Eddie Garcia
EBAYAbout Eddie Garcia
Eddie Garcia (age 53) served as eBay’s Senior Vice President and Chief Product Officer from April 2022 until stepping down effective May 11, 2025 (transitioning to Strategic Advisor through July 18, 2025) . He is an eBay alumnus with 20+ years of product leadership, having led commerce at Meta, served as SVP/Chief Product Officer at Sam’s Club, and held prior eBay roles in search, payments, buyer experience, and new ventures . Company performance during his 2024 compensation period: revenue $10.3B (+2%), GMV $74.7B (+2%), GAAP net income $2.0B; eBay also highlighted AI-powered listing expansion and strong ads growth ($445M Q4 ads revenue; first‑party ads +18% YoY) . Over the five-year pay-versus-performance window, a hypothetical $100 in EBAY was worth $187.04 at 12/31/2024 (company-defined TSR), with FY2024 net income shown as $1,975M and FX-neutral revenue $10,281M in the SEC-required table .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| eBay | SVP, Chief Product Officer | Apr 2022 – May 2025 | Company expanded AI-powered listing tools; strengthened ads and payments monetization during his tenure window . |
| Meta (Facebook) | Head of Commerce, Facebook mobile app; led marketplace efforts | Jun 2021 – Apr 2022 | Led commerce/marketplace initiatives for Facebook app . |
| Sam’s Club (Walmart) | SVP & Chief Product Officer; previously VP End-to-End Experience | Mar 2019 – May 2021; Apr 2017 – Mar 2019 | Led product and end-to-end experience for Sam’s Club digital business . |
| Travelzoo | SVP, Product Development | Jan 2014 – Nov 2014 | Senior product leadership . |
| eBay (earlier) | Product leadership in search, payments, buyer experience, new ventures | 2003 – 2014 | Led core buyer/search/payments experiences; new venture initiatives . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| — | — | — | No public company directorships or external board roles disclosed for Mr. Garcia in the proxy . |
Fixed Compensation
- 2024 target pay design: base salary $675,000; target annual cash incentive 75% of salary; equity target value $5.6M (60% PBRSUs / 40% RSUs) . 2024 actual annual incentive paid $732,797 (145% of target) with the company financial component certified at 123% and an upward 20% modifier applied to individual performance due to above-target company results .
Multi-year reported compensation (SEC Summary Compensation Table):
| Metric (USD) | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary | $467,308 | $675,000 | $675,000 |
| Bonus | $2,666,500 | $2,250,000 | — |
| Stock Awards (RSUs+PBRSUs, grant-date fair value) | $6,560,035 | $3,918,664 | $4,916,838 |
| Option Awards (PBSOs, grant-date fair value) | $1,030,789 | $1,232,517 | — |
| Non-Equity Incentive Plan Compensation (eIP) | $294,404 | $842,906 | $732,797 |
| All Other Compensation | $2,484 | $19,050 | $19,650 |
| Total | $11,021,520 | $8,938,137 | $6,344,285 |
Perquisites: includes 401(k) match ($13,800 cap) and security/IT support ($5,850 for Mr. Garcia in 2024) .
Performance Compensation
2024 annual cash incentive (eIP) design and outcome:
- Metrics: FX‑neutral revenue threshold; then Non‑GAAP net income (75% weight) and Individual (25%), with a Buyer CSAT “kicker” only if non‑GAAP NI at/above target .
- Company results: company financial component certified at 123% of target for all NEOs (with upward modifier to individual component); Mr. Garcia total payout 145% of target ($732,797) .
| eIP 2024 Component | Design / Weighting | Certified Result |
|---|---|---|
| FX‑neutral revenue (threshold only) | Gate to payout | Surpassed threshold . |
| Non‑GAAP net income | 75% of payout | Certified 123% of target (company component) . |
| Buyer CSAT kicker | +0–5% to company component only if NI ≥ target | Below target, not applied . |
| Individual performance | 25% (subject to company ±20% modifier) | Applied with +20% company modifier; Mr. Garcia: overall 145% of target . |
PBRSUs (three-year program; 60% of 2024 equity mix):
- Metrics and weighting per year within cycle: FX‑neutral revenue (50%) and Non‑GAAP operating margin dollars (50%), each with 0–200% scale; annual ROIC modifier ±15%; three‑year relative TSR (vs S&P 500) modifier ±15% on average annual results (cannot increase payout if TSR is negative) .
- 2022–2024 cycle payout: 112% of target (three-year average performance 107% with rTSR modifier 105%) .
- Vesting: 100% of earned shares vest in March following each three-year cycle end (e.g., 2022–2024 cycle vested March 2025) .
| PBRSU 2022–2024 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 3‑yr Modifiers | Final Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FX‑Neutral Revenue (Target/Actual) | $10.44B / $9.83B | $9.61B / $9.80B | $10.28B / $10.24B | ||
| Non‑GAAP Op. Margin $ (Target/Actual) | $3.23B / $2.94B | $2.67B / $2.77B | $2.92B / $2.89B | ||
| ROIC modifier | 27.8% vs 30.5% tgt | 27.8% vs 25.4% tgt | 31.1% vs 30.0% tgt | ||
| Annual payout | 51% | 169% | 99% | rTSR 105% | 112% |
Former Performance-Based Stock Options (PBSOs; 2022 and 2023 grants only):
- Performance goal: cumulative “Total Ads and Payments Revenue” unlocks across three years; achievement “unlocks” 25% per goal; earned options then time-vest across the period .
- 2022–2024 PBSOs: 75% earned; remaining 25% forfeited (stretch goal not achieved) .
- 2023–2025 PBSOs: 100% earned; final one‑third vests in March 2026 .
Eddie Garcia PBSO details:
- 2022 PBSO grant (May 15, 2022): exercise price $46.65; 75% earned; time vesting: 66.7% of the 2023-earned tranche vested Mar 2024 and 33.3% Mar 2025; the 2024-earned tranche vested Mar 2025; options outstanding include 49,033 exercisable and 61,290 unexercisable as of 12/31/2024 .
- 2023 PBSO grant (Apr 1, 2023): exercise price $44.37; 100% earned; time vesting: for 2023-earned tranche one‑third in each of Mar 2024/2025/2026; for 2024-earned tranche two‑thirds Mar 2025 and one‑third Mar 2026; options outstanding include 31,768 exercisable and 158,834 unexercisable as of 12/31/2024 .
| PBSO Cycle | Eddie Garcia options earned | Exercise price | Next vesting cadence |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2022–2024 | 110,323 options (75% of award) | $46.65 | Remaining portion vested Mar 2025 per schedule . |
| 2023–2025 | 190,602 options (100% of award) | $44.37 | Final one‑third vests Mar 2026 . |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Beneficial ownership: 303,968 shares (<1%); includes 237,393 options exercisable within 60 days of April 15, 2025 and 9,510 RSUs scheduled to vest within 60 days .
- Outstanding equity at 12/31/2024 (selected):
- Unvested RSUs: 16,663 (5/15/22) $1,032,273; 13,465 (5/15/22) $834,157; 31,250 (4/1/23) $1,935,938; 35,685 (4/1/24) $2,210,686 .
- PBRSUs (unearned/unvested share counts presented per SEC rules; 2022–2024 earned at 112%, 2023–2025 and 2024–2026 shown at maximum in table): 49,767; 147,223; 174,587, with market value line-items shown at $61.95, the 12/31/2024 close .
- PBSO options: 49,033 exercisable/61,290 unexercisable (2022 grant @ $46.65); 31,768 exercisable/158,834 unexercisable (2023 grant @ $44.37) .
- Ownership policy: executives must own ≥3x salary (CEO 6x); unvested RSUs count; all executives and directors were in compliance as of 12/31/2024 .
- Hedging & pledging: prohibited for directors and executive officers .
Employment Terms
- Service and transition: Garcia served as SVP, Chief Product Officer since April 2022, stepped down effective May 11, 2025, and acted as Strategic Advisor through July 18, 2025; during transition he continued base salary/benefits; severance per Standard Severance Plan (as if terminated without cause) .
- Standard Severance Plan (outside a change-in-control): for SVP-and-above, 1x salary and 1x target bonus; pro‑rated eIP; 12 months health premium payment; RSUs accelerate if vesting within 12 months; PBRSUs pro‑rated based on actual performance plus 12 months of service credit (cash in lieu may be elected by the company); PBSOs accelerate for 12 months for SVP tier; CEO/CFO have longer PBSO acceleration windows .
- Change in Control Severance Plan (double trigger): 2x salary and 2x target eIP; pro‑rated eIP; 24 months health premium payment; 100% acceleration of RSUs; PBRSUs deemed earned at target for undetermined periods; PBSOs deemed earned at greater of target or actual for completed periods; no tax gross-ups; no single-trigger CIC acceleration .
- Clawbacks: robust policy since 2014 plus Dodd‑Frank/Nasdaq compliant supplemental clawback effective Dec 1, 2023 (covers “big R” and “little r” restatements) .
- Insider trading policy: blackout/pre‑clearance; Rule 10b5‑1 compliance .
Potential payments to Eddie Garcia (illustrative, assuming termination at 12/31/2024 and using $61.95 share price for equity calculations, per proxy methodology):
| Scenario | Total (USD) |
|---|---|
| Involuntary termination outside CIC | $17,916,757 |
| Involuntary termination in connection with CIC (double trigger) | $24,410,314 |
| Death or disability | $19,222,807 |
Investment Implications
- Alignment: High proportion of at-risk, performance-based equity (PBRSUs with revenue/op margin/ROIC and rTSR modifiers) ties realized value to profitable growth and shareholder returns; 2022–2024 PBRSUs paid near target at 112%, indicating balanced performance vs goals .
- Vesting/supply dynamics: As of 12/31/2024, Mr. Garcia held sizable unvested RSUs and earned PBSOs with exercise prices of $44.37–$46.65; based on the 12/31/2024 stock price of $61.95 used in proxy valuations, these options were in-the-money, creating potential exercise/sale flow around vesting events, though his May–July 2025 transition triggered severance treatment (accelerations per plan) that may have pulled forward some supply into 2025 .
- Retention risk resolved: The April 25, 2025 announcement that Garcia would step down effective May 11, 2025 (with a brief advisory transition) removes ongoing retention risk in product leadership but increases focus on succession and continuity in product execution .
- Governance posture: Anti‑hedging/pledging, ownership requirements (3x salary), and comprehensive clawbacks reduce misalignment and mitigate risk of value-destructive behaviors; 2024 say‑on‑pay support was strong at ~86%, signaling broad shareholder acceptance of pay design .