmarking)
- Committee reviews compensation levels vs a defined peer group; targets around 50th percentile; TSR peer group used for PRU design (relative TSR modifier/adder) .
Performance Compensation – Detailed Program Table (Equity)
| Component | Metric | Weighting | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PRU – Financial (annual) | Revenue (FY1–FY3) | 40% total (13⅓% per year) | 60% of goal → 6⅔% credit | 100% of goal → 13⅓% credit | 120% of goal → 26⅔% credit | Conditional PRUs credited annually over 3 years . |
| PRU – Financial (annual) | Adjusted EBITDA (FY1–FY3) | 40% total (13⅓% per year) | 60% of goal → 6⅔% credit | 100% of goal → 13⅓% credit | 120% of goal → 26⅔% credit | Conditional PRUs credited annually; non-GAAP metric reconciled in Annex A . |
| PRU – TSR (3-year) | Relative TSR | 20% total | 25th percentile → 50% of TSR component | 50th percentile → 100% | 75th+ percentile → 200% | Additive component to Conditional PRUs after 3 years . |
| RSUs | Time-based vesting | — | — | — | — | Vest 1/3 per year over 3 years . |
Equity Ownership Details (as of FY2023 Year-End and FY2024 Grants)
| Category | Shares |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership (03/12/2025) | 4,906 |
| Unvested RSUs (01/01/2024) | 32,105 |
| Unearned PRUs (01/01/2024) | 12,574 |
| FY2024 RSU grant (06/21/2024) | 34,177 |
| FY2024 PRU target grant (06/21/2024) | 41,772 |
Employment Terms – Severance Economics (Illustrative)
| Trigger | Cash Multiple | Equity Treatment | Other Terms |
|---|---|---|---|
| CIC + termination without cause (during/within 12 months) or CIC + good reason (within 12 months) | 2×(base salary + target bonus at 100%) | Immediate vesting of all unvested RSUs/PRUs; PRU payout per greater-of rule if awards not assumed | 12-month non-solicitation; confidentiality . |
Investment Implications
- Strong pay-for-performance linkage: CFO’s incentives tied 70% to global operating income, 20% to cash generation efficiency, and 10% to individual goals; long-term PRUs balance growth (revenue, EBITDA) with market-relative TSR, reinforcing durable value creation .
- Retention/transaction posture: Double-trigger CIC and full equity vesting upon non-assumption support executive focus during M&A and provide competitive protection without single-trigger windfalls; 12-month non-solicit reduces transition risk .
- Alignment vs. selling pressure: Hedging/pledging bans curb misalignment and forced selling; modest personal share ownership plus sizable unvested RSU/PRU pipeline suggests future selling could occur around vesting dates but within policy limits; monitor Form 4s post-vesting .
- Governance and shareholder feedback: Robust clawback language, no gross-ups/repricing, and 97.7% Say-on-Pay support indicate investor acceptance of program design and its performance orientation .