Stephen Cohen
BlackRockAbout Stephen Cohen
Stephen Cohen, age 49, is BlackRock’s Chief Product Officer and Head of Global Product Solutions (since January 2024). He joined BlackRock in 2011 from Nomura, where he was Global Head of Equity Linked Strategy, and previously led EMEA iShares/Wealth and Index Investments, EMEA regional leadership, and global Fixed Income Indexing at BlackRock . Context for performance during his senior tenure: in 2024 BlackRock delivered record revenue (+14% YoY), as-adjusted EPS up 15%, as-adjusted operating margin of 44.5%, and $641B net inflows; since IPO, shareholder total return has compounded at ~21% annually (vs ~8% for the S&P 500) . BlackRock’s long-term incentive (BPIP) paid 43.0% of target for the 2021 grant (2022–2024 performance), reflecting rigorous pay-for-performance calibration .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| BlackRock | Chief Product Officer and Head of Global Product Solutions | 2024–present | Oversees firmwide product strategy and solutions across asset classes (senior leadership appointment) . |
| BlackRock | Head of EMEA | 2021–2024 | Led EMEA region for BlackRock, including growth and client execution . |
| BlackRock | Head of EMEA iShares & Wealth; oversaw Index Investments in EMEA | 2017–2021 | Led ETF/Index/wealth distribution and product for EMEA . |
| BlackRock | Global Head of Fixed Income Indexing | 2011–2017 | Led global fixed income indexing platform . |
| Nomura | Global Head of Equity Linked Strategy | Pre-2011–2011 | Senior markets leadership prior to joining BlackRock . |
External Roles
- No external public company board roles for Stephen Cohen are disclosed in the executive officer section of BlackRock’s 2025 proxy .
Fixed Compensation
- Stephen Cohen is not a Named Executive Officer (NEO) in the 2025 proxy; individual base salary and cash bonus amounts are not disclosed for him .
Performance Compensation
BlackRock senior executive program design (applies to NEOs and informs GEC practices; Stephen Cohen’s specific awards are not disclosed):
- Annual Total Incentive determination framework:
- Financial performance (50% weighting), Business strength/strategic objectives (25%), Organizational priorities (25%); Total Incentive outcomes range 0%–135% of prior-year total incentive for 2024 and forward .
- Long-term Performance Plan (BPIP):
- Vehicle: Performance-vested RSUs; 3-year cliff vest based on matrix of average annual Organic Revenue Growth ($) and average annual Operating Margin (as adjusted); payout range 0%–165% of target .
- Target and guardrails: 100% payout at $700mm Organic Revenue Growth and 43.5% margin; 0% at ≤$0 and ≤37.5% margin; 165% at ≥$1,000mm and ≥46.5% margin .
- Recent realized outcome: 2021 BPIP paid 43.0% of target (three-year avg Organic Revenue Growth $315mm; margin 43.0%) .
| Component | Metric | Weighting | Target/Calibration | Payout Range | Vesting/Settlement |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Annual Total Incentive | Financial performance | 50% | Assessed vs goals and peers | 0%–135% of prior-year total incentive | Annual decision; mix of cash, deferred equity, BPIP . |
| Annual Total Incentive | Business strength | 25% | Strategic objectives/KPIs | 0%–135% | As above . |
| Annual Total Incentive | Organizational priorities | 25% | Talent, culture, priorities | 0%–135% | As above . |
| BPIP (LTI) | Organic Revenue Growth (3-yr avg, $mm) AND Operating Margin (as adjusted, 3-yr avg) | Matrix (no per-metric weight) | 100% at $700mm / 43.5%; 165% at ≥$1,000mm / ≥46.5%; 0% at ≤$0 / ≤37.5% | 0%–165% of target RSUs | Vests after 3 years in shares . |
| BPIP (2021 actual) | As above | As above | $315mm / 43.0% achieved | 43.0% payout | Settled on Jan 31, 2025 . |
Other equity elements often used at BlackRock (not necessarily granted to Cohen unless separately disclosed):
- Deferred equity Bonus RSUs: typically vest one-third annually over three years; dividends accrue and are paid upon vesting .
- 2023 non-recurring performance-based stock options: granted to select senior leaders (excluding CEO/President) as part of succession planning; vesting tied to stock-price and organic revenue hurdles; not part of regular annual pay .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Alignment element | Policy/details | Implication |
|---|---|---|
| Stock ownership guidelines (GEC) | GEC members must own a target number of shares; until met, must retain 50% of net after-tax shares from vested awards; MDCC monitors compliance . | Encourages long-term skin-in-the-game. |
| Hedging/pledging | All employees (including Section 16 officers/directors) are prohibited from short selling, hedging, holding BLK in margin, or pledging BLK as collateral . | Reduces alignment and liquidity-risk red flags from pledging/hedging. |
| RSU vesting | Deferred equity Bonus RSUs vest 1/3 per year over 3 years; dividends payable on vest . | Creates predictable vest-driven supply; potential quarterly/monthly selling windows. |
| BPIP settlement | 3-year performance period; payout in shares based on matrix (0%–165%) . | Performance-gated equity reduces short-term focus. |
| Beneficial ownership disclosure | 2025 proxy lists ownership for directors/NEOs; Stephen Cohen’s individual share count not disclosed (not an NEO) . | Individual ownership data unavailable in proxy; monitor future filings for updates. |
Employment Terms
| Topic | Terms (from BlackRock programs and disclosures) |
|---|---|
| Employment agreements | No ongoing employment agreements or guaranteed compensation arrangements with NEOs (indicative of approach to top executives) . |
| Clawbacks | Dodd-Frank compliant clawback for accounting restatements; additional clawback for significant restatement due to employee actions; equity forfeiture for restrictive covenant breaches/cause . |
| Tax gross-ups | No excise tax gross-ups and no tax reimbursements for perquisites . |
| Severance plan | For eligible U.S.-based employees (including NEOs): lump sum equal to 2 weeks of salary per year of service (min 12 weeks, max 54 weeks) upon involuntary termination without cause tied to RIF/position elimination . |
| Non-solicit condition | Payouts contingent on release and non-solicit of clients/employees for one year post-termination (for amounts due on terminations other than for cause) . |
| Change-in-control (CIC) – plan posture | No automatic single-trigger vesting or transaction bonuses for NEOs; if awards not assumed by acquirer, they vest at CIC (performance-based at target); if assumed and involuntarily terminated within 12 months post-CIC, vesting as specified (e.g., RSUs vest upon termination; BPIP vests at target) . |
| Treatment of equity on termination | RSU deferred bonuses: unvested forfeited on voluntary/for-cause; continue vesting if involuntary without cause; accelerate for death; details per plan . BPIP: unvested forfeited on voluntary/for-cause; continue to be eligible to vest based on performance if involuntary without cause; for CIC-termination, vests at target; accelerated for death (subject to performance) . |
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment is strong at senior levels: 3-year BPIP with explicit financial hurdles and 0%–165% payout range, coupled with annual incentive weighting 50% on financial outcomes, ties upside to durable growth and margins; the 43% payout on the 2021 BPIP underscores rigor and downside risk to equity comp .
- Insider selling pressure: standard 1/3 per year RSU vesting and BPIP share settlements can create periodic liquidity; hedging/pledging prohibitions reduce risk of collateral-driven selling or misalignment .
- Retention risk appears mitigated by multi-year vesting, ownership retention requirements for GEC, and absence of guaranteed contracts; severance economics are modestly formulaic, and CIC features avoid single-trigger windfalls while providing reasonable protection when awards are assumed .
- Execution context: In 2024 BlackRock posted record inflows and double-digit revenue/EPS growth with margin expansion, providing favorable backdrop for product leadership roles like Cohen’s; however, individual compensation/ownership for Cohen is not disclosed, so monitoring future filings (e.g., Form 4/ownership) is advisable for trading signals .
Note: Stephen Cohen’s individual compensation and share ownership are not reported in the 2025 proxy because he is not a Named Executive Officer; analysis above relies on disclosed firmwide senior-executive program design and policies that apply across BlackRock’s leadership .
Key Supporting Tables
BPIP calibration (2024 grant design; applies to 2025–2027 performance)
| 3-yr Avg Operating Margin (as adjusted) | 3-yr Avg Annual Organic Revenue Growth ($mm) <=0 | 450 | 700 | 850 | >=1000 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| >=46.5% | 100% | 123% | 133% | 149% | 165% |
| 45.5% | 83% | 112% | 122% | 138% | 154% |
| 44.5% | 67% | 101% | 111% | 127% | 143% |
| 43.5% | 50% | 85% | 100% | 116% | 133% |
| 41.5% | 33% | 68% | 83% | 105% | 122% |
| 39.5% | 17% | 51% | 67% | 92% | 111% |
| <=37.5% | 0% | 35% | 50% | 75% | 100% |
Termination treatment summary (plan provisions)
| Award type | Voluntary resignation | For cause | Involuntary without cause | Qualified retirement/disability | Death |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RSUs (deferred equity bonus) | Forfeit | Forfeit | Continue vest per schedule; any unvested at 1-yr post-term vests; CIC termination within 1 yr vests at termination | Continue vest per schedule; 1-yr post-term vesting; non-compete conditions apply | Immediate vest/settlement . |
| BPIP RSUs | Forfeit | Forfeit | Eligible to vest post-period subject to performance; CIC termination within 12 months vests at target | Eligible to vest post-period subject to performance | Eligible to vest post-period subject to performance . |
Company performance context
| Metric (as adjusted where noted) | 2024 result |
|---|---|
| Total net inflows | $641B |
| Revenue growth YoY | +14% |
| EPS growth YoY | +15% |
| Operating margin (as adjusted) | 44.5% (+280 bps) |
| AUM (year-end) | ~$11.6T |
Investment Implications
- Strong structural alignment: Performance-gated equity over multi-year horizons, retention/ownership rules for GEC, and robust clawbacks/tax policies are favorable for shareholder alignment and reduce governance red flags like pledging or tax gross-ups .
- Watch liquidity windows: Annual RSU vesting tranches and BPIP settlements can create supply; absence of hedging/pledging dampens forced selling risk, but tracking future insider filings will improve timing insight .
- Retention outlook: Multi-year vesting and strategic scope of role (global product) suggest embedded retention levers; severance/CIC constructs avoid windfalls yet provide continuity if roles evolve through transactions .