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Laurence D. Fink

Laurence D. Fink

Chief Executive Officer at BlackRockBlackRock
CEO
Executive
Board

About Laurence D. Fink

Laurence D. Fink (age 72) is Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of BlackRock and Chair of the Board’s Executive Committee; he has served as a director since 1999 and co‑founded BlackRock in 1988 after serving as a Managing Director and member of the Management Committee at The First Boston Corporation . Under his leadership, BlackRock delivered record 2024 results: revenue +14% y/y to $20.4B, operating income (as adjusted) +23%, EPS (as adjusted) +15%, operating margin (as adjusted) +280 bps to 44.5%, and 29% TSR in 2024; 5‑year TSR was 131% through year‑end 2024 . 2024 NEO pay decisions emphasized long‑term incentives, with Mr. Fink’s Total Annual Compensation outcome of $36.7M reflecting a “Far Exceeds” performance assessment and inclusion of a new CEO Carry Incentive tied to private markets growth .

BlackRock financials context:

MetricFY 2023FY 2024
Revenues ($)17,859,000,000 *20,407,000,000 *
EBITDA ($)6,773,000,000*8,207,000,000*

Values retrieved from S&P Global.
Notes: AUM and margin metrics referenced in proxy are “as adjusted.” See company disclosures for definitions .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic impact
The First Boston CorporationManaging Director; Member, Management CommitteePrior to 1988Capital markets experience and senior leadership foundation before co‑founding BlackRock

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsNotes
Other public company directorships in past 5 years: None

Fixed Compensation

Multi‑year summary compensation (SEC SCT):

Metric ($)202220232024
Salary1,500,000 1,500,000 1,500,000
Bonus (cash)7,250,000 7,900,000 10,567,500
Stock awards (grant‑date fair value)23,250,554 16,449,974 18,150,103
All other compensation725,555 1,089,500 550,943
Total32,726,109 26,939,474 30,768,546

Notes: SCT reports equity in year granted and cash in year earned .

Performance Compensation

  • Total annual compensation structure: More than 90% of NEO pay is performance‑based and at‑risk; awards are determined using weighted performance areas (50% financial performance; 25% business strength; 25% organizational priorities). CEO awards are delivered via cash bonus, deferred equity bonus (time‑vested RSUs), BPIP (performance‑based RSUs), and CEO Carry Incentive .

2024 outcome (determined early 2025):

ComponentAmount ($)
Base salary1,500,000
Annual cash bonus10,567,500
Deferred equity bonus (RSUs)7,500,000
BPIP (performance RSUs)17,100,000
Total Annual Compensation36,667,500
  • Deferred equity (RSUs): vests one‑third annually over three years beginning Jan 31 following grant; dividends on vested RSUs are paid at vesting .
  • BPIP (BlackRock Performance Incentive Plan): 3‑year performance RSUs with payout matrix based on 3‑yr average annual Organic Revenue Growth and Operating Margin (as adjusted); 0–165% payout range .

BPIP structure and rigor:

ItemDetail
2024 BPIP performance period2025–2027
Target performance$700m 3‑yr avg. annual Organic Revenue Growth and 43.5% 3‑yr avg. Operating Margin (as adjusted) → 100% payout
Maximum performance≥$1,000m Organic Revenue Growth and ≥46.5% Operating Margin (as adjusted) → 165% payout
Recent BPIP vesting outcomes2020 BPIP: 73.2%; 2021 BPIP: 43.0% (3‑yr period ended 12/31/2024)

CEO Carry Incentive (private markets‑linked, approved Feb 2025):

  • Recurring, annually determined carried interest allocation; 100% at‑risk with multi‑year fund performance hurdles (generally >5–8% preferred return); 3‑year ratable vesting; subject to holdback and clawback .
  • 2024 allocation tied to a composite of ten “flagship‑type” funds across infrastructure, private debt, private equity, and real estate that collectively are expected to generate >$500m in advisory fees over their lives (before further organic growth and carry for BlackRock if performance is strong) .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

  • Beneficial ownership (as of March 28, 2025): 290,327 shares of common stock; percent of outstanding: under 1% (BlackRock had 155,022,282 shares outstanding). Deferred/restricted units and options vesting within 60 days: 13,359 .
  • All NEOs exceeded stock ownership guidelines as of Dec 31, 2024 .
  • Hedging/pledging prohibited: Section 16 officers and directors cannot pledge BLK shares or hedge BLK equity; margin accounts prohibited .

Outstanding equity awards (unvested) at 12/31/2024 (select CEO lines):

Grant dateAward typeUnits (#)Market value ($)
1/18/2022Deferred equity (RSUs)1,9431,991,789
1/18/2022BPIP (PRSUs)9,5099,747,771
1/17/2023Deferred equity (RSUs)3,3623,446,420
1/17/2023BPIP (PRSUs)17,50617,945,576
1/16/2024Deferred equity (RSUs)6,2596,416,163
1/16/2024BPIP (PRSUs)24,06724,671,322

Insider transactions (open‑market, 2024–2025):

Notes: Some filings include gifts and ownership updates; no pledging permitted by policy . Open‑market sales in 2024–2025 were frequent and sizable; filings do not indicate a 10b5‑1 plan for the July 2025 transactions (weighted‑average sale prices disclosed) https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2012383/000112760225019608/xslF345X03/form4.xml.

Employment Terms

  • Contracts: NEOs (including CEO) have no individual employment, severance, or change‑in‑control agreements .
  • Severance plan: If terminated by BlackRock other than for cause in conjunction with a reduction in force/position elimination, CEO would be eligible for severance of $1,557,692 (assuming 12/31/2024 termination), subject to release and 1‑year non‑solicit of clients/employees .
  • Treatment of awards upon termination/CIC:
    • RSUs (deferred equity): continue vesting; any unvested portion vests at 1‑year post‑termination (subject to non‑compete); vest at termination if within 1 year after a CIC .
    • BPIP (PRSUs): remain eligible to vest based on performance; vest at target if termination within 12 months after a CIC; unvested awards forfeited upon voluntary resignation or termination for cause .
    • CEO Carry Incentive: unvested forfeited upon involuntary termination without cause; special treatment for qualified retirement (1 year continued vesting); full acceleration for death/disability .
  • Clawbacks: Dodd‑Frank compliant recovery policy for erroneously received incentive comp; longstanding “standing” clawback for fraud/willful misconduct causing significant restatement; forfeiture for restrictive covenant breaches and “cause.” Policies extend beyond minimum requirements and explicitly cover time‑based equity .
  • Hedging/pledging: Prohibited for all employees and directors; no margin accounts; no hedges .
  • Deferred compensation: CEO participates in Voluntary Deferred Compensation Plan; 2024 aggregate earnings $4,511,156; aggregate year‑end balance $28,540,129 .

Board Governance

  • Board roles: CEO and Chairman (combined); Executive Committee Chair . Director since 1999; tenure 25 years; age 72 .
  • Combined CEO/Chair rationale and mitigants: The Board annually reviews leadership structure and has appointed a Lead Independent Director (Murry S. Gerber, serving since 2017) with significant authority (agenda approval, executive session leadership, liaison role, shareholder engagement) . Executive sessions of non‑management directors were held at every regular meeting; seven executive sessions in 2024 .
  • Independence: If all nominees are elected, ~83% of the Board are independent (15 of 18 directors) .
  • Committee memberships: Fink serves on the Executive Committee (Chair); he is not listed on Audit, MDCC, NGC, or Risk .
  • Director compensation: Employee directors (including Fink) receive no director fees or equity for Board service .

Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback

  • 2024 say‑on‑pay support: 59% (well below ~90% 10‑year average); extensive 2024 outreach to top 50 holders (~65% of shares outstanding) and >30 engagements informed program refinements .
  • Response and 2024 outcomes: Enhanced disclosure of MDCC’s use of discretion, no one‑time awards in 2024, and introduction of an annually determined CEO Carry Incentive aligned to private markets strategy; CEO 2024 Total Annual Compensation outcome $36.7M was the maximum within the determination framework and emphasized long‑term incentives .

Compensation Peer Group

  • 2024 update broadened the comparator set beyond traditional asset managers to reflect BlackRock’s scale and private markets strategy—adding leading alternative asset managers (Apollo Global Management, Blackstone, KKR), retaining a mix of independent/captive managers and technology‑oriented financial services firms; the company does not formally benchmark but reviews market data (Aon Radford McLagan) with MDCC adviser Semler Brossy (independent) .
  • BlackRock’s financial growth and TSR have outpaced NEO pay growth over the long term per company disclosure .

Risk Indicators & Red Flags

  • 2024 say‑on‑pay of 59% signals investor concern around pay decisions and/or disclosure; Board and MDCC responded with program refinements and expanded engagement .
  • Multiple large open‑market sales in 2024–2025 may create periodic selling pressure; policy bans pledging/hedging mitigate alignment risks (see transaction table above).
  • No option repricing, no dividend equivalents on unearned RSUs/options, no tax gross‑ups or supplemental pensions; minimum one‑year vesting requirement for stock‑based awards .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: High at‑risk mix with rigorous, transparent BPIP goals (0–165% payout) and a new carry‑based incentive directly linked to private markets growth supports long‑term value creation; 2021 BPIP vesting at 43% underscores downside risk when performance underwhelms .
  • Retention: No individual contracts; severance via broad plan; equity continues to vest post‑termination absent competition; new CEO Carry Incentive vests over three years and is forfeitable in many separation scenarios—factors that help retention while keeping performance risk with the executive .
  • Governance: Combined CEO/Chair role is counter‑balanced by a strong Lead Independent Director and frequent executive sessions; 83% independent Board composition .
  • Trading signals: Repeated CEO open‑market sales in 2024–2025 suggest periodic supply overhang; however, ownership guidelines, hedging/pledging prohibitions, and continued sizeable holdings temper misalignment concerns (see Form 4 citations above) .

Internet sources for Form 4s:

*Values retrieved from S&P Global.