Elizabeth Romo
TTM TECHNOLOGIESAbout Elizabeth Romo
Elizabeth Romo, 48, is TTM Technologies’ Chief Accounting Officer, appointed in February 2025. She is a CPA with a B.S. in Accounting from Loyola Marymount University and an MBA from UCLA Anderson, and brings leadership experience across internal audit, M&A, corporate strategy, and financial reporting from Public Storage, Aerojet, Northrop Grumman, Ernst & Young, and KPMG . TTMI’s executive compensation design ties variable pay to operating income and operating cash flow annually, with long-term PRUs based on equally weighted revenue and adjusted EBITDA and a three‑year TSR component—aligning incentives to financial execution and shareholder returns .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| TTM Technologies | Chief Accounting Officer | Feb 2025–Present | Finance leadership; leverages internal audit, M&A, and reporting background |
| Public Storage | Vice President, Internal Audit | Oct 2022–Jan 2025 | Led internal audit at a large REIT, strengthening controls and governance |
| Aerojet | Vice President, Corporate Strategy & Development; Senior Director, Internal Audit | Oct 2020–Sep 2022 | Strategy, development, and audit leadership in aerospace/defense |
| Northrop Grumman | Various leadership roles in M&A, internal audit, financial reporting | Prior to 2020 | Transactional and controls expertise at scale in defense |
| Ernst & Young; KPMG | Professional roles | Prior to Northrop Grumman | Big 4 experience in audit/assurance |
External Roles
- No public company board service or committee roles disclosed for Ms. Romo in TTMI’s 2025 DEF 14A .
Fixed Compensation
| Element | Romo (2024/2025) | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary | Not disclosed in DEF 14A | 2025 proxy reports NEO base salaries but does not provide CAO-specific pay |
| Target Bonus % | Not disclosed in DEF 14A | NEO severance calculations reference 125% CEO and 80% for other NEOs; CAO target not disclosed |
| Actual Bonus Paid | Not disclosed in DEF 14A | NEO payouts for 2024 ranged 97%–142% of target; role-specific outcomes not disclosed for CAO |
Program context: TTMI’s annual incentive plan allocates 90% to financial metrics (operating income and operating cash flow) and 10% to individual goals, with metric weightings varying by role (e.g., CEO/CFO 70% operating income, 20% cash flow, 10% individual) .
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan (Program Design and 2024 Outcomes)
| Metric | Typical Weighting (non-sector execs) | Target | Actual FY2024 | Payout Mechanics |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Global Operating Income | 70% (CEO/CFO example) | Committee‑set in Q1 based on budget/prior year | Achieved 102.3% of target | Payout scales 0–200% of target; threshold at 60% |
| Global Cash Flow as % of Revenue | 20% (CEO/CFO example) | Committee‑set in Q1 | Achieved 100.9% of target | Same scaling; individual goals capped at 100% |
| Individual Goals | 10% | Pre‑defined per executive | Assessed by committee | Paid only if financial thresholds met |
2024 NEO bonus payouts: CEO 105%, CFO 105%, Gridley 142%, Soder 97%, Titterton 106% of target .
Long-Term Incentive: PRUs and RSUs
| Instrument | Metric & Weighting | Vesting/Performance Period | Payout Range | Design Features |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PRUs | Revenue (50%) and Adjusted EBITDA (50%); TSR component additive (2023 awards onward) | Three‑year rolling period; annual “banking” of performance with six measurements for pre‑2023 design | 0–2.0x target shares for 2023 awards; TSR component pays 50%/100%/200% at 25th/50th/75th percentile | Thresholds: 50–60% minimum; six‑month trailing avg price mitigates timing risk |
| RSUs | Time‑based | Vests in three equal annual installments; pro‑rata vesting upon retirement/disability/death | N/A | Retention‑focused; no performance condition |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Status |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership (Romo) | Not disclosed in 2025 Security Ownership table (covers directors/NEOs) |
| Ownership guidelines | CEO: 5x salary; CEO direct reports: 3x salary, to be met within 5 years |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited for executives (no puts/calls/derivatives/shorts; no pledging as collateral) |
| Clawback | 2023 policy requires recoupment on restatements or material Code of Conduct violations (3‑year lookback for violations) |
Employment Terms
| Provision | TTMI Disclosed Terms |
|---|---|
| Employment agreement | TTMI states it does not have executive employment agreements |
| Severance structure | Executive Change in Control Severance Agreements; double‑trigger (termination without Cause or for Good Reason within 12 months of a Change in Control, or during a pending CoC) |
| Equity treatment on CoC | If awards not assumed or termination occurs within 12 months post‑CoC, unvested RSUs/PRUs vest at target; otherwise, awards continue to vest if assumed |
| Bonus basis in severance calc (NEO context) | Uses annual target bonus assumptions (CEO 125% of base; other NEOs 80% of base) in severance formulas; CAO-specific multiple not disclosed |
| Deferred compensation | Nonqualified deferred compensation plan available; no employer match; conservative design |
Investment Implications
- New appointment, limited disclosure: As CAO since Feb 2025, Romo’s specific compensation, ownership, and award detail are not disclosed in the proxy; investors should monitor upcoming filings (e.g., Form 4s, future proxies) for alignment/retention signals .
- Strong program-level alignment: TTMI’s mix of annual financial metrics (operating income and cash flow) and multi‑year PRUs (revenue, adjusted EBITDA, TSR) plus anti‑pledging and clawback policies tightly link pay to performance and reduce misalignment/hedging risks .
- Retention mechanics: Three‑year PRU design, time‑vested RSUs, and double‑trigger CoC treatment promote continuity; absence of individual employment agreements suggests standardized severance terms and mitigates windfall risks .
- Governance backdrop: 2024 say‑on‑pay approval of ~97.7% indicates broad shareholder support for the compensation framework that Romo participates in, supportive of stability and reduced pay-related headline risk .