Thomas Hellman
DEVON ENERGY CORP/DEAbout Thomas Hellman
Thomas J. Hellman is Senior Vice President, E&P Operations at Devon Energy (DVN), appointed in January 2025 with effectiveness on January 20, 2025 . He oversees drilling and completions, supply chain, EHS and measurement, and integrated subsurface functions, and holds a BSc in petroleum engineering from the University of Alberta; his age is 57 per DVN’s officer bios . Company performance context: in 2024 DVN delivered $2.9B in net earnings, $6.6B operating cash flow, $3.0B free cash flow, 737 MBOE/d production (oil 347 MBbl/d, +8% YoY), while one-/three-/five-year TSRs were −25.3%, −12.8%, and +63.4%, respectively .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Marathon Oil | VP Operations, Permian & Oklahoma | 2020–late 2024 | Led operations across NM, North Texas, Oklahoma; progressed cost and efficiency programs prior to transaction closing . |
| Marathon Oil | Region VP, Oklahoma | 2018–2020 | Regional leadership across drilling/completions and production optimization . |
| Marathon Oil | Region VP, Permian | 2017–2018 | Drove Permian execution and pace improvements . |
| WPX Energy | VP, Drilling & Completions | 2015–2017 | Directed D&C design/operations; relevant to DVN’s post-merger playbooks . |
| Apache, BP, NSI Technologies, Amoco | Technical and leadership roles | Earlier career | Built broad upstream engineering/operations skillset . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Not disclosed in DVN filings | — | — | DVN’s officer bios and appointment 8-K do not list external directorships or board roles for Hellman . |
Fixed Compensation
| Component | Terms | Effective Date |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary | $475,000 annualized | Jan 20, 2025 |
| Target Annual Bonus | 75% of base salary | Jan 20, 2025 |
| Target Long-Term Incentive (LTI) | $1,500,000 grant value target (awarded annually by Compensation Committee) | 2025 cycle |
Performance Compensation
Annual bonus scorecard (company-level program governing executive payouts). For 2024 (reference design/payout mechanics; DVN states 2025 uses substantially the same goals/weights):
| Measure | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Outcome | Weight | Score | Weighted Score |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Free Cash Flow ($MM, non-GAAP) | 1,485 | 2,235 | 3,235 | 2,943 | 25% | 171% | 42.75% |
| CROCE (%) (non-GAAP) | 21% | 31% | 41% | 36% | 25% | 147% | 36.75% |
| Total Capital Expenditures ($MM, non-GAAP) | 3,780 | 3,600 | 3,240 | 3,631 | 10% | 91% | 9.10% |
| Total Oil & Gas Production (MBOE/d) | 656 | 691 | 760 | 737 | 10% | 167% | 16.70% |
| Health & Safety (composite) | See footnote | See footnote | See footnote | See footnote | 15% | 190% | 28.50% |
| Environmental Performance (composite) | See footnote | See footnote | See footnote | See footnote | 15% | 165% | 24.75% |
| Company Performance Score | — | — | — | — | — | — | 158% (rounded) |
Notes: 2024 targets/outcomes adjusted for Grayson acquisition; detail and reconciliations in Appendix A. Health & Safety submeasures: SIF Actual Rate reduction and SIF learnings; Environmental submeasures: methane intensity reduction, detection reduction, spill rate reduction . DVN states 2025 scorecard uses the same measures/weights (FCF 25%, CROCE 25%, Capex 10%, Production 10%, H&S 15%, Environmental 15%) .
LTI program design (company-level; applies to NEOs and typically executives):
- PSUs (60% of LTI): three-year relative TSR vs peer group; payout 0–200% with negative TSR capped at 100%; Jan 1, 2024–Dec 31, 2026 period for 2024 grants; vesting at settlement per grid .
- RSAs (40% of LTI): time-based vesting, 25% per year over 4 years .
| LTI Type | Weight | Performance Metric | Performance Period | Key Payout Terms |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs | 60% | Relative TSR vs peer group | 3 years (e.g., 2024 grant: 1/1/2024–12/31/2026) | 0–200% of target; negative TSR caps at 100% |
| RSAs | 40% | Time-based | 4-year ratable vesting (25% annually) | Continuous service conditions |
Peer groups: PSU peers for 2025 include APA, ConocoPhillips, Coterra, Diamondback, EOG, Expand Energy (formerly Chesapeake), Occidental, Ovintiv, Permian Resources, S&P 500, and SPDR S&P Oil & Gas E&P ETF .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Policy/Item | Details |
|---|---|
| Stock Ownership Guidelines | Executive officers must own DVN stock at multiples of salary (CEO 6x; other Named Executive Officers 3x), with retention requirements for officers <5 years in role (hold ≥50% of net shares until compliant) . |
| Hedging/Pledging | DVN prohibits directors, officers, and employees from hedging or pledging DVN securities; prohibits short sales, buying on margin, and holding DVN in margin accounts; blackouts and preclearance apply . |
| Beneficial Ownership (Hellman) | Not individually disclosed in Security Ownership table excerpts; the officer list includes Hellman, but the enumerated ownership table does not list him by name . |
Employment Terms
| Term | Details |
|---|---|
| Appointment | Appointed SVP, E&P Operations on Jan 10, 2025; effective Jan 20, 2025 . |
| Severance Agreement | To enter into Severance Agreement materially consistent with SVP E&P Asset Management (Raines): upon termination by DVN without “cause” or resignation for “good reason,” lump sum of 2×(base salary + annual bonus), prorated bonus, and reasonable outplacement assistance; eligibility for DVN benefit plans comparable to similarly situated executives . |
| Change-in-Control | No Hellman-specific CIC terms disclosed in the 8-K; NEO Employment Agreements (distinct program) include 3× cash and specified benefit continuations and vesting provisions upon qualifying terminations post-CIC, but these NEO terms are not stated for Hellman’s Severance Agreement . |
| Clawback Policy | DVN maintains a clawback aligned to SEC/NYSE rules; recoupment of incentive compensation upon financial restatement per policy . |
Performance & Track Record
- DVN Q1 2025 call commentary highlights Hellman’s operational execution: drilling pace up +19% to plan, drill costs −15%, completion costs −8%, driving ~$600K per-well synergy, with simul-frac adoption and 100-mesh self-sourcing reducing costs; achieved ~$116/ft and 9–10 days for 3-mile Niobrara wells, supporting capital efficiency goals .
- Management emphasized business optimization and potential deflation tailwinds to maintenance capital; this context underpins Hellman’s remit in E&P operations to lower breakevens and extend inventory runway .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Executive mix emphasizes at-risk pay: DVN delivers majority of NEO total direct compensation via annual bonus and LTI tied to TSR and operating metrics; 2024 Company Performance Score yielded 158% payout factors, indicating rigorous but attainable metrics and strong operational execution .
- Program design uses relative TSR PSUs (60%) and time-based RSAs (40%) to balance performance and retention; negative TSR cap limits windfall payouts in down markets .
- Shareholder support: 2024 say‑on‑pay approval ~94%, suggesting investor alignment with DVN’s incentive architecture .
Investment Implications
- Hellman’s compensation is modest in fixed cash with high leverage to DVN’s scorecard and LTI, aligning incentives to FCF, CROCE, cost discipline, and TSR; operational datapoints (Niobrara cycle times/costs) indicate execution capability that supports bonus attainment and long‑term value creation .
- Severance at 2× base+bonus (vs. CEO/NEO 3× structure) reduces entrenchment risk relative to top-tier roles; clawback and no-pledging policies mitigate governance red flags and insider selling pressure risk .
- Absence of disclosed personal share ownership limits near-term “skin‑in‑the‑game” visibility; monitor future proxy ownership tables and Form 4 filings for accumulation/compliance against DVN guidelines, and track PSU performance cohort outcomes against the 2025 peer set .